Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-123
Tuesday
26 June 1990

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FBIS-SOV-90-123 *26 June 1990*

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Shevardnadze, Baker Comment on Berlin Meeting

LD2506183190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] [Announcer] In this bulletin we want to dwell in a little more detail on the results of the recent meeting in Berlin of the foreign ministers of six countries under the two-plus-four formula. This took place on Friday last week. I will remind you that they discussed the external aspects of the construction of Germany. Our special correspondent Andrey Sisnev followed this meeting, and I will now hand over to him.

[Sisnev] I will say right away that the meeting had a working character, and no sensations were expected from it. Some ministers arrived in Berlin on the eve of the meeting, but the talks themselves occupied less than a day although they were very intensive. There were bilateral meetings as well. One of these—between Shevardnadze and Baker—took place in the Soviet Embassy in the center of the GDR capital. I want to dwell on these.

The meeting took place on 22 June, late in the evening. The ministers' conversation dragged out considerably. Correspondents waited patiently outside the embassy building. When Shevardnadze and Baker came out to the detachment of the press, questions were ready. The Soviet minister spoke first:

[Begin Shevardnadze recording] We looked at what we have been able to implement already, and what additional impulses are needed to accelerate the process of implementing the Washington agreements. We agreed that our next meeting will be in Paris, at the same time as or after the meeting of the Six, and that before this meeting we will develop preparatory work. We will try at the meeting in Paris to discuss questions on the state of affairs at the negotiations on strategic offensive weapons and conventional weapons, and some regional problems. Maybe our meeting will turn out not to be a full-scale one, but we are nevertheless counting on it being possible to discuss and make decisions on many major problems. [end recording]

[Sisnev] Then James Baker joined in the conversation.

[Begin Baker recording in English with superimposed Russian report] I think that what the minister said is very complete and fair as regards the problem of a German settlement. We spoke about the results of the Washington summit meeting and devoted time to regional problems and also to the coming meeting of NATO countries. [end recording]

[Sisnev] A U.S. correspondent was interested in whether Soviet emigration policy was discussed at the meeting. Baker said in reply to this:

[Begin Baker recording in English with superimposed Russian translation] As I understand it, emigration from the Soviet Union will not be restricted, and we are counting on the adoption of an appropriate law by the Supreme Soviet in the near future. But Mr. Shevardnadze will probably be better able to speak on this. [end recording]

[Begin recording] [Shevardnadze] As for our practice on emigration, nothing has changed and we do not want to change it. I would like to say something else. We expect the Israeli leadership to take measures to ensure that the occupied territories are not allocated to emigres, and it is on perfectly legitimate grounds that we have insisted on this. As for the law, it was as you know adopted in its first reading and then discussed in the commissions and committees. There is a break at the moment. After that recess, I have no doubt that the law will be adopted.

[Unidentified correspondent] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, how do you feel as you leave Berlin?

[Shevardnadze] I have already said at the news conference that my feeling is one of satisfaction with the work that has been done and the useful nature of the talks we have held. I would like, in particular, to express my satisfaction with the content of my conversation with the secretary of state. It was good, and what was needed. [end recording]

[Sislev] Another question came from a representative of the U.S. press. Reports are emerging to the effect that several Soviet nuclear warheads are being withdrawn from the southern republics. Does this correspond to reality?

[Begin Shevardnadze recording] We do not have this problem. If, however, weapons are being withdrawn from somewhere, or even more so if weapons are being destroyed, we would welcome this. But there is no such movement within the country. [end recording]

[Sislev] I was interested in what the secretary of state expected from the forthcoming meeting of the Six in Paris.

[Begin Baker recording in English with superimposed Russian report] We will most probably examine a whole series of issues, and I hope that we will make progress although divergences of opinion do remain. Let me note at the same time that we have achieved a degree of success here in Berlin, too. This relates to the matter of frontiers and that of the basic principles of the content of a document on a final German settlement. [end recording]

[Sislev] Well, let us hope that in Paris the six ministers really will be able to bring their positions closer together and prepare a draft decision as quickly as possible that would be to everyone's liking and at the same time would facilitate an all-European rapprochement.

Shevardnadze Defends Arms, Alliance Policies

PM2506213190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jun 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister: "On Foreign Policy"]

[Text] The PRAVDA Editorial Office has asked me to answer the following questions:

"1. In their letters PRAVDA readers are increasingly expressing concern about our concessions to the West. What is your attitude to this?

"2. What lessons can we draw from the revolutionary events that have changed the face of the East European countries?

"3. PRAVDA readers are asking whether the Warsaw Pact Organization has any future. How will its activity be transformed under the new conditions?

"4. Do not events such as German unification and the planned inclusion of Germany in NATO call into question the successful building of the common European home? How, in your opinion, will the changes in Europe influence the Helsinki process, not least the problem of the inviolability of postwar borders?

"5. Are we not exaggerating the importance of Soviet-U.S. relations and playing down relations with the 'Third World'? What is the relationship between the resolution of global and regional problems?

"6. Can we talk about the success of the deideologization of international relations?

"7. Our country's mass media have carried criticism that our embassies sometimes spend foreign exchange—of which we have so little—to no purpose. Do you agree with that view?

"8. What changes to the Foreign Ministry would you call decisive following your arrival there?

"9. Have you started penning your memoirs?"

As you can see, the questions are varied. Most concern major questions of policy or, I would say, its basis and philosophy. Others are about details. That is why it seems to me more logical and justified to try to provide a more extensive answer to readers' main interest—whether we are acting correctly in our foreign policy or not. In choosing this subject for discussion, I am not planning to dodge any "uncomfortable" questions—I will also state my position on them, but in the "margins" of my thoughts on policy as it were.

I would like to begin with some general remarks.

In principle, in any state foreign policy more than any other sphere retains, as a rule, a high level of consistency and continuity in its goals and overall thrust. But at each stage it not only produces a different, modern reading of its mission but is also enriched by new, large-scale ideas and views and expands the professional tools at its disposal. This is a continuous process. The quality of policy is determined by the extent to which it is geared to progress, is receptive to emerging trends in social development, is realistic, and accords with the demands of the state and common civilized interests.

At the same time, foreign policy is quite an "inert" system. It is not so easy to change, and not only because dozens of departments and organizations and thousands of professional politicians, parliamentarians, diplomats, and specialists take part in its implementation. Other states' positions are also a most important factor in this area. New ideas can be put forward and any principles of new thinking can be formulated, but it will all just be empty words if there is no response or support from the international community. Any country—even the biggest and strongest—can by no means do everything. It will simply not be allowed to behave in the international arena the way it wants.

Foreign policy is viable when it is based on law, on convictions, on joint interests and goals, and on cooperation and collaboration. Strong-arm policy as a component of diplomacy or in its pure form always ultimately leads states to political bankruptcy or catastrophe. Great empires have passed away while states with essentially no armed forces flourish.

Foreign policy can only do what it can. If we go back to 1917, many people at the time complained to the foreign policy departments of Britain, France, and the United States, asking in alarm: how and why was a revolution in Russia allowed? How can we fail to remember the raucous and malicious witch-hunts in the United States against those who "lost China" in 1949? A speech in West Virginia back then initiated the charmed career of McCarthy and the black period of McCarthyism in U.S. history. McCarthy named names of State Department staffers who had weakened the United States in the struggle against world communism. Strange as it may seem, similar accusers have recently emerged in our country. You get the impression that some of them would like a zealous investigation into those who "lost East Europe."

It is a difficult and bitter experience for me to see that there are people who argue that the Soviet Army did not liberate certain European countries but virtually seized them as trophies of war. Chauvinist statements have been made demeaning the dignity of sovereign states.

I consider it my moral duty to apologize to the peoples of the Warsaw Pact states for these offensive and impermissible attacks by some of my countrymen.

We need to accept it as axiomatic that very many things cannot be resolved by diplomatic means. Just as they cannot be resolved with the use of force either. Foreign policy, like domestic policy, cannot defend deeds that are fundamentally indefensible; run counter to common human ideas of equality, freedom, people's power, or democracy; and go against the natural course of history.

Policy founded on ideology and imbued with ideology can only be meaningful if that ideology is based on the principles of goodness, fairness, humanity, and spirituality.

I needed this digression to state how the framework of a feasible, realistic, and sensible approach in foreign policy is envisioned in the context of the new political thinking.

The pendulum of public opinion, at least a certain proportion of it, is veering between two opposed views in our country: everything was good in the past, or everything was bad. I will not get into a debate on this topic. I just want to say that assessments of the past must show no less responsibility than the choice of a path for the future.

The pendulum of foreign policy does not stand still either. Periodically it swings to the right and then to the left. It can be given a push, and then its swings will be wider and more sweeping. But observe: there is a definite sector in the center where it spends most of the time. Foreign policy cannot exist outside of this constant segment of interests and goals. It existed yesterday, today it may be wider, but it has always been there.

"Does the Warsaw Pact Organization have a future?" people ask. Let's remember history. After all, it has not always existed. It appeared in 1955. I recall that NATO was set up in 1949. This means that there were times when we lived without either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Like any agreement, the Warsaw Pact is not everlasting—it was concluded for a specific period. It emerged under certain historical conditions and functioned during the long "cold war" years in an atmosphere of acute military and ideological confrontation. The problem was that our organization was unreceptive to change, was not always in step with the times, failed to modernize, and did not upgrade its military and political structures. All this, of course, could not fail to have an impact now in a fundamentally different situation.

Nonetheless, the Warsaw Pact has existed and will continue to exist for as long as it answers the real needs of its member countries. At the recent Moscow conference of the Political Consultative Committee, a declaration was adopted setting out the agreed thrusts of the profound transformation of our union; its doctrine, strategy, goals; and the organization of all its activity. A commission was set up which will elaborate the corresponding recommendations.

Both in the case of the Warsaw Pact and in the case of the "revolutionary events changing the face of the East European countries" the lesson we can draw is the same: Anything based on the free will of peoples and states is strong and viable.

What can I say to those who ask why the changes in East Europe were allowed to happen and why we agreed to withdraw our troops? The subtext to this is clearly: why did we not use tanks to "restore order?"

Can we seriously think that that is possible, that the problem can be solved that way? Have we really learned nothing; can we not remember the lessons of Afghanistan if we have already forgotten those of 1956 and 1968? Haven't we had our fill of funerals and internationalist invalids?

But articles and publications appear again and again using precisely this subtext to criticize our "East European policy." Undoubtedly, we handle some things in foreign policy not that well and some things quite badly. But if people want to engage in serious criticism it should not dwell on the question: why didn't you stop it? We would then need to agree on every last thing. And the last thing would very often lead—moral and legal aspects aside—to a sharp deterioration in relations with other countries, to conflicts, and even to war. Anyone advocating a strong-arm policy should, in my view, turn not to state organs but to those guys who go on combat patrol, to their mothers, and to the people who would find themselves dragged into a war.

It is time to realize that neither socialism, nor friendship, nor good-neighborliness, nor respect can be produced by bayonets, tanks, or blood. Relations with any country must be based on consideration for mutual interests, on mutual advantage, and on the principle of freedom of choice. That is how we have started conducting affairs and, thanks to this, gigantic changes for the better have come about in the world. Yes, there have been problems too, but it could all end in tragedy if the changes were held up.

Some people now are trying to pretend that the question of the troop withdrawal from Hungary, the CSFR, Poland, Mongolia, and the GDR was decided behind the backs of the military. That is wrong. The main parties in all talks have been our military comrades. The questions were discussed and resolved in a collegial manner.

The fact that the social aspects of the cuts were badly worked out is another matter. We forgot about servicemen as people; we forgot their needs, their families, and their children. This is a major blunder that will have to be urgently rectified.

Clearly there is a need to investigate the situation linked with the all-European process.

The CSCE Final Act was signed in 1975. Soon after I became minister I took part in events to mark the 10th anniversary of its adoption.

It was already clear back then that the Helsinki process was fading away. It was also clear that the focus of the process should be the idea of detente and the eventual surmounting of the partition of Europe, the reduction of military confrontation, and the organization of cooperation among the 35 states in the security and other spheres. This was the germ of the idea of the common European home. It was put forward by M.S. Gorbachev during his first visit to Paris in the fall of 1985. I may even say that this was a major political idea ahead of its time. It was based on foresight about changes in Europe and on the understanding that European security should be built on a collective basis.

The Final Act reinforced the principle of the inviolability of borders in Europe. It was because of this that the question of the borders of a future united Germany is no particular problem now for the four great powers, Poland, Germany, or anyone else.

Yes, the prospect of German unification shook up memories and put many people on their guard—not only in

our country. But let's try approaching this question from the other side. How long could the partition of Germany have continued? Years more, decades more, forever? How long would our soldiers have had to stand guard on the Elbe—years, decades, forever?

If we do not take account of moral factors then where is the greater risk—in maintaining the division of a great nation which will inevitably strive for reunification, or in unifying it in the context of an all-European settlement? In my view, only the second path leads to peace and stability. The question is thus about the quality and reliability of an international-law settlement which will be achieved along with the building of German unity. The problem is not that there will be one state instead of two, but that German soil should never again pose a threat to peace and that other European countries' legitimate interests be taken into account.

Right away people are worried about what will happen if Germany's planned membership of NATO takes place. Here we need to clarify a few things. First, the FRG has long been a NATO member. This means it can only be a question of increasing NATO's potential by the addition of the GDR when and if the latter becomes part of Germany. I by no means intend to say that the possible expansion of NATO does not concern us. We are by no means indifferent to Germany's future military-political status. But this question will probably be viewed differently depending on the changes which take place in Europe. These changes—and there is broad international agreement on this—will proceed in the following directions.

The building of German unity must be accompanied by a general and substantial reduction in troops and armaments in Europe—including the reduction of the German military arsenal—to the level of defense sufficiency.

At the same time, the Helsinki process will be institutionalized. As we see it, it is a question of regular summits, meetings of foreign ministers, political consultations at ambassador level, the institution of a CSCE Secretariat, and the creation of an information exchange center on activities in the military sphere along with a conflict resolution center.

We must not only transform blocs into primarily political alliances, but also agree on the definite principles of mutual relations between them and the states comprising them. The best option is to adopt a politically binding declaration on intentions vis-a-vis each other.

A very great deal will depend on the kind of decisions approved at the London NATO Council session in July. It can be said without exaggeration that the choice made there will have far-reaching consequences for both Germany and all of Europe.

Needless to say, the revision of political directives, doctrines, and strategies will take time, and its implementation will not happen immediately. That is why we need above all to agree on the transitional period during which there would not be any substantive military-strategic changes on GDR territory, and in particular during which there would be a continued presence for the contingent of Soviet troops.

I am talking about the key points of a future settlement of the external aspects of German unity. Needless to say, it will include many other elements. I am sure that within the "two-plus-four" mechanism we will be able to reach agreements that will take proper account of all sides' legitimate interests. Now I would just like to ask readers not to view the situation as one-dimensional or static. A united Germany will exist in a situation that will be significantly different—not least in military-strategic terms—from what existed yesterday or exists today.

We are also sure there will also be close economic relations between a united Germany and the USSR, and that we will be able to cooperate and collaborate in the interests of a future Europe and the world.

We are talking a great deal about stability in Europe and the world. I think we all realize how much in this area is connected with our "domestic" concerns, the state of our economy, a healthy political and spiritual atmosphere in our country, and the success of our perestroyka. A strong and stable Soviet Union is a necessary element in the European and world balance guaranteeing peace for all.

Quite honestly, I have always been surprised by the complaints that Soviet diplomacy allegedly "exaggerates the importance of Soviet-U.S. relations and plays down relations with other countries."

Relations with the United States have been and will continue to be central for us. They simply could not be otherwise. For only the United States has the potential to annihilate the USSR, and only we can respond in kind. A clash between us would be a global catastrophe. How can we fail to devote paramount attention to Soviet-U.S. relations!

It is not a whim but because we have a sense of responsibility that we conduct various talks with our U.S. partners, work out and conclude agreements and treaties, and are building really new relations with that great power. Constant dialogue, summits, and ministerial contacts are a sine qua non of the world's survival and the strengthening of international stability. They are in the interests of all countries, large and small, developed and developing.

I cannot accept the rebuke that Soviet diplomacy "forgets" about the "Third World." In recent years we have raised both the scale and the quality of our ties with the developing countries. We have established or raised the level of our diplomatic relations with around a dozen states. How many "Third World" leaders have visited Moscow during the perestroyka years! We have visited dozens of countries never before visited by such high-ranking Soviet representatives.

At the same time, we are not satisfied with our relations with the developing countries. Not so much in the

political sphere as in the economic, cultural, scientific, technical, and other spheres. We are considerably restricted in this area by the state of the Soviet economy and the structure of our foreign economic ties.

The "Third World" also means the problem of regional conflicts and the resolution of such global sore points as ecology; development strategy; financial debt; the spread of peaceful advanced technology; and prevention of the spread of technology facilitating the creation of nuclear, chemical, missile, and other weaponry. Everything in this area is interlinked, and we can cope with it all if we do not divide the world into categories but approach it as an integral whole.

I am glad to be asked if we are not "conceding" too much to the West. I am glad because I have long wanted to speak out about these complaints. I acknowledge that readers raise this question with good intentions. But I would also like to reply to those who are directly responsible for the country's security, who give the go-ahead to the options we work out at talks, and who then criticize Soviet foreign policy in the press for its "incomprehensible concessions." I would like to respond to certain articles like the one in RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA entitled "Free Cheese Is Only Found in a Mousetrap."

We have always worked on the basis that arms reduction talks are totally necessary for the country's security and for peace. I will say bluntly that we not only need limitations but we above all need them since our partners—with their strong economies, better science, healthy finances, and higher living standards—can more easily withstand an "open" arms race. That is axiomatic for me. I would not advocate relying on the maxim that "necessity is the mother of invention."

Exchanging three SS-20's for one Pershing-2 is advantageous and cheap, I would say. The Pershing could have hit our General Staff with confidence, while the SS-20's could not have reached their Pentagon. Surely the "specialists" who continue to compare the quantitative parameters of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles know that?

Sometimes complaints are made out of ignorance. The other day at the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Congress, one comrade stated that during a speech in Copenhagen I had allegedly announced the withdrawal of Soviet tactical missiles from central Europe without authorization. I was not offended because he could not have known that I was speaking on the basis of a document signed by the defense minister and the chief of the General Staff. This position was elaborated for the talks at the Soviet-U.S. summit.

I will also explain the mechanics of talks on disarmament issues. The delegations to them are staffed by the relevant departments on a parity basis. Generals, colonels, other officers, and representatives of the military industry take part in the talks. The center for coordinating positions and elaborating directives is the General Staff—I will reveal that secret. The Foreign Ministry has one seat in the group that meets there and no chance of "imposing" its opinion. The group's recommendations are submitted to the political leadership and, if necessary, reported to the country's president. I want to emphasize this because all decisions are thoroughly worked out and positions formulated on the basis of consensus.

We are supposedly in the glasnost era. Diplomats are openly criticized for their "concessions"—most usually unspecific—and for allegedly damaging the country's "security." But isn't it time to talk more openly about security too? Soviet taxpayers are entitled to know what kind of "security" they are getting for their money. In order to make an educated judgment about "concessions" people need to know the comparative features of the relevant systems, their reliability, and to have information about military programs and their cost.

We can only welcome the fact that the defense industry is helping the country to survive, to correct the economy, and is organizing the production of civilian output. But we must also talk about the problems. Why, for instance, are those who affected to strengthen the country's security by manufacturing chemical weapons and continuing to produce them when no one else in the world was doing so, now keeping quiet? Now we either have to develop the technology and spend at least 3 billion rubles to destroy these weapons, or else these toxins will turn whole regions into wasteland.

It seems that certain comrades still do not believe the state's policy is really to ensure that nuclear and chemical weapons are destroyed on a reciprocal basis, that troops and armaments are cut, and that we are guided by the principles of sufficiency and nonoffensive defense.

When people are in the know they will voice their opinions to diplomats and the military about where we should be firm and where we can compromise. I would welcome it if RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA readers told us just how much cheese can be bought with the money spent developing [sozdaniye] unnecessary, obsolete military hardware.

And I would like to reiterate that all decisions on foreign policy questions are not made by any one person inclined to compromise, but are worked out by the representatives of many departments. But, on the whole, I consider it normal that we have arguments. This will only be of benefit to the country and its defenses.

Now allow me to respond to some individual questions.

We have been trying to ensure that the diplomatic service becomes more professional, competent, bold, open, and democratic; to ensure that it accords with the demands of perestroyka and helps it. Some things have succeeded, others not quite. I cannot claim to be satisfied with what we have achieved.

As for my memoirs, I don't even have any plans in that direction. Quite honestly, I don't even have the time to think about it, although I do of course have things worth

remembering. I happened to be a minister at a most interesting time—without exaggeration, at a crucial period in world politics. I have been a witness to and often a participant in major events.

Most of all, I am glad that we succeeded in signing the Geneva agreement and getting our boys back from the war in Afghanistan without detriment to the dignity and prestige of the country, keeping Afghanistan as a friend and a good neighbor.

Yazov Interviewed on Concerns About NATO

PM2506220190 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 26 Jun 90 p 3

[Interview with "Marshal D. Yazov, member of the Presidential Council, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and USSR defense minister," by unidentified RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent; place and date unspecified: "What Concerns the Minister"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, judging by the Warsaw Pact states' declaration recently adopted at the Political Consultative Committee conference in Moscow, and the session of the Defense Ministers' Committee in Berlin, your concerns as USSR defense minister have obviously increased.

[Yazov] Your comment is accurate. I do indeed have more concerns, above all in connection with the emergence of the need to review the nature and functions of the Warsaw Pact. We are entering the transitional period mentioned by the participants in the Political Consultative Committee conference. The new situation in the world and particularly in Europe has produced new tasks linked with the galvanization of the disarmament process and the forthcoming creation of a new all-European security system. We have abandoned the confrontational elements contained in our previous documents. I would note, incidentally, that there were also many such elements in past resolutions of the NATO alliance. The changes taking place as a result of our perestroyka and the new political thinking proclaimed by the Soviet Union have not only changed our approaches to the military-political problems of the day, but are also changing us ourselves. We have long been committed to making the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces defensive, cutting our troops, and withdrawing Soviet units from the territory of allied states.

As you can see, there has been no reduction in my concerns. What do I have in mind? As I understood it from the speeches by the participants in the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee sessions, their desire to see our organization more political than military is a temporary desire until new security structures are created in Europe. And in this context the natural, and I would say worrying, question arises of what the prospects are for developing these new all-European security structures if NATO has no intention of disbanding itself and is even planning to include a united Germany in its military alliance. In my view, the logic here is out of kilter. People are trying to present attempts to strengthen NATO even more as measures to ensure stabilization in Europe—measures which will allegedly benefit the USSR and its perestroyka. It seems that, for all the fine assurances that we have been hearing from the West lately, in actual fact NATO takes little account of this concern of ours.

Yet the Defense Ministers' Committee—still fully resolved to promote a growing level of trust between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO bloc, and wanting to make relations between them nonconfrontational in order to actively participate in shaping the structures for an all-European security system—expressed the hope and stated that this goal would be promoted by expediting the practical transition toward change within NATO. If the decisions being made by that bloc to alter its activities are implemented, such steps will not only effect a strengthening of the climate of confidence on the European continent but will also be an incentive to accelerate the disarmament process.

My colleagues on the committee stressed with particular satisfaction the importance of the Soviet-U.S. summit and the accords on the reduction of strategic offensive arms and the elimination of chemical weapons. We made a positive assessment of the results of the Vienna conventional arms talks. But we need to accelerate them.

I would like to stress that a joint commission has already been set up within the Warsaw Pact framework which is to submit a proposal, by the fall, on the prospects for the continued existence of the Warsaw Pact military organization, including the Joint Staff. The international public will clearly assess this decision of ours on its merits. It will undoubtedly have a positive political aspect to it. However, I cannot agree with the idea expressed by certain conference participants that each country should defend itself. There are many contradictions in that approach, particularly compared with what we observe in NATO. After all, NATO's members are striving to strengthen that alliance and want to convince us that the presence of U.S. troops in the FRG and Britain makes the guarantee of all-European security—and, consequently, the guarantee for each individual NATO member—more reliable.

[Correspondent] Meeting with British Prime Minister M. Thatcher in Moscow recently, you drew her attention to the fact that NATO is sticking to its previous positions of forward-based defense....

[Yazov] I unfortunately received no reply from Mrs. M. Thatcher to my question about the possible restructuring of NATO and its new approaches to the changing situation in Europe. You witnessed that. What will such a NATO restructuring be like, what will its essence be, and will it be implemented? We have heard nothing on this issue. NATO, as is clear from the speech by M. Thatcher herself at the NATO Council session in Scotland, views its role in Europe as decisive.

Unfortunately I can state that, despite all the outward changes in the direction of improved relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization, certain forces in the West still adhere to the previous positions that the Soviet Union is the enemy of Western countries.

On the one hand, our Western partners are satisfied that the Warsaw Pact is being transformed into a political alliance. But, on the other, they are keeping their alliance a military-political alliance and allotting it a central role in the future. This does not add up. M. Thatcher says that political pledges and promises alone cannot safeguard security and that NATO must maintain strong defenses in the future. But they try to reassure us just with political promises.... Surely this factual state of affairs cannot fail to increase my concerns as the defense minister responsible for the USSR's national security?

NATO currently has a partial force advantage. I still cannot shake off the impression that the NATO staffs are guided by the desire to unilaterally disarm the Soviet Union.

Take the following example. The United States categorically refuses to join in the talks process on cutting its naval armaments. At the same time, it insists on the inclusion of our land-based naval aviation in the Vienna talks. This produces a strange picture, I would say. The United States and NATO are retaining around 1,500 ship-borne aircraft, half of which are carrier-based attack aircraft. And these will not be affected by any cuts since they are not part of the Vienna talks package. Yet we, in their view, should cut our land-based naval aircraft. Is that equivalent? Of course not. Or take the following fact. The United States has a 200,000-strong Marine Corps. Its equipment testifies to the offensive nature of its mission. It can be moved to any part of the world and conduct offensive operations. The size of the U.S. Marines allows the United States to create the necessary advantage in forces and materiel in any place at any time.

Here is the last point I would like to make. NATO advocates the retention of both conventional and nuclear U.S. forces in Europe. The question arises: against whom will NATO's tactical nuclear weapons be targeted? I recall that Soviet units are being withdrawn from the East European states.

The British prime minister claims that, without modernized NATO nuclear arms deployed on forward lines, that alliance's defenses would be less reliable. As you can see, people still see us as the enemy. And, insofar as I can judge, this is done deliberately despite all our practical steps to strengthen universal security not only on the European continent but in the world as a whole. That is what concerns me most of all today.

GDR's Meckel Calls for Pact-NATO Summit

PM2606080990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jun 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "A Meeting Is Necessary"]

[Text] London, 21 Jun—GDR Foreign Minister M. Meckel has proposed that another summit of Warsaw Pact and NATO states be held this summer. This meeting should help resolve the question of the military status of a future united Germany, he stated in an interview with REUTER.

In his opinion, the talks that will be held in Berlin Friday [29 June] between the foreign ministers of the FRG, the GDR, Great Britain, the USSR, the United States, and France on the "two-plus-four" formula will scarcely resolve this question. For this reason a meeting of the representatives of both blocs is necessary. It should be held even before the meeting of the heads of state and government of CSCE member countries planned for the end of the year.

Military Outlook on Unification, Role of NATO

PM2406183090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jun 90 Second Edition p 6

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov, staffer at the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center, in response to readers' letters, under the rubric "From Competent Sources": "Germany's Future: A Military Man's Viewpoint"—first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] PRAVDA readers in the USSR and abroad often write to us: we are mainly familiar with the viewpoint of Soviet politicians on the question of the future of a united Germany. But what do the professional military think on this subject? Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov, staffer at the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center, answers.

The military-political future of the new Germany is not, of course, a matter of indifference to Soviet people, who do not forget history's terrible lessons. Therefore, in connection with that country's joining the North Atlantic bloc it is necessary first of all to answer this question: what will its military role in NATO be and what will the role of the alliance itself be in a changing world?

Is it sensible to ignore the desire of certain forces in the West to retain for the North Atlantic bloc its former function as an instrument of policy from a position of strength? And how should we regard attempts to "compensate" for the weapons now being withdrawn from the territory of the FRG and other European countries under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles with other nuclear systems? In particular, I am referring to the plans being nurtured in NATO for siting on the territory of Germany and a number of other West European countries, as well as Turkey, new air-launched tactical nuclear missiles capable of reaching targets in the European part of the Soviet Union. Plans exist for using on these missiles the warheads of the medium- and shorter-range missiles now being eliminated.

One wonders: can we be indifferent to such plans and words? So if the entry of a united Germany into NATO

implies simply an expansion of the North Atlantic alliance's sphere of military activity and its increased proximity to our borders, then this solution to the question can hardly be considered acceptable.

On the other hand, when it comes to the continuation of work to overcome the division of the European continent, thought should be given to the question of bringing existing military-political institutions into line with the unifying tendencies of the all-European process. The recent session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in Moscow laid the foundations for a review of the very nature of the Warsaw Pact in line with the radical changes in Eruope. It is reasonable to expect an answering movement on the part of NATO, a movement toward a change in the alliance's military doctrine, which was born out of the cold war. In this context it would also be possible to resolve in an entirely new way the question of ensuring the security of a united Germany. For instance, to consider the idea of its belonging to the two alliances simultaneously, while they still exist. This dual membership could act as a basis for the creation of new all-European suprabloc security structures.

Thanks to the growing level of confidence between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, a real opportunity is arising today to make their relations nonconfrontational, an opportunity for active participation in the formation of the structures of an all-European security system.

If the United States and NATO accept the principle of rapprochement between the blocs in combination with the process of German unification, in the course of which there would be no change in the present commitments either of the FRG or of the GDR, and if a reform of both blocs is carried out in parallel, in an organic linkage with the Vienna and all-European process, then I think that in these circumstances there need be no objection to the new Germany's joining a renewed NATO.

Soviet Academics Discuss East European Changes

LD2506194290 Moscow TASS in English 1935 GMT 25 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Invanov]

[Text] Moscow June 25 TASS—A round-table conference was held today at the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Its topic was the causes of major political changes in East European countries. The conference attended by representatives of various Soviet academic institutes was organised by the Association of International Youth Initiatives.

Participants in the conference stressed that the developments in Eastern Europe were the result of pupular revolutions, whose essence was the struggle for the elmination of unpopular command political regimes, which had nothing in common with socialism.

Yuriy Novopashin, deputy director of the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies, believes that changes in Eastern Europe are of a truly revolutionary character, that they are "neither counterrevolution, nor a blow at the positions of socialism".

Many speakers pointed out that changes in Eastern Europe would be a factor of decisive importance for world development in the 90s.

United States & Canada

Bush Rejects Miterrand's Soviet Aid Proposal

90P50037 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 22 Jun 90 p 3

[TASS report: "There Will Not Be Aid"]

[Text] Washington, 21 Jun (TASS)— The U.S. Administration is not prepared, at least not at this time, to support the proposal of French President F. Mitterand on economic assistance to the Soviet Union, stated U.S. president G. Bush, speaking on Wednesday at a news conference in Huntsville (Alabama). However, he said, the United States has agreed to discuss this initiative at the upcoming July meeting of the heads of the seven leading countries of the West.

The president acknowledged that Western support could help the Soviet economy, but U.S. participation, in his words, involved "a number of serious difficulties." Regarding this, the head of the White House stated that it is necessary for the Soviet Union "to implement still more economic reforms."

"I tried to be very frank with Mr. Gorbachev regarding the difficulties in the area of financial support when he was here," Bush said. "I spoke with him about this in Malta. In addition, we presented him with a list of things that could be done to improve our ability to cooperate fully with him. But I do not plan any new initiatives."

U.S. Commander Urges Stronger Nuclear Deterrent

PM2106095190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "J. Chain Statement"]

[Text] New York, 19 Jun—General John Chain, U.S. Strategic Air Command commander, has made a statement calling for a strengthened U.S. nuclear potential. In a letter published by the PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER he stressed that, despite all the changes in the contemporary world, the United States as hitherto needs "powerful nuclear deterrent forces."

J. Chain thinks that the Soviet Union "as hitherto poses a massive strategic threat." Therefore, he indicates, the United States must modernize its strategic forces. Here the general proposes that special attention be paid to implementing the B-2 "Stealth" bomber development program, which, in his opinion, will become "the central element of successful nuclear deterrence in tomorrow's world."

However, this bomber will surely be the ruination of the American Treasury before becoming a reliable deterrent. While the construction of an air armada of 132 bombers was estimated at $58 billion in the eighties, the U.S. Congress General Accounting Office has now determined that in actual fact the sum exceeds $70 billion.

Cheney Argues for U.S. Military Presence Abroad

LD2606092290 Moscow TASS in English 0901 GMT 26 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Stanislav Lunev]

[Text] Washington June 26 TASS—The U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney said that despite substantial positive changes in the international situation, the United States should preserve its military presence in the territories of foreign states.

Richard Cheney was speaking on television on Monday.

He said that the current system of alliances with U.S. participation is the key element of U.S. national security. He said the United States should continue to keep U.S. troops at forward bases.

Cheney said this presence can be continued with smaller contingents of troops and at lower costs than at present, but that forward basing should still be preserved.

Besides that, the U.S. defence minister declared his opposition to deep cuts in areas of the Armed Forces that are [words indistinct] forward-based U.S. "troops in wartime. [single quotation mark as received]

He mentioned, specifically, the Fourth Division of the U.S. Army stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado, aimed at reinforcing U.S. troops stationed in Europe. He said the division's command inspects from time to time the forward bases of the division, while its units regularly participate in exercises on that territory. He said that the importance of this and other similar units of the U.S. forces might be substantially enhanced in the future.

Cheney said that U.S. forces might be reduced in the years ahead. He said that their volume will be determined by progress in reaching Soviet-American agreements on arms control, Soviet troop withdrawals from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland, the preservation in the coming five years of the positive tendencies observed over the past six to eight months.

If this happens, cuts of forward-based troops could be considered. He noted, however, that even in that case the principle of forward bases should remain.

The U.S. defence secretary also warned about the need for U.S. servicemen discharged from active service to maintain their readiness, so that this process should not have a negative effect on the country's security.

He said that excellent specialists are needed for the armed services. He said that the Armed Forces might be smaller, but that he sees no reason why they should not be of the same high quality.

Repayment of WW II Debts to U.S. To Resume

LD2106080190 Moscow World Service in English 0700 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] The Soviet Union intends to resume payments to settle its debt to the United States under the lend-lease aid agreement made during the Second World War. In a press interview the Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Links Yuriy Chumakov mentioned the first two payments, made in 1973, which were then suspended, due to the failure by the American side to comply with the principle terms of the agreement guaranteeing repayment. The debt to settle stands at $647 million. The United States is prepared to accept the Soviet proposal to repay it by the year 2030.

Deputy Minister on Lend-Lease

PM2206153590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with Yu. Chumakov, USSR deputy minister for foreign economic relations, by own correspondent F. Ivanov: "We Will Pay Our Lend-Lease Debts"—date and place unspecified; first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Reports have appeared in a number of Western publications on how, under an accord reached during the Soviet president's visit to the United States, the Soviet Union will start to pay off the debts it incurred through lend-lease: aid given to our country by the United States during the Great Patriotic War.

IZVESTIYA's correspondent asked Yu. Chumakov, a participant in the talks and USSR deputy minister for foreign economic relations, to talk about this.

[Chumakov] First of all, I must point out that Presidents Gorbachev and Bush were not the ones who reached the agreement on paying off our lend-lease debts. Talks on this subject were held when the trade agreement was being drafted, and the letters exchanged in this connection are an appendix to it. They define the terms and procedure for the repayment of our debts and map out a specific schedule.

[Ivanov] Yuriy Nikolayevich, why has the question of repaying our debts arisen only now, 45 years after the end of the war?

[Chumakov] That is not quite true. Talks were first held in this connection when the first trade agreement between our countries was being drafted in 1972, when Soviet-U.S. relations were gradually beginning to normalize. Then, as now, it was supplemented by an exchange of letters guaranteeing the repayment of these debts if the terms of the trade agreement were fulfilled: Giving our country most-favored-nation status in trade, export credits, insurance, and other guarantees. These terms were agreed in the course of fairly long negotiations. In 1973 we made the first two payments, but we stopped paying a year later because the U.S. side was not fulfilling the basic terms of the trade agreement. And now we have come back to this question again.

[Ivanov] What kind of sum are we talking about here?

[Chumakov] Our total lend-lease debt, including interest, amounted to $722 million. We repayed $48 million in 1973 and so $674 million remains to be paid. In 1972 we agreed that we would pay this money in equal amounts over the period through 2001. Naturally, this schedule has now had to be reviewed. We have proposed that the deadline for repaying the debt be the year 2030. According to preliminary data, the Americans are agreed to this. I would like to repeat, however, that the repayment of the debt depends on how the United States fulfills the terms of the new trade agreement.

Economic, Scientific Cooperation With U.S. Noted

LD2506164690 Moscow TASS in English 1359 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 25 TASS—"The scale of Soviet-American economic, scientific and commercial cooperation does not match the striving of businessmen for rapprochement and maximum increase of mutually advantageous contacts," a top Soviet manager has said. Lev Vaynberg, chairman of the board of the association of joint ventures, amalgamations and international organisations in the USSR territory, general director of the joint venture Interquadro, was speaking to TASS.

The recent Soviet-American summit was a major political event, and also created considerable prerequisites for invigoration of business between the two countries. A large number of representatives of Soviet business circles visited the United States to search for new forms of cooperation. Vaynberg was among them.

He believes the reason behind the insufficient level of business cooperation is that until recently, virtually all important deals were concluded by monopoly state structures, ministries, agencies, foreign trade associations. "It was a cumbersome mechanism and decision-making and implementation of these decisions dragged out for many months and even years. This has not promoted our image as serious partners," Vaynberg said.

Vaynberg believes that the situation is now changing. Decentralisation of state structures disrupted the centre's monopoly on foreign economic activity. Now that a transition to a market economy is being made, it is necessary to involve more participants in this activity. Meanwhile Soviet participants interact mostly with medium and small Western firms. Large corporations so far do not see in the USSR organisations and personalities they could regard as worthy partners.

"We have participated in preparing a large-scale agreement on a joint projects—culture, science, education—U.S.-USSR," Vaynberg went on. "It is aimed at large-scale

introduction of information technologies in school education, tuition of invalids and children with defects of speech, hearing and vision, as well as managers' training.

"This agreement, as well as a number of other agreements signed with the United States is not intergovernmental, does not need to be ratified and comes into force from the moment of signing. Quality up-to-date equipment will be installed in dozens of soviet schools in the new academic year as a result."

Vaynberg said that the most difficult thing is interaction between fundamentally different economic systems: the market and the command system. The functioning of joint ventures show that they are incompatible. The beginnings of market structures are simply rejected by the administrative system. This applies to the leasing, the individual labour activity, and production cooperatives.

Perestroika in the USSR opens a prospect of stability which humanity has been lacking for so long, Vaynberg believes. In present conditions the Soviet Union can really participate in the international division of labour.

China

Sino-Soviet Armed Forces Reduction Discussed

LD2606065690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0555 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Text] [no dateline as received] A meeting of a Soviet-Chinese group of diplomatic and military experts was held in Beijing 15-26 June. The Soviet section of the group is headed by G.V. Kireyev, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's directorate covering the socialist countries of Asia; the Chinese section by Liu Guangzhi [name as received] deputy head of the PRC Foreign Ministry's section covering the USSR and the countries of East Europe.

The two sides discussed matters concerning measures to implement the 24 April 1990 agreement on the guiding principles for a mutual reduction in Armed Forces and a strengthening of confidence in the military sphere in the area of the Soviet-Chinese border. Agreement was reached on starting talks on these matters in Autumn 1990 in Moscow.

Joint PRC Scientific, Technical Ties Noted

OW2406015390 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0200 GMT 9 Jun 90

[Second of a three-part interview by station commentator (Karipov) with academician Laverov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology]

[Text] Nuclear energy, space exploration, and seismic prediction are key projects of Soviet-Chinese joint research. Scholars from the two countries will develop cooperation more actively in these fields.

These are remarks by academician Laverov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, in an interview with our station commentator (Karipov). The academician also discussed cooperation in other scientific fields, adding that to broaden the foundation of such cooperation will greatly benefit both the Soviet Union and China. Details of the interview follow:

[Laverov heard speaking briefly in Russian, fading into Mandarin translation by announcer] Academician Laverov said: I would like to point out that the two countries share a particular interest in manufacturing new materials. Scholars all over the world have placed the research and development of new materials on top of the agenda. However, we have not yet reached the desired level of cooperation because materials needed for manufacturing micro computers are commercial secrets of Western energy corporations. Therefore, prospects for cooperation in this field exist between countries such as the Soviet Union and China, where the economy is owned mostly by the state. Cooperation in this field is also especially important because the study and development of new materials will be the focus of scientific and technological advances in the Soviet Union and China by the end of this century.

[Laverov again heard speaking briefly in Russian, fading into Mandarin translation by announcer] Academician Laverov continued: I would also like to emphasize the importance of cooperation in bio- engineering. The solution to food and health problems, which are very pressing to both countries, depends to a large extent on achievements in bio-engineering. At present, our scholars are pioneering a modern protein industry to benefit mankind by developing methods to extract protein from flora products and beans, including soybeans and peas. Undoubtedly both sides are interested in developing medicine based on fruits in bio-engineering research. In discussing these issues with my Chinese counterparts, I hope that close contacts will be established between us. We believe it is very important for Soviet and Chinese doctors to cooperate in finding cures for such universal diseases as hepatitis, myocarditis, and cancer.

On prospects for Soviet-Chinese scientific and technological cooperation, Laverov said: A large number of Soviet experts and professional people specializing in various fields have already visited China, while Chinese experts have also come to the Soviet Union. It is anticipated that an agreement on comprehensive cooperation will be signed during a visit to China in July by Maslyukov, chairman of the Soviet side of the USSR-PRC Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation Committee. This will be followed by my visit to China to sign more detailed plans for scientific and technological cooperation. Such plans will usher in a new stage of cooperation between our two countries. I am deeply convinced that the great economic potential of the Soviet Union and China and the emerging favorable

political situations in both countries have created tremendous possibilities for our scholars and experts to exert joint efforts to achieve more rapid advance.

China Plans To Increase Wheat Imports

OW2106134390 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 18 Jun 90

[Text] China intends to increase import of wheat to satisfy the needs of its urban and rural people for foodstuff.

Sources in Beijing said: Last year China bought 16.58 million metric tons of wheat from abroad, more than 3 million metric tons over 1980, thus setting a new record.

Though China's production increases rapidly, the population increases even faster.

Lukyanov Receives PRC Youth Delegation

LD2206032790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 21 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Comrade Lukyanov today was visited by a delegation of the All-China Youth federation which is being led by Song Defu, the first secretary of this organization. The delegation arrived in the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet All-Union Leninist Young Communist League.

Comrade Lukyanov discussed the main directions of perestroyka in the Soviet Union, especially noting the role of youth and its organizations, primarily the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, in renovative processes. He dwelt on the activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the results of the session which was recently concluded. It was emphasized that, despite a certain difference in the particularities of each country, the transformations in the USSR and PRC have much in common and are directed towards strengthening socialism.

It was noted on both sides that the developing contacts between the youth of both countries are creating a good basis for strengthening trust and mutual understanding between the peoples of the USSR and the PRC and is making a constructive contribution to the process of the comprehensive development of equal and mutually advantageous Soviet-Chinese relations. [video shows Lukyanov and entourage meeting PRC represenatives]

PRC Industrial, Trade Exhibit Opens in Moscow

OW2506223390 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0200 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Text] The China Industrial and Trade Exhibition opened in Moscow yesterday.

Present at the opening ceremony on the Soviet side were Davletova, deputy chairman of the State Planning Commission; Kachanov, first deputy minister of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and other officials; as well as representatives of social organizations.

Present at the opening ceremony on the Chinese side were Yu Hongliang, Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union; Xu Dayou, vice chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade; as well as officials of the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union.

Addressing the opening ceremony, Xu Dayou said: [passage indistinct on Xu's recorded speech]

In his speech, Kachanov, first deputy minister of foreign economic relations, pointed out the importance of holding traditional exhibitions such as this. He said: We can say that holding economic and trade exhibitions can substantially promote the development of Soviet-Chinese trade and economic cooperation. We are greatly satisfied that the trade volume of the two countries has grown 15 times during the last 10 years. The total trade volume reached 2.4 billion rubles in 1989, which was a record high. The trade volume between the two countries will continue to increase this year. Because both countries and peoples hope to develop cooperation in all fields on the basis of the principle of equality and reciprocity, our two countries' economic relations have been developing rapidly.

Kachanov expressed the belief that the exhibition will enable more Soviet and Chinese organizations eager to develop bilateral relations find their partners, hold talks on matters relevant to their economic interests, and find methods of cooperation.

After the national anthems of the two countries were played at the opening ceremony, Kachanov and Davletova cut the ribbon to open the exhibition, and the entrance of the Chinese exhibition opened.

Northeast Asia

No Tae-u Advised To Reexamine Security Status

SK2506135790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT Jun 90

[From the "Asian News" program]

[Text] Aides to ROK President No Tae-u recommended that he reexamine the (?security status) of the ROK, while preparing for future arms reductions and the reunification of the fatherland. This recommendation is included in a report to the ROK president. The [words indistinct] of the active-duty Armed Forces must be replaced with a reserve forces system. This report pointed out that the ROK's mutual alliance with the United States in the security sector must be fundamentally reexamined within (?10 years). In addition, it was stressed, it is reasonable to (?maintain) at least 20,000 U.S. troops in the ROK.

Benefits of DPRK Maritime Cooperation Discussed

SK2306101090 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 18 Jun 90

[From the "Annals of Friendship" program]

[Text] On 22 June, 30 years ago, a USSR-DPRK treaty on (?trade and navigation) was signed. The treaty has successfully overcome problems since then. Ships flying the Soviet flag are often seen at ports in People's Korea, and Korean ships are seen at Nakhodka port and [name indistinct] port in the Far East. Our station reporter asked (Igor Nikiforov), director of the External Economic Liaison Office of the Maritime Station, to talk about cooperation between the people of the Far East and their colleagues in the DPRK.

[Begin (Nikiforov) recording in Russian fading into Korean translation read by announcer] Our maritime station has successfully cooperated with the DPRK for many years. This cooperation is very beneficial to both us and the Korean side. For more than 10 years, our country's ships have been repaired at Najin port, and the cargo is transported by railroad. Using this Korean port, we promote work with our DPRK colleagues and considerably relieve their port of its handling capacity. [sentence as heard] The functionaries of the Far Eastern Maritime Office in Najin maintain close relations with the Tonghae [word indistinct], a maritime company in the DPRK, which provides us with their ships for transporting our cargo when necessary.

Part of the cargo is handled at Nampo port and Chongjin port. Last year, we began carrying cargo to DPRK ports by (?containers). For this we installed a special device there. The problem of laying [word indistinct] railroad from [word indistinct] to Najin port and of opening a first railroad is being resolved. We want the Soviet Transportation Ministry and the DPRK Railway Ministry to resolve this problem as soon as possible.

We are also planning to push ahead with a second-stage project of reclaiming Najin port. This includes digging [words indistinct] deep and building many new automated (?docks). We intend to use this Korean port in the future as well.

[Announcer] To the question concerning the possibility of founding joint ventures with the DPRK, (Igor Nikiforov), director of the External Economic Liaison Office of the Far Eastern Maritime Station, replied as follows:

[Begin (Nikiforov) recording in Russian fading into Korean translation read by announcer] We are specifically studying the plan to found a joint venture with the Tonghae [word indistinct] maritime company. If the Korean side allocates the necessary number of ships and their total tonnage satisfies us, the enterprise can be managed properly. We are also planning to set up a joint venture ship-repair enterprise. The Korean side proposed that we have our ships repaired at its (?shipyard). [Word indistinct] will not use our repair plants, but [word indistinct] can repair only [word indistinct] and mid-size ships. We can repair ships at our establishments using Korean workers.

[Announcer] (Igor Nikiforov), director of the External Economic Liaison Department of the Far Eastern Maritime Station, said, finally, that he hopes that cooperation between the Soviet Union and the DPRK will develop further on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the signing of the USSR-DPRK treaty on (?trade and navigation).

'Solidarity' Month With Korean People Celebrated

LD2506161490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0943 GMT 25 Jun 90

[By TASS political observer Sergey Afonin]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Jun (TASS)—A month of solidarity with the Korean people's struggle to have foreign troops withdrawn from South Korea and for the peaceful unification of the country on a democratic basis began today in the Soviet Union. Its opening was declared at a meeting held at Moscow's Vladimir Ilich Electromechanical Plant. Such solidarity meetings and friendship evenings are to be held in many other towns and oblasts of the Soviet Union. All these ventures, being carried out on the initiative of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries and Soviet-Korean Friendship Society, are designed to confirm the principled position of Soviet people regarding the Korean problem. [passage omitted] The demands of the Korean people are understood by and close to Soviet people. They are accurately expressed in the position of the DPRK, which has for all these years been resolutely and consistently in favor of a political solution to the Korean problem on the basis of removing the foreign military presence and of restoring the country's national unity.

Implementation of the five-point proposal of Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK [Workers Party of Korea] and president of the DPRK, would fundamentally alter the situation in the region. It is above all necessary to obtain a lessening of the tension; the signing by North and South of a nonagression declaration; the signing of a peace treaty between the DPRK and the USA; a considerable reduction in the number of the armed forces of North and South; and the withdrawal of U.S. troops and their nuclear weapons from South Korea. [passage omitted]

Obviously, the process of detente and of normalizing the situation on the Korean peninsula can only be guaranteed thanks to joint constructive efforts by both sides.

Anniversary of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Noted

LD2206211290 Moscow TASS in English 1743 GMT 22 Jun 90

[By TASS news analyst Askold Biryukova]

[Text] Moscow June 22 TASS—Washington and Tokyo are observing the 30th anniversary of the American-Japanese "security treaty" on Saturday, signed in September 1951 in San Francisco and revised in 1960.

Stressing the continuity of relations between the two countries in this sphere, the ceremony held in Washington was attended by a son-in-law of the late Nobusuke Kishi, who was Japanese prime minister when that memorable event took place, and Shintaro Abe, former foreign minister and a prominent figure in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

Naturally, participants in the ceremony stressed only those aspects of the treaty that were beneficial to each of them. For the United States the treaty became a pillar of its military strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region and provided it with a place d'armes, used on more than one occasion in military actions against Asian nations. Japan made profits running into billions of dollars on this arrangement. At the same time, the American "umbrella" over Japan, created in accordance with the treaty, enabled Japan to concentrate on economic development, permitting that country to become a leading world economic power.

New trends promoting changes in Europe reached the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, the question arose: What to do with a treaty concluded during the "cold war" period, which is based on the "enemy image" postulate? Left wing critics of the treaty believe it has become obsolete and Japan should withdraw from a military alliance with the United States.

Right-wing critics also favour Japan's withdrawal from the treaty. However, they regard it as a possibility to bring Japan's military potential into line with its economic might.

Those who favour Japan's further military buildup—it ranks third in the world by the volume of its military budget—are more influential now in Japan than those who support other forms of ensuring the security of Japan and other countries in the region. By talking about "element of instability remaining in the region" and "the lack of a clear plan to reduce tension in Asia," Tokyo officials actually side with those who favour continuing military preparations.

JSP Representative on Treaty

OW2506135190 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Recorded "views" of Kosube Uehara, Japan Socialist Party, JSP, representativw in the lower house; place and date not given—first two paragraphs are introduction by correspondent Potapov]

[Text] The revised Japan-U.S. Security Treaty came into effect 30 years ago today, on 23 June 1960. At that time, campaigns opposing the new treaty shook the whole nation of Japan. At the vanguard of the campaigns were the left-wing forces of Japan, namely the Japan Socialist Party [JSP]. Will you now please hear views of lower house Representative Kosuke Uehara of the JSP on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty?

Representative Uehara, who is serving as chairman of the JSP Policy Commission on Matters Concerning the Self-Defense Forces and the Security, said the following:

[Begin recording] The Japan-U.S. military cooperative structure which has been maintained by the Japanese Government is based on an alleged threat from the Soviet Union—an allegation that the Soviet Union, being a military superpower, poses a threat to Japan. I can understand that even now the Soviet Union is a great power with considerably large military capabilities. But it is also true that now the United States and the Soviet Union are going from a relationship of mutual dialogue to one of mutual coordination and cooperation. They are indeed heading for a relationship of partnership.

Besides, the Berlin Wall has disapppeared too. East Europe is undergoing a major change, and there are reforms going on in the Soviet Union. Should the Japanese Government, despite such a situation, continue to stick to allegations of a Soviet threat, insist on retaining the security posture and keep on building up the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces, that will not be in conformity with the international opinions and expectations of the Japanese people.

The 21st century will be a century of disarmament. During the 1990s, nations' strategies will be changed toward nuclear disarmament. We should become intimate with the Soviet Union. While solving various issues pending between Japan and the Soviet Union, I hope Japan will change the direction of its security posture too—toward disarmament.

To put it bluntly, allegations of a Soviet threat stemmed from the intentions of conservative forces wanting to maintain the security posture. It is becoming increasingly clear that building up the Self-Defense Forces has been based on a figment of the imagination that there is a threat against Japan from the Soviet Union.

Anyway, such voices alleging existence of the threat from the Soviet Union are getting weaker. I would like to think that the people are presently developing a better understanding of the situation. [end recording]

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Burma's Transfer of Political Power Discussed

BK2306161190 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Station observer commentary: "The Military's Stand After Burma's Elections"]

[Text] The Central Election Commission of the Union of Myanmar [Burma], after receiving election returns from the remote areas of the country, had issued announcements on the results of the 27 May multiparty general elections stating that out of the 485 constituencies, the National League for Democracy [NLD] had won in 396 constituencies.

The announcement by the Central Election Commission has proven true the predictions that the NLD will represent about 80 percent in the new National Assembly. Many observers have noted that the ratio of this majority would made the task of drawing a new constitution for Burma easier. If the new constitution is accepted and approved, observers point out that it could well meet the condition set by the spokesman of the State

Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC] that power will be transferred only when a strong and stable government is established.

Whatever the case may be, it is unclear how this step will be implemented. Many Western observers, especially foreign correspondents, have concluded and pointed out that the many points included in a recent speech delivered by the SLORC chairman appeared to be conditions set by the military leaders to stall for more time for the transitional period for transfer of power. The military government did not agree with the comments presented by Western magazines in recent weeks. It said everything is done according to law and that the elections were held according to the plan for holding elections as announced earlier.

The military government, which is faithfully trying to accomplish Burma's transformation to democratic rule according to their timetable, is at times said to be lacking in flexibility and eagerness. But, a Soviet expert in Moscow who specializes in Myanmar affairs pointed out to Radio Moscow that he personally feels allegations that the military leadership has some dishonest schemes to monopolize power are not true. There is only one way for the Defense Services to redeem their reputation after the results of the 27 May elections; that is to concede and accept the results and to help establish a new Assembly.

The expert also stated that only by doing this could some assurances be received from new parliamentary delegates that they will not demand enquiries on senior military officers involved in the 1988 military's activities and the activities after the military coup d'etat. Some experts in Myanmar affairs pointed out that the military wanted to fade slowly out of the political scene because it will discourage the inclination to throw rocks at the back of a running away. Perhaps that is the reason why there has been no positive response from the SLORC to demands being made by some NLD leaders to transfer the power as soon as possible.

It has been learned that NLD leaders had decided to ask the SLORC to hold discussions on the transfer of power as soon as possible. U Kyi Maung, one of the central executive committee members of the NLD, explained to reporters that discussions with the military leaders should be held with the thought of national reconciliation in mind. According to news and observations received from diplomatic sources in Yangon [Rangoon], this approach to relations between the winning parties from the elections and the military government is receiving the most support. Most observers pointed out that without the time frame set for beginning discussions to establish new organs of state power, the change from military rule to civilian rule in Myanmar is becoming smoother than was thought last month.

U.S. Aid to Cambodian Resistance Denounced

BK2306080890 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1100 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Commentary by station observer Oleg Alekseyev]

[Text] In the United States, an alliance comprising 45 antiwar organizations is arranging a movement to demand that the U.S. Government stop giving military aid to the Cambodian groups opposing the Cambodian Government. Concerning this matter, our observer Comrade Oleg Alekseyev makes the following comments:

As is generally known, the United States is currently supporting two of the three Cambodian groups opposing the Cambodian government, namely the Sihanouk and Son Sann groups. As for the Khmer Rouge, Washington does not want to have any contact with it. Therefore, U.S. military aid is given directly to the Armed Forces of the Sihanouk and Son Sann Armed Forces.

Listeners might raise this question: What does this matter when, following the Cambodian meeting in Tokyo, Sihanouk and Son Sann have already agreed to stop fighting?

As a matter of fact, this agreement has not yet caused any impact on the situation inside Cambodia. This is because the military campaign is still being launched against the armed forces of the Phnom Penh government, not only by the Khmer Rouge whose leader, Khieu Samphan, had vehemently refused to sign the Tokyo joint communique on the cease-fire, but also by the armed units under the command of Sihanouk and Son Sann.

Speaking to newsmen, a representative of the U.S. antiwar group said, among other things, that U.S. military aid is still being dispatched to the Armed Forces of Sihanouk and Son Sann. This is a factor undeniably hampering the stabilization of the situation in this country.

However, this is not the only main point. What is worse is that although the U.S. aid is meant for the Sihanouk and Son Sann groups, it has helped to strengthen the Khmer Rouge's military power. Many points along the Thai-Cambodian border which are lifelines for transporting arms aid to the Sihanouk-Son Sann armed forces are under the control of this rebel group. This is why a part of this weaponry has often been seized by Khmer Rouge soldiers. It should be noted that this event has also been reported by the press of various Southeast Asian countries.

In this respect, Washington's deeds run totally counter to its repeated announcement that the United States has always resolutely opposed the restoration of the genocidal regime in Cambodia.

Let me recall that it is the Khmer Rouge ringleaders who are directly responsible for the genocidal policy implemented in Cambodian from 1975 to 1978 during which over three million Cambodian people were killed.

This is not just an historical page, but serves as a reminder. What would happen if the Khmer Rouge lorded it over Cambodia again, as they are now wishing? our observer Comrade Oleg Alekseyev concludes.

Rogachev Receives Vietnamese Ambassador

PM2506084590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 18 June USSR Deputy Foreign Minister I.A. Rogachev received Nguyen Manh Kam, SRV ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request.

Near East & South Asia

Moscow Analyzes Effects of U.S. PLO Decision

LD2406132690 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Text] The PLO Executive Committee, responding to the U.S. decision to suspend diplomatic contacts, issued a strong statement on Thursday accusing the United States of aborting peace efforts in the Middle East. Commentary by our news analyst (Andrey Volin):

President George Bush announced on Wednesday he was suspending Washington's limited diplomatic contacts with the PLO on the grounds that the Organization failed to forcefully condemn an aborted terrorist attack against Israel last month by a radical group within the organization.

Reaction throughout the world was mixed from accusations and regrets to satisfaction and cheers. However what makes many political observers wonder is whether there had been another option. For an answer to this question let's look at how American, Palestinian, and Israeli sides view the situation.

By suspending the dialogue President Bush was apparently trying to balance political and diplomatic considerations. Politically Bush realized that without a satisfactory response from the PLO he had to take some actions before he was forced to do so by Congress. Diplomatically the President wanted to leave the impression that he was giving the PLO leader 'Arafat every chance to save the talks.

'Arafat, who for two years has sought to steer the PLO away from terrorism, this time denounced attacks against civilians in general without referring to the raid and said that the PLO had started an internal inquiry to find out if the targets were military or civilian. The PLO's representative in Washington, Hassan 'Abd al-Rahman, called the U.S. decision surprising since President Bush seemed to have accepted the PLO's statement that it did not condone the raid and was investigating it. He said he believed the U.S. Administration buckled under pressure from Israel and the main pro-Israeli lobby in Washington. Meanwhile Nabil 'Ali Sha'th, a senior advisor to Yasir 'Arafat, said that he had doubts whether the PLO would accept any action from 'Arafat that surrendered to American's bullying and blackmail. Diplomats note that 'Arafat's room for maneuvers was limited, with the PLO rank-and-file increasingly impatient with his conciliatory policies and pressing for a new guerrilla offensive. PLO officials say the form of the dialogue with the United States was seriously flawed almost since it began in December of 1988 when PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat, at a Geneva news conference, renounced terrorism and recognized Israel's right to exist. But since then the PLO leader has [words indistinct] that the dialogue has produced no substantial results. The PLO felt Washington sought only to extract concessions on behalf of Israel while offering little in return. In the end the organization decided that the probable damage to Palestinian Liberation Organization unity from bowing to new U.S. demands far outweighted the advantages of keeping the talks alive. We cannot appear to be dictated to or to be treated in this colonialist manner, said Jamil Hilal, head of the PLO Information Department in Tunis. Jamil Hilal also said that the Organization was less upset about the suspension of the dialogue itself than about the consequences it could have in a tense Middle East. We are concerned at how the Israeli cabinet will see it, he noted. Jamil Hilal didn't have long to wait for the answer.

On Thursday Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir urged the United States to permanently cut its dialogue with the PLO. Israel has long sought the U.S. break with the PLO, and not without a good reason. It will now be easier to talk with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza because the PLO will no longer be considered a partner in the peace process, said Mr Shamir's spokesman Avi Pazner. Former Defense minister Yitzhaq Rabin of the Labour Party also suggested that Shamir's right wing cabinet could use Bush's decision as a springboard for progress in peace talks in Cairo with Palestinians

However, after President Bush's suspension of the dialogue, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker warned that Israel still needed PLO consent for any dialogue with the Palestinians. Everybody recognizes that without PLO consent there won't be a dialogue for Israel. They have been seeking to develop one for 22 years since the 1967 Middle East war and none has come forward, said James Baker. Asked whether he thought any Palestinians would negotiate with Israel without PLO approval, the PLO representative in Washington Hasan 'Abd al-Rahman said there was no chance.

So the situation is in a deadlock. Israelis would like to have a separate dialogue with Palestinians from the occupied territories and on their own terms. Americans would like Israel to go along with Baker's formula which includes participation at the talks of Palestinians deported from the West bank; and Palestinians are not likely to enter any talks without the PLO's approval, and the PLO right now is an outsider because of the us decision.

As the editor of Israel-based (?CHICUN) magazine, (Michael Lerner) put it, while I detest the PLO, Bush's action is counterproductive to the interests of bringing peace to the Middle East. Unfortunately, to bring peace we need to talk with and negotiate with our enemies and not our friends.

New Israeli Government Seen To Hinder Peace

WA2506184390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jun 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major R. Mustafin under the rubric "International Commentary": "Time Going Backwards"]

[Text] In Israel after three months of sharp internal political struggle full of drama and behind-the-scenes intrigue, maneuvering and concessions, grandiose declarations and the despair of failure, a new government has been formed. Literally on the last day allotted to him, Y. Shamir, leader of the right-wing Likud bloc of parties nonetheless managed to secure the support of 62 of 120 deputies in the Knesset (Israeli parliament). This gave him the right to create a new government coalition.

The coalition consists mainly of political "hawks" from among the Likuds—people such as D. Levi and A. Sharon, heading the ministries of foreign affairs and housing construction, as well as ultra- orthodox rabbis and "rightist madmen," as assistants to Shamir have characterized several ministers of the new Israeli government. Granting concessions to such parties as "Tehiya," "Tzomet," "Moledet," and others in chasing after their votes, Shamir has driven himself into a corner and become their political hostage.

Expressing a rare unanimity in their assessments of the new Israeli government, Western and Arab observers consider it the most rightist government in the country's entire history. And in the opinion of the Israeli newspaper HADASHOT, even such a "hawk" as Shamir is going to appear to be on the left—although I believe it would hardly be possible to agree with such an assertion.

Official documents on the basic orientation of the new government's activities also testify to this. These state openly that Israel refuses, directly or indirectly, to participate in negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, and they confirm the status of Jerusalem as the sole capital of Israel. The government objects to the participation of Arab residents of East Jerusalem in elections in the occupied territories. It is going to struggle energetically against the Palestinian insurrection, using the army and other security forces to this end, and it will continue to settle the occupied territories.

Labor Party Chairman Sh. Peres has accused the new cabinet of not intending to advance the peace process. The results of a recently conducted public opinion poll also testify to the unpopularity of the government. Only 14 percent of Israelis support it. Meanwhile, the United States, Israel's main ally, announced its readiness to cooperate with the new Israeli government and declared it would remain faithful to the obligations it has assumed.

In the situation which has come about, where the creation of a new Israeli cabinet serves at least as a source of serious alarm in the Near East, the Palestine Liberation Organization has shown a restrained, well thought-out approach. Bassam Abu Sherif, adviser to Yasir 'Arafat, declared the readiness of the PLO to conduct negotiations with the Israeli government on the basis of UN resolutions which recognize the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and creation of their own independent state.

While the government crisis continues, it is as if time were standing still in the Near East. The new Israeli government and its dangerous plans might well move the clock backwards in this region to a new spiral of tension and confrontation. Even in the absence of this, the slight potential for peace whose contours vaguely appeared just three months ago is in danger of being eroded. In any case, in commenting on the composition and declared political policy of the Israeli government, Arab commentators believe this government is pushing the Near East toward a new war. This cannot help but evoke alarm in world public opinion.

Russian Orthodox Pilgrims Head for Jerusalem

LD2506164690 Moscow TASS in English 1636 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 25 TASS—A group of Russian Orthodox pilgrims flew to Athens, they will head for Jerusalem, the Holy Land.

The group includes representatives of various eparchies of the Moscow Patriarchy, priests, laymen, monks and students of church educational institutions. Such pilgrimages have become regular, TASS was told at the Moscow Patriarchy.

Histadrut, Belorussian Trade Unions Sign Accord

TA2606091290 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 26 Jun 90 p 12

[Staff report]

[Text] The Histadrut Trade Union Federation and the Trade Union Council of the Soviet Republic of Belorussia signed a cooperation agreement on social, economic, and health matters in Minsk yesterday, the Histadrut spokesman announced. The agreement also calls for the normalization of relations between Israel and Belorussia.

The signatories were Histadrut Secretary-General MK [Knesset Member] Yisra'el Qeysar and his Belorussian counterpart, Vladimir Goncherik [name as published], a member of the Supreme Soviet.

The agreement calls for joint symposia and the exchange of information on environmental issues and the role of unions in education and culture.

In matters of health, the agreement calls for aiding those affected by the Chernobyl disaster, which includes about 20 per cent of all Belorussians—two million people.

Qeysar also invited a Belorussian delegation to Israel as guests of the Histadrut.

Quake Relief Efforts to Iran 'Know No Borders'

NC2606094090 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1700 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] Dear friends, reports received from Iran these days are extremely sad. Natural disasters are continuing there and after the first quake early Thursday morning, another quake took place on Sunday which led to more casualties, destruction, and tragedies for the Iranian nation. More than 50,000 people have been killed so far. This is the number of bodies that have been found. More than 100,000 have been wounded and about 500,000 are homeless. The S.O.S. signal from Tehran is reaching the ears of everyone, and this request is not going unanswered, thanks to human respect. Our analyst Yuriy Solton writes:

Sympathies know no borders and can surpass the limits of enmity and hostility—hostility created by statesmen who sometimes carry out futile efforts to overcome it. I was not surprised that an American plane was among the planes that landed at Tehran Airport on Sunday. This was the first plane to land there since the 1980 crisis between the two countries after the American diplomats were taken hostage in Tehran.

The leadership of Iraq, which was at war with Iran for eight years, has also expressed its condolences and has stated its readiness to help. Other countries, whose relations with Iran are not at all friendly, have also followed suit. Help is arriving in Iran from nearly every continent, and even from Mexico, which was itself a victim of a quake five years ago. Help is coming from China, Japan, France, Britain, and other countries. Can all the countries that are helping be listed? And is it necessary to list them? A true humanitarian does not seek fame.

I would only like to point out that the Soviet people also understand the Iranians' tragedy well. The memory of the destructive quake in Armenia is still alive and today, one and a half years later, its consequences have not yet been overcome. At that time, the Armenian nation fully felt the sympathies and support of millions of people from various countries.

Today, Soviet assistance is reaching Iran. Among this assistance is the dispatch of a large group of doctors and relief workers who are working next to specialists from other countries. Reports state that after seeing the operation by the foreign relief workers, one of Iran's religious leaders said with tears in his eyes: We in Iran did not know that we have so many friends. He added: Maybe after this horrific incident we can revive our old relations, which were severed, with other nations.

Yuriy Solton writes in conclusion: This may happen. Every tragedy has two faces. One is the tragic face, and the other is the face that reminds: You are not alone in the world.

East Europe

GDR Police Kill Soldier Holding Hostages

LD2606103390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0910 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Mikhail Voronenkov]

[Text] Berlin, 26 Jun (TASS)—On the evening of 25 June near the town of Burg (Magdeburg district) a man was killed in a shoot-out with a sub-unit of the People's Police. A rifle and more than 800 cartridges were found on him.

ADN has reported that the unidentified man was thought to be a representative of the Western Group of Forces. He attempted to escape in a car, taking a couple and their two children hostage.

In the shoot-out the criminal wounded two policemen. The hostages were unharmed.

The TASS correspondent was told at the USSR Ministry of Defense that the dead man was Soviet serviceman S. Suvorov. While company duty officer, he left the site of his military unit at 1800 of his own accord taking with him a gun and ammunition. At 2200, the runaway was found and surrounded. He wounded one policeman in the shoot-out and was killed. The weapon and ammunition are in the hands of the GDR criminal police and an investigation is under way.

GDR's Gysi Interviewed on German Unification

OW2206150390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Interview with Gregor Gysi, chairman of the Party of Democratic Socialism of the GDR, by unidentified correspondent; place not given; from the "120 Minutes" program—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Herr Gysi, the unification of Germany is unavoidable. It is a settled issue. Thus, the Germans' desire for unification is being realized. What do you feel? Are you happy?

[Gysi] I don't know if you can link such an event with happiness or unhappiness. It depends on what kind of Germany is created, by which path and by what means unification occurs; in a way which considers the security interests of neighboring countries, including the Soviet Union, or in such a way that in the future Germany becomes a dominant power economically and militarily. It is important what kind of face the new Germany has. That is what the struggle is about. And so, when I can answer all of these questions unambiguously, it will be easier for me to answer your question about happiness.

[Correspondent] Your party is called the Party of Democratic Socialism. What is democratic socialism, and do you think the idea of socialism is still viable?

[Gysi] You have to consider capitalism when answering that question. As far as Stalinist and post-Stalinist

socialism are concerned, then that model in my view is not a well-founded one. Furthermore, I never considered that socialism. But the capitalist system does not resolve universal human problems—not in the areas of ecology, the equality of men and women, or social justice. I think you can say capitalism's achievements are weak in the area of disarmament. The issue should be universal human interests. It was with this in mind that we came to realize the necessity of creating a new structure: democratic socialism. This involves the loftiest measures of democracy and a rule-of-law state and the loftiest measures of humanism in cultural relations; that is, deep mutual understanding between various nations and the elimination of xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and everything negative.

[Correspondent] You are drawing an idyllic picture, a picture which has never been realized.

[Gysi] Of course it is an idyllic picture. To have social progress, you have to have your version of utopia before you or an ideal toward which you strive. I know that ideal will never be reached, but it should serve as a reference point. In my view, the socialist is always a bit of a dreamer, but at the same time a realistic, sober politician.

[Correspondent] You had discussions with the CPSU. Who in the Soviet Union do you consider your allies aside from the CPSU?

[Gysi] I know there are various groups, ideas, and movements here. If any of them are interested in contacts with us, and if we judge them to be leftist or at least democratic forces, we are interested in dialogue with them.

[Correspondent] The last question, Mr. Gysi: What do you want for yourself?

[Gysi] Well, first of all I wish myself the very best [word instinct]. I hope very much that the European process moves in the direction of more stability and security rather than the reverse. The Germans have a special historical responsibility after two world wars in this century. The new Germany should be a fully democratic and law-governed state. We have to remember that history repeats itself. However, there is the hope that in the new Germany we can incorporate all of the richness of the movement—the movement for ecology and social justice so that Germany doesn't become expansionist. However, I must say that that danger is a real one.

*Prunskiene Visit to Poland Reported

90P50036 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 23 Jun 90 p 3

[TASS report: "Visit to Poland"]

[Text] Warsaw, 22. [TASS] Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers Chairman K. Prunskiene arrived in Poland on Thursday [21 June] for a one-day working visit. At the airport she expressed the desire to maintain good-neighborly relations with Poland. According to her, currently the most important issue in bilateral relations is strengthening political and economic contacts.

The ZYCIE WARSZAWY newspaper notes that the visit of the head of the Lithuanian government was not planned earlier. It took place at the initiative of K. Prunskiene and is of a working nature.

According to a report from the Polish government press bureau, questions of the current political and economic situation of Lithuanian were touched on in a conversation with T. Mazowieczki. Problems of bilateral relations and the Polish minority in Lithuania were also discussed.

In her conversation with journalists, K. Prunskiene spoke in favor of a moratorium on Lithuania's declaration of independence during negotiations with Moscow. In her words, this does not mean a change in the given document. If negotiations are broken off, the moratorium will also cease.

'Bilateral Relations' Discussed

PM2606104790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Dispatch by IZVESTIYA correspondent L. Toporkov: "En Route From Greece"]

[Text] Warsaw—After concluding her visit to Greece, Lithuanian Prime Minister K. Prunskiene stopped off in Warsaw on her way home. Here she met and spoke with Prime Minister T. Mazowiecki and Polish Foreign Minister K. Skubiszewski.

The main theme of the talks was the development of bilateral relations, with particular stress on economic relations. The current political and economic situation in Lithuania was discussed, along with the expectations which must become reality in connection with the upcoming talks with Moscow. Prunskiene expressed the hope that cooperation between Lithuania and Poland would be arranged in the name of overcoming the "Soviet blockade."

The Polish leaders—the guest said at a news conference—expressed regret that assistance from them is impossible without Moscow's agreement, particularly with respect to organizing the transit of petroleum and fuel supplies from Poland. We agreed, she noted, that it is time to start trilateral talks. It is clear to us, she continued, that other countries, including Poland, cannot forgo their own interests to support Lithuania. But the Polish Government and Parliament are amicably disposed toward us.

The tone of Prunskiene's statements was calm and they were essentially devoid of any harsh or sharply confrontational features. Deputy Prime Minister R. Ozolas, who was accompanying her, turned out to be more talkative. Answering a TRYBUNA correspondent's question about whether the Lithuanian side has a chance to conclude talks with the current Kremlin leadership,

Ozolas answered that it does. However, he noted, if changes do take place in Moscow this would not be bad for Lithuania—and not only for Lithuania. And the prospect for changes is, in his opinion, a very real one. In the final analysis, the guest said, the presidential post was created so that Gorbachev could have the opportunity of remaining in it if he ceases to be general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Summing up her brief visit to Poland, Prunskiene said that it has marked the beginning of future cooperation between the two countries. She also noted that for the time being it is impossible to establish diplomatic relations between Lithuania and Poland.

Yeltsin Receives Polish Sejm Delegation

PM2506105190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Single Edition p 12

[Report by unidentified TASS correspondent: "Conversation With Delegation"]

[Text] RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Chairman B.N. Yeltsin was able to allot only one hour, during a break between sittings, to converse with a Polish Sejm delegation headed by Sejm Marshal M. Kozakiewicz. He told the Polish colleagues about the work of the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies and republican Supreme Soviet session and shared his thoughts on ways of achieving Russian sovereignty and on the program for the switch to market relations. Concerning the turbulent Congress proceedings, the leader of the Russian parliament noted that pluralism is undoubtedly better than unanimity. It teaches us to work in a coalition and to consider the interests of numerous groups.

Profound changes in the social and economic structure inevitably give rise to impatience among the people. This is a problem for politicians both in Poland and in Russia. It was the interlocutors' belief that the state should exist for people and not the other way round—this is the direction of the changes in both countries.

'Purge' of 'Reds' in Poland Deplored

PM2506115990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Correspondent L. Toporkov report: "That Forgotten Word 'Purge'—Driving 'Reds' Out of Polish State Institutions"]

[Text] Warsaw—A special commission set up by Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski is carrying out a major overhaul of that department's cadres and its diplomatic subdivisions. The commission is headed by Deputy Minister Makarczyk. A considerable number of Polish Embassy workers abroad will be recalled. Thirty-eight envoys have already returned home.

Order is being instilled, as they say here, in the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The announcement of changes affecting the military is being called a "cadre earthquake." Before the end of the year 6,000 officers are to be discharged from the Polish Army. Some 40 generals will be dispatched to civilian life and another 12 will retire next year. Some 700 colonels and lieutenant colonels will leave the Army.

Since the beginning of the year about 190 top officials have been dismissed from the Internal Affairs Ministry. As GAZETA WYBORCZA writes, they are primarily those who "symbolize martial law and other dark aspects of the ministry's activity in past years." The security service has been reduced to utter ruins: many thousands of functionaries, headed by security chief Karpacz—who incidentally is a deputy in the Sejm—have been ousted.

When the new authorities were still taking their first steps it was often said that the main criteria for judging a specialist would be professional qualities, intelligence, talent, and experience. Now the newspapers are writing something quite different and in parliament it is often said that there is no room for "Reds" in state institutions.

Even among themselves, Solidarity figures react nervously and jealously to the election to a leading post of someone who does not figure in the new nomenklatura. For example, a noisy conflict erupted between Senator A. Tokarczuk, chairman of the Citizens Committee in Bydgoszcz, and J. Rulewski, chairman of the regional Solidarity board. A candidate from the Solidarity public list rather than the Citizens Committee was elected chairman of the city council there (by secret ballot). Rulewski was immediately accused of "plotting and betraying Solidarity's interests." He, in turn, responded sharply to the Citizens Committee chairman. The Citizens Committee was venomously dubbed a "voivodship committee."

"We workers of the Arkady Fiedler No. 16 School in Torun protest the dismissal of our director. How inhuman it is when the main consideration is that he was a member of the Polish United Workers Party rather than the fact that he is an excellent teacher with many years' experience and a truthful man whom we all trust and who was just 3 years from retirement."

The letter appeared in the newspaper. There were 40 signatures.

Sadly, the half-forgotten word "purge," which dates back to a different era, is reentering the Polish vocabulary. When one hears it, this word merely compromises the process of democratization and the creation of a law-governed state which is being accomplished in this country.

Baltic Fleet Ships Conclude Visit to Poland

LD2406161890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1508 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Text] Warsaw, 23 June (TASS)—TASS correspondent Mikhail Malchun reports: A solemn farewell ceremony brought to an end the official friendly visit by a detachment of Soviet warships under the flag of Rear-Admiral Ye. A. Chebanov, deputy commander of the Baltic Fleet,

in Szczecin today. The Soviet sailors took part in the sea festival, traditionally held here, at the invitation of Army General F. Siwicki, minister of national defense of the Republic of Poland.

The day before their departure, the detachment's command laid wreaths at the central cemetery in Szczecin at the memorials to brotherhood in arms, the liberators of the town, and those lost at sea.

The patrol escort "Neukrotimiy" and a large amphibious warfare ship have now set course for their native shores.

Results of Bulgarian Assembly Election Viewed

PM2206110590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Kapralov: "When Results Were Summed Up"]

[Text] Sofia—The elections to Bulgaria's Grand National Assembly have ended. The seats in parliament are distributed as follows: 211 seats for the Bulgarian Socialist Party, 144 for the Union of Democratic Forces, 23 for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, and 16 for the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union.

The elections began 10 June—exactly seven months after the historic Bulgarian Communist Party Plenum which put an end to T. Zhivkov's regime. At the time Petr Mladenov, the new Central Committee general secretary and now Bulgarian president, promised that glasnost and democracy would exist not verbally but in reality and that man would be placed at the center of attention of party and state policy. All questions guaranteeing the freedom of the individual and pluralism of opinion would be resolved by legislative means, it was said at the time.

These promises have been fulfilled. The result is that a credit of trust in the party has been received from the people.

The elections ended 17 June. Exactly seven months after the historic 18 November meeting on Aleksandr Nevskiy square. At the time representatives of the opposition comprising the nucleus of the Union of Democratic Forces proposed a resolution on the elimination of the consequences of Zhivkov's regime and democratization in the country. It was read out by Zhelyu Zhelev, the future leader of the Union of Democratic Forces: Cadre changes to be continued at all levels, social protection for the badly off, freedom of speech and of the press, and real pluralism to be ensured, and articles of the law contradicting human rights to be repealed.

Today it may confidently be said that these demands have been met and the people who stood that day on the steps of Aleksandr Nevskiy castle have gained the parliamentary rostrum.

In the past months I cannot recall an instance of an attempt to shut anyone's mouth in Bulgaria, of anyone being persecuted for their convictions, being called to order for a bold item in the press, or being prevented from gathering for a meeting. The newspaper pages have become accessible to representatives of all parties and movements and many of them, not without government aid, now have their own publications and premises and have received funds for the election campaign.

If the ruling party had not begun renewal with itself, today the election results would have been different. It is possible to argue over the pace of this renewal, particularly locally, but it is a fact that 90 percent of the central apparatus and 60 percent of the local apparatus consists of new people and most important they are the bearers of new ideas and a new style of leadership.

The desire of today's party and state leaders is not to decide for the people but to decide with the people, including the opposition, all fundamental questions. The party has proceeded with the people, not so much urged on by the opposition as overtaking it in its ventures.

The most difficult question to be resolved now is the creation of a new government. Irrespective of the election results, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, which does not have a tested majority in parliament, has suggested forming a government on a broad coalition basis. But the opposition in the shape of the Union of Democratic Forces which, according to Z. Zhelev, will remain united until the end of the work of the Grand National Assembly, categorically refuses to take part in the government together with the socialists. The Bulgarian National Agrarian Union is not opposed to coalition, but it must not be on a two-party basis.

The opposition hopes that in the near future the correlation of political forces in the country will change in its favor, which may be manifested at the elections to the local organs of power. Its leaders are already inspired by the victory at the elections in Sofia, Varna, Plovdiv, and Gabrovo. At the same time the leaders of the Union of Democratic Forces admit that the tasks of Bulgaria's emergence from the grave economic crisis must be above the interests of the political struggle.

USSR Ready To Improve Relations With Albania

LD2606090490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0800 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Report by TASS Correspondent Georg Mikhaylin]

[Text] Moscow, 26 June—(TASS)—The Soviet Union is prepared to renew and develop friendly relations with Albania, Oleg Voronkov, deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Socialist Countries of Europe Administration, stated in conversation with a TASS correspondent.

The recent statement by Ramiz Alia, chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of Albania, on that country's interest in restoring diplomatic relations with the USSR and the USA has found an adequate response in the Soviet Union and has been evaluated by its leadership as an important and positive step in the direction of normalizing

Soviet-Albanian relations, the spokesman for the Soviet foreign policy department reported.

A retrospective analysis shows that at the basis of the complications in bilateral relations was a tight knot of ideological and state interests, and as a result a transferral of the differences in ideology to inter-state links. In the past differing conditions for the development of socialist countries and their specific characteristics were not taken into account in the way they should have been. For this reason even insignificant differences in their ideological conceptions and priorities of state construction caused the most serious friction in their relations, Oleg Voronkov noted.

In present conditions, in his opinion, such an approach has outlived its time; it would contradict the principles, generally recognized by international society, of complete equality and respect for sovereignty, independence, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. However, the Soviet diplomat believes not only a departure from the stereotypes of the past, but also a certain boldness are necessary to remove the mistrust and alienation in USSR-Albanian relations.

The Soviet Union also relates positively to Albania's intention of participating in the general European process. The Soviet leadership sees in this the beneficial influence of changes on the European continent toward forming an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding in relations between all the states of Europe, without exception, Oleg Voronkov said in concluding the conversation.

West Europe

Yeltsin Meets Austria's Vice-Chancellor Riegler

AU2106200690 Vienna Television Service in German 1730 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Christian Schueller report from Moscow]

[Text] It is not unlikely that international policy will be made before long in the businesslike office of the RSFSR president. Boris Yeltsin intends to pursue his own foreign policy and to even appoint his own defense minister.

He met with Austrian Vice-Chancellor Josef Riegler as a politically totally independent chief of state. He said: In your country, the party and government functions are combined; we are about to separate them again—A little dig at his visitors, a big dig at Gorbachev.

Following an hour of talks, the vice-chancellor and Austrian People's Party chairman was impressed by so much stubbornness.

[Begin Riegler recording] I invited Mr. Yeltsin to visit Austria, and he readily accepted this invitation. [end recording]

Referring to Gorbachev's dual political role, Yeltsin said: [Begin Yeltsin recording in Russian with superimposed German translation] I advised him to confine himself to the role of chief of state. That is enough work. Let somebody else be the party chief. There should be enough gifted people in a country of 280 million people. [end recording]

While Josef Riegler is leaving for an excursion to the Zagorsk monastery, Yeltsin plunges into the next domestic-political battle.

Aeroflot Hijackings Cause Concern in Finland

LD2606122890 Moscow TASS in English 1207 GMT 26 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondents Voitto Leskinen and Aleksandr Surikov]

[Text] Helsinki June 26 TASS—The hijacking of Aeroflot planes is causing increasing concern in Finland. Just last week two Soviet passenger planes flying on domestic routes were compelled by hijackers to land at Helsinki airport. In both cases the hijackers threatened to blow up the planes unless the crew altered course.

These dramatic events were discussed at a special meeting of the Finnish government on Monday. Prime Minister Harri Holkeri said that the government condemns air piracy and regards it as serious crime.

According to Finnish laws, a person found guilty of hijacking a plane can be sentenced to a prison term of up to 12 years.

The Soviet side demanded that both terrorists, who are citizens of the USSR, be extradited. In 1974, the Soviet Union and Finland signed an agreement on joint measures to combat air piracy. It, specifically, envisages the extradition of those guilty of air piracy.

At the meeting on Monday the government made assurances that appropriate Finnish bodies will promptly consider all the matters connected with the hijackers' request for political asylum and with the USSR's demand for their extradition, the Finnish Telegraph Bureau reported. "We do not want to give any pretext for the repetition of such incidents," Holkeri said.

British Defense Parliamentarians Visit Kremlin

LD2506170290 Moscow TASS in English 1615 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 25 TASS—A delegation of the British Parliament's Committee for Defence met in the Kremlin today with members of the Soviet parliament's Committee for Defence and State Security.

Soviet parliamentarians informed the guests of the committee's structure, its tasks and elaborated bills dealing with defence and state security.

The guests were particularly interested in activities of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the Soviet position on German unification, the current role of Soviet troops in

East Germany and difficulties in troops quartering after their withdrawal from Eastern europe.

They informed their Soviet counterparts of the British Parliament's work and answered questions.

The British delegation laid a wreath to the unknown soldier's tomb, visited the Soviet Army General Staff and the Armoured Troops Academy.

European Community on Economic, Political Ties

LD2606061890 Moscow TASS in English 0603 GMT 26 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondents Sergey Oleinik and Aleksandr Sisnev]

[Text] Dublin June 26 TASS—The leaders of European Community countries have agreed to convene a conference next December to adopt a programme for turning the Common Market from a predominantly economic union into a political one.

On the first day of their summit in Dublin on Monday, the EC leaders also considered convening a conference in Rome on December 14 to discuss financial integration, and mapped out cooperation in environmental protection and anti-drug efforts.

EC countries clearly lack unity on the political union issue. Most favour a common foreign policy and the extension of powers of the community's governing bodies, up to the adoption of binding economic and political decisions by them.

However, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher opposes such broad political union, regarding it as a threat to British national sovereignty.

EC foreign ministers have been instructed to prepare proposals and recommendations on the issue for the December conference.

During the discussion of environmental protection and anti-drug efforts, the leaders called for closer cooperation with Eastern European countries.

They supported the idea of convening an East-West conference in the first half of 1991 to work out a common strategy to combat drug trafficking.

The leaders considered the establishment of a European drugs agency and a European environmental control organisation.

In the evening, they began to discuss the proposal of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Francois Mitterrand of France to prepare an immediate aid package for the Soviet Union.

A British spokesman said the leaders agreed on the need to help the Soviet Union overcome its economic difficulties. It is not a question of whether or not economic aid should be provided for the Soviet Union, he said, but of how to do it.

An Irish spokesman said the leaders had a common wish to demonstrate their support for President Mikhail Gorbachev and his policy of perestroyka.

Supreme Soviet Committeemen Cited on FRG Trip

PM2506112590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Balandin: "There Is Something to Learn in the FRG, Soviet Parliamentarians Believe"]

[Text] Bonn—A delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet committee for the affairs of women and of family, mother and child protection was in the FRG for seven days at the invitation of Bundestag Chairman Rita Suessmuth. The Soviet parliamentary deputies were acquainted with the activity of the Bundestag committee for the affairs of young people, the family, women, and health and visited a number of enterprises and medical, rehabilitation, and children's institutions. They imparted their impressions of the trip to your IZVESTIYA correspondent.

"It is obviously superfluous to say that meetings between parliamentarians from different countries promote better mutual understanding," said V. Matviyenko, the delegation's leader and chairman of the committee. "Our acquaintance with the Bundestag deputies was no exception."

FRG Bundestag Chairman R. Suessmith adheres to the same opinion, stressing that the joint Soviet-West German statement signed during M.S. Gorbachev's official visit to the FRG opened a qualitatively new chapter in relations between our countries. Now it must be filled with content according with the interests of both sides.

"We also derived much that is useful for our parliamentary activity," V. Matviyenko continued. "The system of elections in the FRG is complex but undoubtedly interesting. It could in part serve as an example for the elaboration of new practice in our country too. The old practice has already become obsolete and does not accord with today's conditions. We were also acquainted with the principles for the division of responsibility between the federation and individual lands. This will be useful to us when discussing the foundations of relations between the whole state and individual republics.

"It was important for us to learn how the social protection of the population and its poor strata and families with many children is ensured under the conditions of a market economy. We are now elaborating a unified system for the payment of grants to such families. West German experience is very useful. In the FRG a very substantial grant is paid with the birth of even a first child. Paid maternity leave is granted for 18 months and the right to return to their job is kept for women for a

long time. The state thus compensates a family's expenditure on raising and educating children.

"In our view the financial aspect of financing the health care system also deserves attention. In our country medical services are free but as everyone knows nothing costs as much as that which costs nothing. Forgive my involuntary play on words, but the level of our medicine is perhaps lower than can be permitted. We need to switch to "insurance medicine." Here the experience of the FRG's sick pay offices would be very useful to us. For their money West German citizens receive appropriate aid. We could implement mixed financing applied under our own conditions, that is, supplement state subsidies with citizens' insurance. This would make it possible to improve the standard of services."

"We also derived much that was useful from our meetings," stated H. Gerold, secretary of the Bundestag committee for the affairs of young people, the family, women, and health.

FRG Finance Minister Supports Soviet Reforms

LD2506182190 Moscow TASS in English 1357 GMT 25 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Serov]

[Text] Bonn June 25 TASS—Becoming guarantor of the five billion [currency not specified] credit to the Soviet Union by the West German bank consortium, the West German Government stresses its support to the Soviet leadership's reforms, West German Finance Minister Theodor Waigel said in an interview with WELT AM SONNTAG newspaper.

This step should set an example to other West European states, he said.

Soviet economic reforms are in the interest of all Europe and go along with democratic changes on the continent which cannot be imagined without the Soviet Union, the minister said.

President Gorbachev's policy deserves support on the part of the West and wide economic cooperation with the Soviet Union is needed, he said.

Waigel said he was sure Western countries will soon adopt decisions at the highest level to support Soviet reforms.

The Soviet Union should cooperate with the West to ensure economic reforms' success, the minister said. The credit is aimed to raise Soviet citizens' standard of living and increase political stability in the Soviet Union. The credit should also facilitate the activities of joint ventures and those West German firms that cooperate with the Soviet Union, Waigel said.

FRG Bundestag, Bundesrat Ratify State Treaty

PM2606083590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Balandin under the rubric: "Panorama of International Life": "State Treaty Ratified"]

[Text] Bonn—Both houses of the West German Parliament—the Bundestag and Bundesrat—have voted to ratify the state treaty between the FRG and GDR on creating an economic, currency, and social union, and also to recognize the final nature of Poland's western border.

In his government announcement, FRG Federal Chancellor H. Kohl called this decision an historic event for the German people' future. He particularly stressed the need for further all-round development of relations and expansion of economic, scientific, and technical coooperation with the Soviet Union, Poland, and other East European countries. The transformation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact into political unions would assist the replacement of confrontation by reasonable cooperation [kooperatsiya] to a significant extent. In the chancellor's words, the members of both alliances could conclude a nonaggression pact within the CSCE framework, which other countries could join subsequently.

In recognizing the final nature of the western [as published] border with Poland, FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher said, the Germans are not relinquishing anything except that which had already been lost as a result of the criminal war. Without this, there can be neither peace in Europe nor German unity.

A majority of FRG Social Democrats supported the decision to ratify the state treaty, having earlier called for its boycott. Only a section of them, together with most Green Party deputies, voted against.

Explaining their stance, representatives of Saarland and Lower Saxony (FRG Laender where Social Democrats, who voted against ratification of the treaty in the Bundesrat, are in power) stated that, while supporting the actual idea of a united Germany, they consider that the chosen means to achieve it is incorrect. The state treaty will not be able to protect the interests of ordinary people.

They also sharply criticized the federal government's tactics to this end. Too hasty a transition from a planned economic system to a free market economy could lead, in their opinion, to serious adverse effects for ordinary citizens.

Green Party deputies in the Bundestag think that the state treaty does not take account of the external aspects of a united Germany, encourages the sell-off of the people's [narodnaya] property, and shifts all social burdens onto the GDR's population.

For the first time, representatives of West Berlin voted on equal terms with other deputies, having been given this opportunity following the abolition of previously existing restrictions by the allies.

So, the state treaty will come into force 1 July this year. There is a certain amount of risk, L. Spaeth, minister-counsellor of Baden-Wurttemberg Land and a Christian Democrat, stated in this context, but unification should lead to a common positive economic growth in the future.

French Leader Sees Change in Global Stategic Map

PM2206103590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "'In the Interests of All.' French President's Interview"]

[Text] Paris, 20 Jun—"During the forthcoming meetings of EC leaders in Dublin and the meeting of leaders of the world's seven leading industrial countries in Houston I intend to propose discussing the question of the possible granting of financial, commercial, and technical assistance to the Soviet Union." This was stated by French President Francois Mitterrand in an interview with the newspaper LE MONDE.

Commenting on journalists' questions on the situation in the Soviet Union, the French head of state stated: "If Mikhail Gorbachev is successful it will be in everyone's interests. It will mean that Soviet people's living standards will improve and that it will be possible to make the legal and political system in the USSR more flexible, decentralized, and adaptable to modern conditions. I think that Gorbachev is capable of doing this, although it is an unusually complex task."

The French president dwelt in detail on questions connected with the profound changes currently taking place in Europe and the prospects for the emergence of a new European security system and the development of European integration and cooperation.

F. Mitterrand's answer to a question about NATO's future role was: "On the basis of the current state of forces in Europe, NATO must and should maintain its cohesion, including a united Germany. However, it would be good to review its purely military content. Today the idea based on the 'bloc against bloc' concept is no longer realistic, in my view. The alliance could become open to the resolution of all problems of security policy associated with the balance of power in Europe. This implies that NATO's sphere of activity will be the same as stipulated in the North Atlantic Treaty, and that France will retain special status in it." Nonetheless, "in the future I would like Europe to eventually safeguard its own security. In practice it would be impossible to do this immediately. We will be thinking and working on this basis."

Currently, the main point in this area is not to create conditions for the USSR getting scared about attempts to "encircle" it. When a new European security system appears, the strategic map of the world will totally change, F. Mitterrand stressed.

French Minister Visits Joint-Venture Radio Station

PM2206152990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 20 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] For the ninth time an All-Europe Music Festival is being held in various countries. Its aim is to promote spiritual and moral unity among the peoples for the sake of peace and good-neighborliness. The first commercial music radio station in the Soviet Union—"Evropa Plyus Moskva"—was ceremonially opened in Moscow today.

[Reporter] This is what its studios at the Ostankino TV and radio complex look like. French Culture Minister Jack Lang visited there today. The Soviet-French joint-venture radio station and its output are already familiar to listeners in Moscow and Moscow Oblast. Its broadcasts between 0700 and 0100 hours are entirely given over to the most varied types and kinds of modern music. The creative collective brings together Soviet and French specialists. Addressing them, Jack Lang expressed gratitude for the creation of this Soviet-French radio station. The French minister expressed the hope that "Evropa Plyus Moskva" would become another strand of friendship linking our peoples. Noted

LD2506181190 Moscow TASS in English 1744 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 25 TASS—The outlining of new opportunities in the cooperation between the French concern Rhone-Poulenc and its Soviet partners was the main subject of today's conversation between its president Jean-Rene Fourtou and Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister Lev Voronin.

Annual trade turnover between the concern and Soviet enterprises and organisations exceeds 100 million dollars, the Rhone-Poulenc president told TASS. However, its imports from the USSR account only for one quarter of this sum. Rhone-Poulenc finds it difficult to invest capital in the Soviet economy, first, because the USSR does not have the goods needed by the firm, and, second, because it is not sure of the solvency of Soviet partners. However, Rhone-Poulenc is very much interested in doing business on the Soviet market and increasing its trade turnover.

During the conversation at the Soviet Council of Ministes Jean-Rene Fourtou mentioned several projects which could promote this process. Primarily, it is the testing in the USSR of new Rhone-Poulenc preparations protecting farm crops and the organisation of the production in the USSR of fodder and medication for livestock and poultry on the basis of the firm's technologies. Fourtou also suggested the production of medicinal preparations and cooperation in environmental protection.

Voronin expressed interest in the proposals of the French firm. He pointed out that they could meet the Soviet Union's present demand. Their implementation will begin soon.

So far as the solvency of Soviet partners is concerned, he assured the Rhone-Poulenc president that these are temporary difficulties, which would be overcome in several months.

Supreme Soviet Group Meets Portuguese Leaders

PM1906110190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jun 90 Morning Edition p4

[Dispatch by IZVESTIYA correspondent L. Kostanyan: "Prospects of Accord"]

[Text] Lisbon—The people of Portugal are sincerely interested in the successful development of all-European cooperation within the CSCE framework. This was said by Portuguese Foreign Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro at a meeting with a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by Anatoliy Ananyev, USSR people's deputy and chief editor of the journal OKTYABR. The delegation is currently in Portugal at the invitation of the country's Assembly of the Republic.

The main task now, according to the Portuguese minister, is to create the basis for a system of European security and cooperation that will satisfy everyone. Reaching a consensus is not easy, but efforts should be made to achieve this nevertheless: The peoples expect their leaders to find a common language and peace to triumph. The minister stressed that the problem of peaceful cooperation concerns not only the East but the West as well and that both sides are working persistently to reach mutual understanding. There are prospects of accord, and these prospects must be used.

The Soviet delegation held talks with the Portuguese parliament's Foreign Affairs Commission, was received by Assembly of the Republic President Vitor Crespo, and met representatives of parliamentary groups. Like the dialogue with the foreign minister, these meetings touched on global problems and questions of bilateral relations, which, as the two sides pointed out, contain considerable reserves for broadening economic and cultural cooperation.

More on Spanish Parliamentary Visit With Zagladin

PM2206115590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Meetings in Moscow"]

[Text] The importance of Soviet-Spanish parliamentary ties and the development and consolidation of relations between the USSR and Italy as a whole were discussed 18 June in the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs. A meeting was held here with a delegation from the Spanish General Parliament Congress of Deputies' Foreign Affairs Commission.

We are filled with a deep interest in the processes taking place in your society, L. Fajardo, the head of the delegation and the commission's chairman, said during the talk. What is happening in your country, he continued, and in Central and East Europe opens up a new future before us all. In Spain we adhere to the idea of building a united Europe. We are convinced we are not alone in this.

Both sides confirmed the need for all-around assistance to the headway of the all-European process.

At the request of the guests, A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the Committee for International Affairs, and members of the committee who had taken part in the talk explained Soviet approaches toward the task of building the all-European home and the problem of Germany's reunification and answered questions concerning our assessment of the changes in the East European countries and relating to Soviet-U.S. relations and perestroyka in the USSR.

The theme of the all-European home was continued 19 June at a meeting between the delegation and the USSR President's adviser V.V. Zagladin. He described in detail the USSR's concepts on this question.

Speaking of Soviet-Spanish relations, the USSR president's adviser noted that the Soviet Union views Spain as a good, reliable political partner.

J. Cuenca, Spanish ambassador to the USSR, took part in the talks.

The Spanish parliamentarians laid a wreath at the Tomb to the Unknown Soldier.

Turkey Returns Plane, Considers Asylum Request

LD2206230690 Moscow TASS in English 1821 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] Istanbul June 22 TASS—The An-2 plane, hijacked to Turkey last Monday from the Soviet airport of Izmail, was returned to the Soviet Union at 17.45 Moscow time today.

The plane was handed over to a four-member Soviet crew that had arrived in Turkey.

At the same time, the Turkish authorities are considering the granting of a political asylum to the pilot, the CUMHURIYET newspaper said. By decision of the prosecutor's office of the town of Kandira, he was fined for a symbolic sum of 10,000 Turkish liras for "violating the passport regime and encroaching on the Turkish state border" on Thursday.

West German Pilot's Illegal Landing Criticized

LD2506163690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 0830 GMT on 25 June, in its "Vremya" program, broadcasts a video report from Batumi by correspondent N. Gongadze marking the recent anniversary of Mathias Rust's illegal landing in Moscow's Red Square. The correspondent begins his report by recalling that West German pilot Hans Schneider landed his aircraft at Batumi Airport at 1430 on 9 June. An eyewitness to the incident is interviewed. He recalls that Schneider left flowers at the

airport and quickly took off again. He also left a placard with a message which was published in the central press. He was in Soviet territory for nine minutes but spent no more than 30-40 seconds at Batumi and the border guards fired only three warning shots.

Gongadze then interviews an unidentified official who declares that border violation is "always a serious incident and always has elements of provocation" and is also unsafe. Was this a provocation or a goodwill mission, he asks? "Certainly, in the situation of democratization, glasnost, and opennes," the official continues, "everything could have been done quite differently." There must be no repetition of this sort of thing, he concluded. The video shows the correspondent at the airport, interviewing the eyewitness and the official in an office, a drawing of Schneider's plane, and a picture of his message, in German, praising Gorbachev.

Latin America & Caribbean

Soviet Naval Ships Arrive in Cuba for Visit

LD2506180490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1645 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] Havana, 25 June (TASS)—TASS correspondent Andrey Borodin reports: A convoy of Soviet ships arrived in Cuba for an official visit today. The convoy includes the large antisubmarine ship "Azov," the destroyer "Gremyashchiy," and the tanker "Genrikh Gasanov" under the command of Rear Admiral A.V. Gorbunov, commander of a fleet force of the Black Sea Fleet.

In the course of the visit, which will last till 30 June, Soviet sailors will visit the National Assembly of the People's Government in Havana Province and meet representatives of the Cuban public.

Cuba's Castro Recommends Economic 'Resistance'

PM2006160990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jun 90 p 3

[Report by TASS correspondent V. Kulikov: "Ready for Battle by Torchlight; According to Fidel Castro, the Country Might Have To Live Through 'a Special Period in Peacetime'"]

[Text] Havana—The only way for Cuba to survive in present conditions is to offer resistance, the country's leader, Fidel Castro, said at a meeting with journalists. The Cuban leadership is making attempts within the framework of this concept to seek internal reserves that will ensure the national economy's vital activity in the event of the country's total isolation from the outside world. In a speech at the close of the 16th Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions Congress on 29 January 1990, Fidel Castro introduced a new term into everyday speech: "a special period in peacetime." According to him, this period could begin if "the republic's economic relations with East European countries undergo negative changes and the processes taking place in the Soviet Union become so difficult that there arises the threat that Soviet supplies to Cuba may be reduced or even terminated altogether."

It is common knowledge that until now the state of the Cuban economy has been determined to a considerable extent by the level of trade relations with the Soviet Union and other CEMA countries, which account for some 88 percent of the country's foreign trade turnover. And more than 70 percent of this is represented by supplies from the Soviet Union.

In view of the changes in Eastern Europe, Havana is concerned that the possibility of maintaining trade relations at the same level with these countries will be sharply curtailed in the near future. However, it is mainly concerned about the prospects of cooperation with the USSR, whose parliament and mass media, according to F. Castro, "are showing a tendency to review the economic relations that exist between the Soviet Union and Cuba." This is what prompted the country's leadership to begin preparation for "a special period in peacetime" early this year. In this respect, the emphasis has been placed on possible disruptions in fuel supplies from the Soviet Union. "If the Soviet Union were to cut its exports of oil and other types of fuel by even one-third," F. Castro said at the Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions Congress, "this would create a situation in the national economy where it would have to prove its viability in conditions of a total blockade of the island or even foreign invasion."

The party program document "Appeal to the Fourth Cuban Communist Party Congress," which is now being actively discussed at party meetings, talks about the need to prepare for serious difficulties in the near future. It is planned to "provide guarantees not only of the country's survival but of its development." It is proposed—even in these conditions—to work to implement the food program and develop tourism, genetic engineering, biotechnology, and a number of other sectors, which can be reinforced by Cuba's currency reserves. The redistribution of material resources and capital investments will lead to a freezing of social programs.

A labor collective movement, "More impressive results with less expenditure," has been organized and is being broadly propagandized in Cuba as part of the "belt tightening" preparations. "Days of working in the conditions of a special period in peacetime" have been held as an experiment. Industrial and agricultural enterprises, transport, medical establishments, and academic institutions all participated in these distinctive rehearsals for a state of emergency.

Judging from press articles, during these "special days" work at enterprises and construction sites taking part in the experiment was mainly performed manually or with the aid of hand-cranked machines, shifts were increased, and, as dusk fell, burning torches were used for illumination. Moreover, an extra workforce was dispatched to

production. Agricultural cooperatives compiled inventories of oxen, mules, and also all primitive agricultural implements that have been preserved. According to the plans, all this must replace tractors and combines in "a special period."

Transport, which is virtually entirely composed of imported equipment, has two main tasks: to save on fuel and resolve the acute problem of a spare parts shortage. As far as the former is concerned, things are not going too well. However, one of the leaders of the capital's transport network, Arturo Cordova, said optimistically, without going into details, that specialists "have almost completed tests [illegible] will make it possible to save as much as 10 perce[illegible] fuel currently consumed." They are trying to solve [illegible]e parts problem by dismantling vehicles that h[illegible]n written off.

Even in the event of "a special regime's" introduction, the country's leadership intends to "continue to implement the food program." Local authorities intend to replace natural products with convenience foods and substitutes: For example, they will use whey and other secondary types of raw materials in the manufacture of sausage products, as "their use, within the acceptable norms, will make it possible to save on energy-rich foods." Bakeries are planning to bake bread from a mixture of wheat flour, yucca, sweet potato, and potato.

Military and civilian hospitals are broadening their use of medicinal herbs instead of expensive imported medicines, and anesthetics are being replaced with acupuncture.

Reporting on work during the "special days," the Cuban mass media underline the enthusiasm of the Cuban working people, "who are aware of their responsibility for the country's future and are endeavoring to make the maximum personal contribution to preparations for this possible development of events." However, judging by people's moods, far from the whole population feels the same way about this aspect of economic policy.

It is hard to say what direction will be taken in preparation for "a special period." Now, since the mid-April Havana session of the intergovernmental Soviet-Cuban Commission for Economic and Scientific and Technical Cooperation—on the basis of whose results the Protocol on Trade and Payments for 1990 was signed—the campaign has eased off a little.

Nevertheless, saving resources and energy and withstanding the difficulties associated with "a development of the international situation unfavorable to the country" remain the center of the Cuban leadership's attention.

Supreme Soviet Session

National Security Working Group Meets

PM2506130790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jun 90 First Edition p 1

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Kosarev report under the rubric "In USSR Supreme Soviet Committees and Commissions": "Debate on National Security Problems"]

[Text] The parliamentary vacation that began at the end of the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet is an extremely theoretical concept. It is time for the deputies who have gone off to their regions to meet with voters. But those left behind in Moscow are continuing their work in committees and commissions. At least the "skyscraper" at 27 Kalinin Boulevard, Moscow, is not empty. The group elaborating the concept for the country's national [obshchenatsionalnyy] security met Wednesday on the 12th floor of this building; your correspondent was there.

The group, set up on deputies' initiative, is headed by Academician Yu.A. Ryzhov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Committee for Science, Public Education, Culture, and Upbringing. I asked him before the sitting began to say how the idea of setting up the group arose.

[Ryzhov] In conditions of the new political thinking and an international situation that is quite different from before, we must rethink concepts like national security, defense, and defense sufficiency. We must have a good idea of the nature of conversion, how it must be implemented, what we must defend, and what danger threatens us... It transpires that there are a host of concepts: military-political danger, external and internal danger, economic danger, environmental danger, and so on. All this must be analyzed at long last. [Ryzhov ends]

Experts among scientists representing academic institutions, departmental research centers, and public organizations took part in the working group's 20 June sitting alongside USSR people's deputies. After clarifying the conceptual apparatus, the sitting's participants heard and discussed reports on various problems of national security and exchanged opinions on them. We will not rehash every speech since there were a lot of them. We will draw readers' attention to just some of the ideas voiced during the exchange of opinions...

—"There is no longer a military threat to us today..."

—"That is a mistaken and misleading opinion. There is a great deal of instability and uncertainty in the world, the arms race is continuing, and there is still the danger of an accidental war."

—"The real threat to us comes from our economic lag."

—"We must speak first of all about the security of the individual and only then about the security of the state."

—"A package of laws to ensure the country's security is what is needed; a national security council must be set up..."

As you can see, the range of opinions is very broad and, as is inevitable in such cases, a debate arose. The speakers included USSR People's Deputies Yu.A. Ryzhov, A.V. Reshetnikov, V.N. Lopatin, I.S. Seleznev, Yu.A. Levykin, senior CPSU Central Committee official I.Ye. Malashenko, and representatives of military academies, academic institutions, VUZ's [higher educational establishments], and scientific centers.

One sitting is hardly enough to work out a unified viewpoint and identical approaches to complex problems but the discussion was undoubtedly beneficial. This was confirmed by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Prof. Major General N.A. Chaldymov, head of the V.I. Lenin Military-Political Academy Philosophy Department and president of the Soviet "Army and Society" Association:

[Chaldymov] I am convinced that the national security problem is one of the key problems in military policy today. Any attempts, any efforts to create and implement a national security concept are beneficial. Like any first meeting of a new organ, today's sitting looks somewhat chaotic. But nevertheless we can even today glimpse the constructive nature of the business we have begun.

[Kosarev] Aren't you surprised that the group has emerged under the Supreme Soviet's Committee for Science?

[Chaldymov] Not at all. Many of our ventures are very often not carried through or are not done as we would like solely because we lack a scientifically based concept and the means of attaining our goal, having a quite random set of desires and aspirations. That is we often proceed by the method of trial and error. If the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Science undertakes this important matter, there may be more opportunities to develop a scientific approach to elaborating a concept.

Political & Social

Estonian Leader Mentions Possible Congress Delay

LD2606105290 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] With what kind of stances will Estonian communists go to Moscow if they are at all going in the near future? Juhan Virkus enquired.

[Virkus] Today a plenum of the [independent] Communist Party [CP] of Estonia discussed theses of the Estonian Communist Party for the 28th CPSU Congress. Harri Roots [secretary of Central Committee], you made a 30-minute long report. Or rather, you added some thoughts to those documents which were handed out to the plenum participants. One of the main thesis was: Why are the Estonia Communist Party delegates going to Moscow?

[Roots] Well, yes, the theses-elaboration commission had held long debates on this: Should one go to Moscow to disintegrate the system or should one go to Moscow to strengthen the system?

Finally, we came to the conclusion that one should go to Moscow to assist as much as possible and with those means available to us—which are not many—those democratization processes which are just beginning within the extent of the whole CPSU. It seems indeed that our fate largely depends on what kind of processes will envelope Russia first and foremost, but also other Union republics, and the leading parties which are indeed at the moment still reigning over there, even though Article 6 has been removed from the Constitution. So we propose our vision of what the Soviet Union should look like, and we will propose a model of a fairly loosely connected association of states, an association of the kind which consists of independent, sovereign states who themselves decide if they belong in it or not. On the whole, we would like each nation to have maximum opportunity to choose freely the development path which suits it best, in the context of further development or [word indistinct]. Strangely enough, namely those issues have been written up the weakest in the CPSU hitherto official documents. We have laid the main emphasis namely upon this.

[Virkus] It was also discussed how work will be done at the 28th congress in Moscow, if there will be consolidation with somebody else or if you stay by yourselves?

[Roots] Yes, there were several opinions on this. [passage omitted] We found that it would be more correct to retain our independent attitude both to official Central Committee documents as well as to the Democratic Platform and to the proposals of any other possible kinds of platforms which will come up at the congress. [passage omitted] We have our specific problems and we must also remain independent of those major [factions].

A problem of its own in the course of today's plenum also arose from the idea whether the congress will take place at all, because in the course of the plenum there was a very senior-level telephone call from Moscow and it informed of the new position of postponing the congress until September because further south already grain harvesting has started and there is no time to hold a congress. I personally think, however, that there is a whole string of much weightier reasons which have caused it (?that they want to postpone unpleasantness), but life will indeed go on and in September it will be even harder to hold [a congress].

Confederation of Labor Council Holds Meeting

LD2506133590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1245 GMT 25 Jun 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] In Moscow, a sitting of the council of representatives of the Confederation of Labor has finished. The decisions of 11 July [as heard] have been adopted to initiate political actions throughout the whole country. The following demands will be put forward: the resignation of the government of the USSR; the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet; the conclusion of a new Union treaty; and the holding of new elections for the highest bodies of authority in the USSR.

Zaykov Discusses Conversion Issues, Party Work

PM26060921 90 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jun 90 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed interview with L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, under the rubric "A Word Before the 28th CPSU Congress"; date, place not given: "History Is Being Made Today"]

[Text] [PRAVDA] Lev Nikolayevich! In terms of education and work experience you are not only a party official but also an engineer and economic planner. How have you combined these two qualities in your activity? Does a party official need engineering experience under the new conditions of the separation of functions?

[Zaykov] Of course, a person is not born a party official. And it was in production work that I developed as an engineer, a leader, and an individual. There, in the working environment, I gained an understanding of the chief values of life—principledness, comradeship, the attitude toward people.

In the labor collective I had dealings with workers, designers, and scientists. Many problems were resolved, at various levels. As I went from being a worker to being director of the association, I felt the burden of responsibility becoming heavier. But it was only later, in soviet and party work, that I understood and appreciated the schooling that I had received in production, when I had to resolve many similar problems, only on an increased scale.

The transfer itself to soviet work—on Leningrad Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee]—was very complex for me. But life, as is known, does not know subjunctive moods. We are all children of our time. I was accustomed to observing party discipline, and during those years—and this is well known to you—very rigid discipline operated in the party. There was a definite system, and we lived and worked within that system.

Of course, in those times an ispolkom [executive committee] chairman acted far from independently. Many decisions had to be coordinated with the obkom [oblast party committee] and gorkom [city party committee]. To this you must also add the Moscow bodies, where it was no less difficult to "push through" a specific issue. Such overwhelming tutelage undoubtedly fettered initiative and belittled the role of executive power locally.

Then came years of party work. Now, recalling the past, I can state unequivocally: A party official does not need engineering experience (an arts graduate can also work

successfully as a party secretary) so much as experience of life, competence, and a systematic approach.

Party-mindedness in work is a concept which is as alive as the party. It is our misfortune that we exchanged this concept for large-scale and petty economic tutelage and replaced it with "pressure" methods or, if you like, with the diktat of party organs from above. Under those conditions primary party organizations lost their identity.

Party-mindedness is essentially the social thrust of the communist's actions. I have always believed that the main components of a party-minded approach to work are objectivity and reliance on collective reason and science. You must not be the slave of stereotypes and dogmas, of narrow departmental or group interests. All my life I have followed a single rule—to formulate a decision collectively and bear personal responsibility for its fulfillment.

[PRAVDA] During the years of perestroyka you have headed the country's major party organizations—those of Leningrad and Moscow—and have also worked directly on the CPSU Central Committee. What tasks have faced you? What, in your view, have you succeeded in doing in these sectors, and what has not come off and why?

[Zaykov] Differing assessments are now being made of what my comrades and I managed to do in Leningrad. I can only say one thing: Under those conditions and in that situation we endeavored to do everything we could to improve things.

For example, we went over to comprehensive socioeconomic planning. And even today this is, I believe, one of the most important conditions for stable work. We developed the technical modernization of fixed capital. We began actively strengthening the construction industry base. We tackled cadre training thoroughly. Without this is it really possible to speak seriously of a switch to market relations? Or our efforts to develop the oblast's agriculture. I am sure that they were not in vain.

Under those conditions, however, all this made it possible to achieve results only in individual areas and did not produce an overall positive effect. And this is why we felt so keenly the need for changes and fully welcomed the ideas of perestroyka.

The Central Committee April plenum found me in the post of first secretary of Leningrad party obkom. It is not for me to judge by virtue of what objective reasons and circumstances I ended up in Moscow, on the Central Committee. I myself believed at the time that it was necessary to remain in Leningrad, but party discipline played its part here too.

I believe that a biographical factor—36 years of work in "defense"—also told to a certain extent. The "Leninets" Science and Production Association where I was working is one of the largest, multiprofile enterprises in the radio industry and, moreover, is linked with hundreds of plants, scientific research institutes, and design bureaus in practically all sectors of the country's industry. A large collective of eminent scientists and designers works there, creating the most modern equipment. Therefore, when I was entrusted with questions of developing the defense industry on the Central Committee, my accumulated experience and also my good business contacts with defense industry workers and the military came in very handy. At the 27th CPSU Congress I was elected a member of the Politburo.

In November 1987 a plenum of Moscow Gorkom unanimously elected me first secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom.

I will state frankly that for me this was, on the one hand, an expression of tremendous trust and, on the other, a tremendous responsibility. Judge for yourself: I didn't know Moscow well—only from flying visits—and I had to get accustomed to people and delve into the serious problems of a great city with 9 million inhabitants.

It has to be borne in mind that the situation in the country and the party was changing extremely rapidly, particularly so in the capital. The period 1987-1988 and the first half of 1989 was a time of the gradual transfer of managerial functions from party to soviet organs.

If the party gorkom had not devoted proper attention to economic questions, particularly long-term ones, it would hardly be possible now to tackle in earnest the organization of self-management in territories and city districts.

The necessary normative documents for the rayons' transfer to the principles of economic accountability and financial independence were prepared jointly with Moscow Gorispolkom, and individual schemes for managing the city economy were tried out. Of course, they are not all working at full strength today, and maybe we should abandon certain schemes.

Of course, we might be accused of letting the gorkom become too involved in economic problems, of which the city had accumulated an extremely large number. But this is not quite so. We worked concertedly with Moscow Gorispolkom. Remembering my work experience on Leningrad Gorispolkom, when I had to look over my shoulder at the obkom and gorkom, in the post of first secretary of Moscow Gorkom I strove to give freedom of action to the leaders of soviet organs. We on the gorkom saw it as our role, above all, to influence their actions through the communists working on ispolkoms.

Visiting the provinces and delving into the concerns and needs of labor collectives, we strove to take appropriate measures to overcome stagnation. And then to involve the leaders of Union and republic ministries and departments in resolving the accumulated problems with the intention that every department be steeped in Moscow's concerns and needs.

It was the CPSU gorkom that initiated the development of Moscow's special status as the capital of the USSR and the master plan for the development of the Moscow region.

Secretaries of primary party organizations began visiting the gorkom more frequently, and their advice and requests were heeded attentively there. We were constantly meeting with the ideological aktiv and party veterans. The gorkom press center began operating.

We set the task of giving cadres an opportunity to work independently and to feel confident in themselves, we stopped calling them to order, and we attentively heeded criticism from below. We emancipated workers in the rayon management link. Many young party members joined the leadership. Of course, this was just the start of the turning point.

As a result of this close, concerted, joint work we succeeded, in particular, in beginning the fundamental reconstruction of enterprises determining the sore points of the city economy—above all, 76 factories and plants in the city's light industry and meat and dairy industry. Moscow's defense enterprises were also involved in this work. I am pleased that confidence was once again shown in me, for a second time, at the city party conference in January 1989, when 889 of the 990 delegates voted for me—in a secret ballot moreover.

I am convinced that, having solid groundwork and a clear program for the future, the party gorkom must not now abandon its active influence on the resolution of problems which really affect working people's interests. This was also said by the delegates to the 28th city party conference which was just been held.

It has to be stated bluntly that we also made many mistakes, particularly when conducting the campaign to elect USSR people's deputies. We were unable to properly support those candidate deputies who really adhere to the positions of perestroyka and who are devoted to the socialist choice—primarily workers.

Why have we not been able to achieve everything that was conceived? One reason is that many ideas came up against people's old mentality, which, as is known, changes considerably more slowly than the political situation. And the second reason is that we were insufficiently persistent in seeing through what had been begun and in overcoming resistance from conservative sentiments. We also plainly underestimated the importance of explaining to Muscovites the basic aims outlined by the gorkom, and we inadequately informed the population about this.

[PRAVDA] You engage in questions of defense and military policy. You did not interrupt this work even when you were secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom. We know that you were directly involved in preparing the military-political decisions for the adoption of the Stockholm agreement on confidence-building measures in Europe and the treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as in the preparation of many other future treaties on arms limitation. It is no secret that the opinion is current that we have supposedly made concessions to our talks partners which harm the USSR's defense capability. It is also being said that we no longer need a strong army. These questions were also raised acutely at the Russian party conference, which became the Constituent Congress of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party. What would you say in this regard?

[Zaykov] Arms limitation is not an arrogant whim of M.S. Gorbachev, not a desire to please the West. It is an objective command of the times. In our country foreign policy activeness and the restructuring of internal life have now combined in a single process, when the relaxation of effort in one sector could do harm in another one.

But I agree with those who adhere to the position that we need a strong army today. We need it as a guarantor of peace.

I wish to remind you of the classic thinking of many important military strategists from various epochs: If a people is unable to maintain its own army, it will maintain someone else's. I was told this, in particular, by soldiers and officers of the Western Group of Forces, which I visited recently.

Our Armed Forces are an inalienable part of the people. They demand the same care and social protection as other sections of our society. But the army is not a frozen formation—it must correspond to its own times in just the same way as economics and politics do.

Therefore the switch to the primacy of panhuman values in our politics and the revision of the entire system of views on problems of war and peace and of the country's security were two of the first steps of perestroyka.

Democratization and openness have added to military politics their own colors and voices, but also their own difficulties. At the same time they have strengthened objectiveness in decisionmaking.

The art of very complex military-political mosaics was transferred from the monastic cells of the bosses to a "veche" [people's assembly in towns of medieval Russia] of professional specialists. The leadership began trusting specialists more and heeding their prescriptions. And new forces joined in, with their own ideas, thoughts, and approaches. For previously there had been an overt shortage of this.

We have evolved an efficient working structure which includes a wide range of specialists and organizations working on questions of military politics. Scientists, engineers, and military specialists of leading institutes and design bureaus of the USSR Academy of Sciences, industry, the General Staff, and the USSR Ministry of Defense, and diplomats participate in resolving military-political problems, including problems relating to the holding of talks. Highly qualified specialists of the CPSU Central Committee Defense Department constantly render invaluable assistance. This achieves the maximum objectivity. A problem is not considered resolved unless mutual understanding has been reached on all aspects of it.

And the chief point—the interests of ministries and departments have been placed among the interests of the state, where the state has acquired unquestionable priority. There are no longer any "ownerless" questions which, frequently because it was not clear whom they belonged to, used to get stuck in one of the ministries or departments, and were resolved one-sidedly or not at all.

As for concessions in talks, there simply are no talks without mutual concessions. But I can firmly state that concessions on our part never jeopardize the national interests of the Soviet state. And the chief task of ensuring our country's security is always fulfilled and is unshakable.

[PRAVDA] What is your attitude toward the idea of going over to a professional army? And again. Many people believe that questions of the country's defense and of military building are a matter for state organs and that party organizations must be abolished in the Army and Navy. What is your opinion of these questions?

[Zaykov] As regards a professional army, I believe that it has prospects. An army must be small, mobile, and equipped with the most sophisticated combat hardware, in which the tone is set by high-class professional specialists. But the move to a professional footing can only be made gradually, as it affects the destinies of hundreds of thousands of people. The process of professionalization must begin, above all, in the technically best equipped branches of the Armed Forces—the Rocket Forces, the Air Forces, the Navy, and the Air Defense Forces.

The most complex question concerns the party's place in defense building and in army collectives.

I believe that even under conditions when we have separated the functions of party, soviet, and economic organs, the party is obliged to have its own position and action program in questions of defense building. But, naturally, the center of gravity must be moved to the Presidential Council, under which it is necessary to have a highly qualified apparatus to tackle problems of strengthening defense capability.

As regards the party's place in army collectives, clear mention was made of this in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform, which I support in principle.

[PRAVDA] Lev Nikolayevich, you participate in the work of the Central Committee commission on preparing the programmatic document for the 28th congress. Which problems of the party's development, in your view, are now particularly acute? What must be undertaken to avert the danger of a possible split in the party? What is your attitude toward the possibility of "peaceful coexistence" among the various platforms in the CPSU and toward pluralism of opinions and ideas?

[Zaykov] I will reply briefly. The chief issue is the party's ideological and organizational unity. Only in this event is it capable of resolving the tasks. And the second point. The Central Committee leadership must take principled stands and not make concessions for the sake of expediency. But, of course, it must hold a dialogue and listen to and hear those who have a different viewpoint.

Speaking of pluralism, I undoubtedly have a positive attitude toward it, but only if it is a question of pluralism of opinions among the members of what is really one party. But when what is meant by pluralism and "platforms" is the possibility of conducting unbridled anticommunist propaganda, while remaining in the party's ranks in order to force one's way into power, then I am categorically against this.

[PRAVDA] Everyone now is concerned about the problems of a "breakthrough" to a market economy. In this connection ordinary working people are anxious about the possibility of enterprises closing down, prices taking off, and mass unemployment. What does your experience both as a prominent economic planner and as a political leader suggest to you in this situation? Do you put to the state's leadership questions of social protection for working people employed in defense sectors in connection with the impact of conversion and the vulnerability of defense enterprises under conditions of a market economy?

[Zaykov] It really would be good to make the breakthrough to a market economy with fewer losses. But everything must be done to ensure that it does not become a "breakthrough" in the literal sense of the word, for everything around us is already in holes. It must be a well-conceived and well-considered transition which will be understood and welcomed by the entire Soviet people.

Just as you cannot go to sleep a communist (if, of course, you are a committed party member) and wake up, let us say, a social democrat, so you cannot go to sleep under a planned economy and wake up under a market economy. And then you hear everywhere: A market definitely means success in resolving all problems, for it is a panacea against all ills. But if not, what then?

Whenever you draw up any program you must always think about the consequences of realizing it. And so too with the market. It can take us to new horizons of progress, but it can also thrust us far back and bring the economy right to its knees, from which it will never rise again.

I am convinced that these questions will be discussed properly within the party, at the CPSU congress. If this idea is welcomed by communists, who will then convey it to the masses, this will make it possible to place our economy—and thus also society as a whole—on a new footing without upheavals and without unnecessary losses. Such universal accord and patience at the difficult time of the switch to market relations and the involvement of the entire intellectual potential of the party and the people will, I believe, make it possible to avoid the negative consequences which are extremely undesirable when reforming the system.

About social protection. This question is of concern—very great concern—to working people in all sectors, not

only in the defense complex. But social protection can only be ensured with a material base. Talk of protection will remain just idle talk if the level of the economy continues to fall.

As for conversion, we have only just embarked on it. A state conversion plan has been drawn up which will be examined in the Presidential Council in the very near future. It is then that the real work will begin. This is a complex, lengthy process. And gossip about conversion which only misleads the people really does impact adversely.

[PRAVDA] PRAVDA readers frequently raise the question of the practice of voluntary retirement for leaders of all ranks. What is your attitude toward this problem? What are your plans for the future?

[Zaykov] I favor such a practice. But something else must also be seen: Various arrogant individuals who have attained power without being competent and without sufficient experience cover up their dilettantism with arguments about possible retirement. This is a kind of loophole.

As for me, I have been working on the Central Committee for two convocations. I believe that new, young cadres must take my place. But a communist can serve the homeland and the party in other work too.

And the final point. Each generation has its own burden to bear, its own mission in history. But history is not written today, it is only being made today. And, as a rule, the deeds of one generation have to be assessed by another generation.

Vorotnikov Interview Before CPSU Congress

PM2506153590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jun 90 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed interview with V.I. Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, under the rubric "A Comment Ahead of the 28th CPSU Congress"; date, place of interview not given: "Unity First and Foremost"]

[Text] [PRAVDA] Vitality Ivanovich, have you primarily represented Russia's interests in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo? The government of Russia was subjected to criticism at the first Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies. How justified was it?

[Vorotnikov] I was elected to the Politburo in 1983, almost simultaneously with my appointment by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to the post of chairman of the republic council of ministers. Naturally, since then—including during the last 18 months, when I have been working as chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium—my activity in the leading party body has made it possible, and essential, to approach general party matters taking Russia's interests into account. In a brief interview you can't describe how difficult it was, particularly during the early days, to combat the decades-old attitude that the RSFSR was "the eldest brother in the family of Union republics" who should carry the main burden. Partial problems were successfully resolved, but that cannot be said about the whole package of problems. And these were often problems typical of not just Russia but the entire country.

What is my attitude to the criticism voiced at the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies? I accept and join in the objective criticism, but I cannot agree with the attempts to "tick off" the government in defiance of the facts—and attempts of that kind were made.

The government's performance should obviously be assessed on its results, considering what it has managed to do and what it has not managed to do and why. Taking into account the historical situation, the general situation in the country, the directions and methods of work chosen in previous years, and so forth. And, of course, giving primary consideration to the fact that the second half of the eighties was the start of the period of perestroyka, a sharp break in the arrangements that had become established in society.

[PRAVDA] If we are to remain realistic, against this backdrop it is impossible not to acknowledge that the situation in Russia—no matter how discontented and dissatisfied with it we may be—is no worse than in many other republics.

[Vorotnikov] Yes, that is so. The RSFSR's national economic development indicators are no worse than the Union-wide figures. But no way do they match either the original forecasts, or our plans, or especially present-day requirements. That is the problem.

I am not saying this in self-justification. But a long time is indeed needed to restructure, remodel, and modernize the national economy. During the initial stage we—I mean the leadership of the republic and the country—obviously underestimated the possible difficulties; we thought that the processes would go more easily. Unfortunately in reality everything turned out to be considerably more complex. But it is now clear that if every year we are going to be waiting for drastic improvements and looking for people to blame because they are not achieved, while not learning to operate in an efficient and modern manner, we will be pointing people's expectations in the wrong direction whether we like it or not.

Incidentally, it would be a great oversimplification to consider that the reasons for our shortcomings are only to be found in the stagnation period. Many problems and difficulties have also emerged during the perestroyka period, and they have not been overcome either. The blame for this is ours.

It is untrue that we sat back and did nothing. The government and ministers had one constant concern—how to ensure the fulfillment of national economic plans, an upsurge in every sector, and the progressive development of the entire range of socioeconomic relations. And it can be said for the sake of objectivity that during the initial stages this work produced positive results. We played an active part in elaborating the concept of perestroyka and its various aspects. I won't make any

secret of the fact that on many questions it proved necessary to have complex and protracted discussions at Union level. Our proposals on the structure of RSFSR national economic management and the implementation of economic reform were repeatedly discussed in the Central Committee Politburo and the USSR Government. Unfortunately we did not display the requisite firmness on all questions, and this applies particularly to reorganization in the agro-industrial complex. The RSFSR government voiced official opposition to the Siberian river diversion plans as far back as 1983. But the public was not informed about this. We actively supported the idea of combating drunkenness, mapping out stages for this struggle, but at the same time we categorically disagreed with the savage administrative pressure and intolerable excesses displayed in the antialcohol campaign. We believe that we were right not to combine higher educational establishments and schools in a single department in the republic as Union-level bodies proposed. The fact that the principles we fought for now need to be improved is another matter.

[PRAVDA] There is currently a great deal of talk about republic sovereignty. A Declaration on the Sovereignty of Russia has been adopted. What benefits does this give the republic?

[Vorotnikov] Sovereignty is indeed a most popular topic at this time. You will recall the excitement and enthusiasm at the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies when this point on the agenda was discussed. Yet apparently four years ago the sovereignty problem did not worry anybody. Well, we're all strong with hindsight. But let us acknowledge that this question has really come to ahead precisely now. It has been prompted by the restructuring of economic relations and the state and political system and by the holes that have shown up in our nationalities policy.

The strengthening of Russian sovereignty is important not as an end in itself, of course, but as a means for resolving vitally essential questions of social development. I discussed precisely this in my report to the congress of republic people's deputies when I proposed a special sovereignty declaration. The congress approved it after painstaking and, I would say, nitpicking work on the text. The Declaration on RSFSR Sovereignty is indisputably an important step forward in elaborating the paths and forms of Russia's independent development and will promote improvements in the effectiveness of its state and economic structures. But as yet it is only a declaration, a political statement enshrining the basic provisions of the concept of sovereignty. The declaration's ideas must be regarded as a basis and taken into account when the new RSFSR Constitution is being elaborated.

[PRAVDA] The declaration has been given a cautious reception in some places...

[Vorotnikov] There is not the slightest reason for this. One of the most important provisions in the declaration is the idea of the interdependence of Russia and the Union. Flippant attempts to regard the republic as a separate entity not linked with the USSR have been rejected. In my view, the people trying to take away from the Russian Federation any responsibility for the fate of the entire country are trying to push it into isolation and onto an irresponsible, fatal path. I will say more: This is betraying the cause of previous generations. How can you abandon something which our peoples lived, struggled, and suffered for? That kind of approach is unacceptable to a Russian.

Look, for all the problems that there are in the sphere of interethnic relations, the situation in Russia is pretty stable. The people of Russia retain a high degree of unity. We must cherish and protect this gain of the peoples—the result of centuries of living together. We must also protect the interests of people from Russia living outside their historical homeland.

[PRAVDA] You are an RSFSR people's deputy and participated in the work of the first congress of republic people's deputies. How do you assess the first results of the work that has been done?

[Vorotnikov] I believe that there are grounds for saying that on the whole the congress fulfilled its task. Indeed, it adopted important documents, elected the republic's Supreme Soviet and its chairman, and confirmed the chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers. It approached the fundamental questions of the Russian Federation's life from constructive, realistic positions.

At the same time the congress showed that many deputies are still not ready for work in conditions of developing democracy and political pluralism. It is impossible not to see that not everyone is able and willing to work for the cohesion and consolidation of social forces. For some of them, unfortunately, Russia's interests are only words; in practice all their thoughts are subordinated to wondering how to uphold sector or regional interests and sometimes just personal ambitions. I by no means regard differences of view as something criminal; on the contrary, they are inevitable, and it is necessary to elucidate and analyze these differences and, if you like, respect the diversity of standpoints. This is the only way to find the truth, which, in my view, always lies somewhere in the middle. But this "truth factor" was absent from some speeches at the congress; all you heard were unjustified complaints, and the standpoint of speakers of this kind boiled down to two main demands: "Gimme" and "Down with." I hope that such extremism will die away with the passage of time, that people will gather experience and realize that nothing gets achieved that way.

But I am convinced that this will not happen automatically. The vulgar approach to politics must be repulsed. The main thing here is to expose disparities between word and deed. Just look how much of everything some people promised before the elections and what they are now saying when they have become deputies. In my view the congress showed convincingly that the burning problems of present-day societal life cannot be solved from populist or conservative positions.

[PRAVDA] Vitaliy Ivanovich, you have repeatedly advocated the creation of a Russian Communist Party. How do you see its role?

[Vorotnikov] You are not quite right here. I repeatedly spoke out, but against—not in favor of—the creation of a Russian party. I have to say that I thought long and agonizingly in the process of overcoming all my doubts and reaching the conclusion that the republic now needs an independent communist party. But only a party operating within the framework of the CPSU as an integral part of it. A party with an identical program and identical statutes to the CPSU. A party which has profoundly grasped its responsibility for the fate of the republic and the entire country. Here, of course, the formation of the Russian Communist Party must not lead to the belittling of the other fraternal parties' role in the CPSU. Russia's communists must consistently strive for consolidation and unity of action on the party of the entire country's communists.

[PRAVDA] What would you wish the 28th CPSU Congress delegates?

[Vorotnikov] First and foremost unity on a principled and constructive basis. Party unity and consolidation are currently most important and essential in overcoming the considerable difficulties facing the party and country.

The second task, inseparable from the first, is to ensure that the atmosphere of the congress and the content of the entire party platform are internationalist.

Third, it is necessary to go for bold and innovative decisions on strategic questions, relying on the powerful creative potential of Marxist-Leninist theory.

Finally, it is important to elaborate guarantees of real intraparty democracy, which will serve as an inexhaustible source of strength and energy for the CPSU.

Yeltsin Interviewed, Backs 'Strong Union'

PM2106105890 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 23, 17-24 Jun 90 p 7

[Interview with RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin by Yegor Yakovlev: "Still Seeking Accord"—date, place not given]

[text] Yegor Yakovlev: In preparing for this meeting, I wanted to read the press reports of the news conference that followed your election. In vain, I leafed through the papers. Even "SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA" confined itself to a brief TASS item.

Boris Yeltsin: Is there a need for all those details? An oral speech is one thing, and a printed report where everything must be verified is another.

Yakovlev: Were you against such reports?

Yeltsin: Certainly not.

Yakovlev: You and I talked at the beginning of this year (MN No. 2). At that time you were already contemplating the forthcoming election to the Russian parliament—and anticipating opposition to your nomination. Did things turn out as you expected?

Yeltsin: Yes and no. While running for the seat in the Russian parliament I felt no opposition whatsoever. The Sverdlovsk Regional Party Committees and the Sverdlovsk Regional Executive Committee were most forthcoming since they knew they might damage their standing with voters otherwise. As for the chairmanship of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, the stakes were very high. I might have guessed that one of the Central Committee secretaries would show an interest in it. But honestly, I never expected the General Secretary to get involved. All I could do was throw up my hands when I learnt that the evening before the last vote Gorbachev had gathered some 250 communist deputies to try and predetermine the results of the voting—not in my favour, of course. I think it was an ill-conceived move.

Yakovlev: After you were voted in, did you receive Mikhail Gorbachev's congratulations?

Yeltsin: No. Perhaps the president congratulates only fellow-presidents. And the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet congratulates only fellow-chairmen. Lukyanov and the chairmen of both chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet all congratulated me.

Yakovlev: The long-standing confrontation between you and Gorbachev has never been grounds for jubilation. Now that you have become Chairman of Russia's Supreme Soviet, the confrontation can't help but cause concern in anyone who wishes our motherland well. Let me repeat the appeal addressed to Gorbachev and Yeltsin from the rostrum of the Russian Congress: "Once you take the helms—one of the whole country, the other of the republic—steer your ships calmly, wisely, cautiously, and reasonably, consulting the people, the deputies, and we will support you in this."

Yeltsin: To come to an agreement, one must have a will for it. I have the will and am ready to go my half of the way, as I have said many times before. I expect that after Gorbachev returns from the United States we'll meet and discuss everything thoroughly. Our cooperation is vital, naturally, within Russia's sovereignty and proceeding from its interests. Russia is Russia, and it has every right to depend on dialogue. There is no point in opposition here.

Yakovlev: You will recall Lenin's famous formula: Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country—then Russia. The turning of this formula into dogma turned the people into cogs, while the entire power bureaucracy kept turning the grindstones of electrification. Could you express, in the aphoristic form, your view of Russia's future?

Yeltsin: I spoke about it in my programme: for the economic, spiritual and cultural revival of Russia. But we must begin by getting out of the crisis. I would put it this way: through crisis to stabilization and revival.

Yakovlev: Going up in three stages?

Yeltsin: Without permitting the living standards to go down at anyone of those stages. This, I believe, is the radical difference with what the all-Union government is suggesting in its programme for the transition to a market economy.

Yakovlev: Is it possible to maintain the living standards even at the first stage, while breaking through the crisis?

Yeltsin: I am familiar with alternative proposals. They envisage a mechanism to check the deterioration of the living standards. But one should not confuse the two notions: prices and living standards. Prices can be raised if living standards are guaranteed.

Yakovlev: I often recall the first post-war reform of 1947, when food rationing was abolished, and money was devalued ten to one. An old woman, my neighbour, threw the 500 rubles she had saved into the wood stove because she did not fancy getting a mere 50 rubles in exchange. Very soon she bitterly regretted her action, because Moscow shops suddenly displayed such a wealth of foods, almost forgotten in the war years, that the worth of the new money was obvious to everybody. The present price rises against the background of empty shops can only lead to unpredictable consequences.

Yeltsin: Of course. It is easy to suppose that the government has taken an ill-considered step. But is this really so? The issue has been discussed three times by the Politburo, and many times by the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. They worked hard to produce the 130-page document. Now the question arises: What was their aim in proposing a 70-per-cent rise in some prices? To effect the transition to the market economy or to bury it?

Yakovlev: There are whole regions in Russia whose leaders have consistently trampled the few shoots of a market economy that had sprung up. Of course, we could improve the laws providing social protection to the newly-born generation of entreprencurs. But if a regional boss finds the very idea of a market economy unacceptable, nothing will save them. How do you intend to resist the open offensive against lease-holders and the co-op members?

Yeltsin: What we need is rapid reaction to unlawful actions by some bosses in some regions. But Russia is large, and one can hardly expect to keep all zealous orthodox types in check. We need a global approach. If the nationwide election of Russia's president takes place early next year, leaders of Soviets (councils) at all levels ought to be elected at the same time. Let the people decide who they want for their bosses: the command-system zealots, or the new thinkers.

Yakovlev: Are you saying that the nationwide election of Russia's president should take place simultaneously with the election of Soviet executives?

Yeltsin: The direct election of Soviet executives could precede the presidential election.

Yakovlev: This proposal follows from your programme, but it's up to the Congress to decide, isn't it?

Yeltsin: The Supreme Soviet could decide as well.

Yakovlev: One of today's problems is that the country has awakened to political life without having the appropriate political structures. Today one cannot name a single influential mass movement on which the supporters of perestroika could rely. How do you correlate your plans for Russia's revival with the idea of setting up Russia's Communist Party? Do you need the party to realize your programme?

Yeltsin: I can't say that. Yet I support the right to establish any political, mass organization, even if it is oppositional, as long as it operates within the framework of the Constitution. If a Russian Communist Party emerges, there will be many people in it with whom it will be possible and useful to cooperate.

Yakovlev: You have said that the country's and the republic's top leaders ought to defend the interests of the entire people, and should not therefore associate themselves with any party. Are you prepared to suspend your CPSU membership today, or will you consider the issue a year later when and if you decide to run for Russia's presidency?

Yeltsin: I'll decide after the 28th party congress. I have been elected a delegate. In that election I ran against 15 people and got 86 per cent of the communist vote. If I suspend my membership now, I'll be letting them down.

Yakovlev: What will your contribution to the 28th congress be?

Yeltsin: I'll be promoting the Democratic platform which, as far as I can see, makes it possible to effect a radical party reform. But I feel the Democratic platform will get no more than 200 or so votes at the congress.

Yakovlev: The election of delegates to the congress took place in a hurry, and the political positions of candidates to the congress took place in a hurry, and the political positions of candidates were not properly defined. I hear that among the delegates, about 45 per cent are party apparat officials, and about 20 per cent are business managers. This suggests that the congress might pass evasive resolutions ignoring the political schism in the party. The congress will thus find itself at an impasse, the party's left and right wings embarking on swift self-development.

Yeltsin: I do not pin great hopes on the congress. But from an ethical point of view it would be wrong to forfeit the last chance to save the party.

Yakovlev: You advocate the idea of concluding treaties between Russia and the other Union republics. If the republics conclude treaties with one another, will the basis for a new treaty of the Union appear?

Yeltsin: Speaking about the treaty of the Union, I do not mean any supercentralization. Rather, it will be a final stage in the political process during which individual republics come to terms with each other.

Yakovlev: What will a treaty with a particular republic cover?

Yeltsin: All kinds of relations—trade, financial, cultural—as well as the protection of the republic's citizens' interests and welfare. For example, of the Lithuanians in russia, or of the Russians in Lithuania. Perhaps, it would be wise to set up groups of deputies in the republics to develop the concept and structure of each treaty. All of this must be carried out without any political or economic preconditions.

Yakovlev: Does the expression "a strong centre" make sense to you?

Yeltsin: The concept of "a strong centre" predetermines the unshakeability of the vertical connections. I am for "a strong Union" which rests on firm horizontal ties among the republics. As far as the Union government is concerned, we shall conclude a treaty with it covering programmes in which Russia is prepared to take part and for which it is prepared to allocate funds. The same treaty will define the share of power to be delegated to the Union government.

Yakovlev: How do you visualize future relations with Lithuania? The delivery of Russian oil and gas to Lithuania has been cut.

Yeltsin: I cannot agree to the fact that the supplies of oil and gas to Lithuania are controlled from Russia. I think that from a psychological point of view we shall not obstruct the processes taking place there now. In the future we'll step up direct ties between our republics.

Yakovlev: The realization of the programme you've proposed will to a great extent depend on the new Russian government. Speaking at the congress, one deputy said Russia's Supreme Soviet ought to be protected against intellectuals.

Yeltsin: If we fail to create an intellectual nucleus in Russia's leadership, we shall most probably fail to achieve anything. I was aware of this before, and had my views confirmed while cooperating with the Interregional Group of People's Deputies.

Yakovlev: yet there is an opinion that the Interregional Group, has failed to produce a comprehensive programme to lead the country out of the crisis.

Yeltsin: This is not so. We did have a comprehensive programme covering all aspects of political, economic and ethnic relations. It was quite clearly formulated, too. It's another matter that neither the group, nor its alternative proposals were recognized. They didn't recognize us but that didn't stop them from borrowing a lot from us. You will recall that it was the Interregional Group who first insisted on changing Article 6 of the Constitution and on instituting a presidency.

Yakovlev: A short time ago I wrote that we ought not to disclose the names of authors whose proposals proved to be correct after being originally rejected. It is not just a question of copyright alone. One must be aware of the direction in which our demoratic evolution is proceeding.

Yeltsin: But the copyright is important, too. In the final analysis ideas are intellectual property which is being borrowed without any plans to pay for it.

Yakovlev: The Interregional Group is the materialization of the idea of the opposition every society needs. Now you will have to face opposition, too. It is clear that the conservative wing of the Supreme Soviet will oppose you. But what about left-wing opposition? Do you expect any?

Yeltsin: It is there already: a group of delegates standing on extremist positions. But it is a small group, really.

Yakovlev: How are you going to cope with them?

Yeltsin: Where there's a will, there a way. [Yeltsin ends]

We said good-bye. Yeltsin squeezed his massive body into his tiny Moskvich. How long will the Chairman of Russia's Supreme Soviet go on driving this vehicle, to the astonishment of the Moscow militia? Said Yeltsin: "When the Supreme Soviet confirms a budget for its chairman, I'll get into an office Volga."

Decree on Enactment of USSR Deputy Law

90UN2059B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 3

[USSR Supreme Soviet decree: "Procedure of Implementation of the USSR Law 'Status of the USSR People's Deputy'"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To implement the USSR law "Status of the USSR People's Deputy" as of its publication.

2. That the USSR Council of Ministers will prior to 1 October 1990 submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals pertaining to alterations and additions to USSR legislation in accordance with the USSR law "Status of People's Deputies in the USSR" and the USSR law "Status of the USSR People's Deputy."

3. That the Union republic supreme soviets will bring legislation of the Union republics into line with the USSR law "Status of People's Deputies in the USSR" and the USSR law "Status of the USSR People's Deputy."

4. To deem as having become invalid:

The USSR law of 20 September 1972 "Status of People's Deputies of the USSR" in the version of the USSR law of 19 April 1979 (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR No 17, 1979, article 277);

the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium edict of 1 September 1980 "Organization of Work With the Electorate's Mandates" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR No 36, 1980, article 736);

the USSR law of 23 October 1980 "Ratification of USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Edict 'Organization of Work With the Electorate's Mandates'" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR No 44, 1980, article 913);

the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree of 3 November 1983 "Procedure of the Application of Articles 33 and 34 of the USSR law 'Status of People's Deputies in the USSR'" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR No 45, 1983, article 688);

the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium edict of 24 December 1986 "Additions to the USSR Law 'Status of People's Deputies in the USSR'" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR No 52, 1986, article 1048) and the USSR law of 30 June 1987 "Ratification of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Edicts on Alterations and Additions to Certain Legislative Enactments of the USSR" in respect of ratification of the said edict (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR No 26, 1987, article 390);

the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree of 24 December 1986 "Groups of Deputies of the Soviets of People's Deputies" ("USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Minutes" No 54, 1986, section 150).

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
The Kremlin, Moscow, 31 May 1990.

Law on Status of USSR People's Deputy

90UN2059A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Jun 90 Morning Edition pp 2, 3

[USSR Law on the Status of the USSR People's Deputy]

[Text] I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. Legislation on the status of the USSR people's deputy

The status of the USSR people's deputy is determined by the USSR Constitution, the USSR law "Status of People's Deputies in the USSR," this law, and other legislative enactments of the USSR.

Article 2. Term of authority of the USSR people's deputy

The authority of the USSR people's deputy begins the day he is elected USSR people's deputy and ends the day of the election of a USSR people's deputy of the new convocation or in instances provided for by Article 9 of this law.

The USSR people's deputy elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet retains authority as a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet up to the election of the new USSR Supreme Soviet.

The authority of USSR people's deputy is not transferable.

Article 3. Deputy's identification and the badge of USSR people's deputy

Throughout his term of authority the USSR people's deputy has deputy's identification and the badge "USSR People's Deputy." Regulations governing the identification and badge of the USSR people's deputy and the sample and description of them are approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Article 4. Combination of the USSR people's deputy's activity with performance of production and office duties

The USSR people's deputy has the right to exemption from production or office duties for the term necessary for him to exercise his authority as deputy.

A USSR people's deputy elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet, a standing commission of a chamber, or a committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet is exempted from production or office duties at the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet, standing commission, or committee, respectively, by way of transfer for the term determined by these authorities.

The procedure of registration of the USSR people's deputy's exemption from the performance of production or office duties for work in an elective body and the fulfillment of assignments of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet and their authorities and in other instances is determined by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 5. Relations of the USSR people's deputy with the electorate or the public organization which elected him

The USSR people's deputy is responsible to the electorate or the public organization which elected him and is accountable to them.

The USSR people's deputy elected from a district maintains relations with the electorate, outfits, and public organizations which nominated him as deputy and the outfits of the other enterprises, establishments, and organizations and also state and public organizations located on the territory of his electoral district.

The USSR people's deputy elected from a public organization maintains relations with its elective authorities and organizations and also with the population and the outfits of enterprises, establishments, and organizations, and state and public organizations according to the place of his residence and work.

The USSR people's deputy, as the plenipotentiary of the people in the country's highest organs of state power, uses his status to ensure the guarantee of the citizens' rights and legitimate interests and protection of their honor and dignity.

The electorate and public organizations give mandates to their deputies. The USSR people's deputy seeks practical implementation of the mandate of the electorate and the public organizations.

A USSR people's deputy who has failed to justify the trust of the electorate or the public organization which elected him may be recalled in the established procedure.

Article 6. Participation of the USSR people's deputy in the work of lower soviets

The USSR people's deputy has a right to participate in congresses of people's deputies of Union and autonomous republics, the supreme soviets of Union and autonomous republics, and local soviets of people's deputies and their authorities on a nonvoting basis.

Article 7. Right of USSR people's deputies to associate in groups of deputies and deputies' clubs

USSR people's deputies have the right to associate in permanent or temporary groups of deputies and deputies' clubs.

The procedure of the activity of groups of deputies and their rights are determined by the standing orders of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet and other legislative enactments of the USSR regulating questions of deputies' activity.

Article 8. Deputy ethics

The USSR people's deputy must comply strictly with standards of ethics and morality. The use of his status by a USSR people's deputy to the detriment of the interests of the state, society, and the citizens is impermissible.

In the event of a breach of deputy ethics, the question of the deputy's conduct is examined on the instructions of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet by the Deputy Ethics Commission.

Article 9. Early termination of the authority of a USSR people's deputy

The authority of a USSR people's deputy is terminated early in accordance with a decision of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet made in connection with the election or appointment of the deputy to an office whose tenure is, in accordance with the law, incompatible with exercise of the authority of USSR people's deputy or in connection with a "guilty" verdict by a court of law in respect of a person who is a deputy having taken legal effect and also in the event of a USSR people's deputy's loss of USSR citizenship.

The authority of a USSR people's deputy may be terminated early in accordance with a decision of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet made in connection with a deputy's personal submittal of his resignation in view of circumstances impeding exercise of his authority or for other personal reasons.

The authority of a USSR people's deputy is terminated early also as a consequence of his recall by the electorate or the public organization which elected him or in connection with the termination of the activity of the public organization which elected the USSR people's deputy and which does not have a legal successor.

II. ACTIVITY OF THE USSR PEOPLE'S DEPUTY AT THE CONGRESS OF USSR PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES AND IN THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET AND ITS BODIES

Article 10. Participation of the USSR people's deputy in the business of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet

At sittings of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, USSR people's deputies examine and resolve on the basis of collective and free discussion all questions that in accordance with the USSR Constitution are within the jurisdiction of the USSR.

The USSR people's deputy is obliged to attend sittings of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and the USSR people's deputy who is a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet also sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and sittings of the chambers. In the event of it not being possible to attend a sitting, the USSR people's deputy notifies the chairman of the chamber or chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 11. Authority of a USSR people's deputy at sittings of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet

The USSR people's deputy enjoys the right to vote on all questions examined at a sitting of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. A USSR people's deputy who is not a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet may take part in its sittings on a nonvoting basis. The USSR people's deputy has the right:

to elect and be elected to bodies of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet and its bodies;

to express an opinion on the personnel composition of the bodies formed by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet and the candidacies of officials to be elected, appointed, or approved by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet;

to suggest questions for examination by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and USSR Supreme Soviet;

to submit proposals and observations pertaining to the agenda of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and

a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and to the procedure of examination and the substance of the questions being discussed;

to submit proposals concerning the hearing at a sitting of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of an account or information from any body or official accountable to or under the control of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet;

to raise the question of confidence in the USSR Government and officials elected, appointed, or approved by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet;

to submit at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and in the USSR Supreme Soviet and their bodies and in other soviets of people's deputies proposals concerning the need for verification of the fulfillment of USSR laws by state and public authorities and enterprises, establishments, and organizations, and concerning a deputy's investigations on any matter within the jurisdiction of the USSR;

to participate in debates, address inquiries, and put questions to rapporteurs and also the chairman of a sitting, and to demand answers and evaluate them;

to present a justification of his proposals and the reasons for his vote and to present information;

to submit plenary amendments to draft laws, decrees, and other legislative enactments;

to read out citizens' appeals of public significance at sittings of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

A USSR people's deputy who has not spoken in debate has the right to convey to the chairman the text of his speech and also proposals and observations set forth in writing on an issue discussed at a sitting of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The text of the speech is included in the minutes of the sitting and is published in the record of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or USSR Supreme Soviet and its chambers.

To acquaint himself with the texts of his speeches in stenographic accounts and minutes of sittings of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet and their authorities prior to publication and also to obtain texts of speeches not due for publication.

The proposals and observations submitted by the deputies at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet are examined and considered at the time of the completion and enactment of bills. In the event of their being turned down, the deputy is given a substantiated answer by the appropriate standing commission or committee.

A USSR people's deputy who disagrees with a decision of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and its bodies with a decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet or its bodies, has preference in setting forth his particular opinion at the sitting.

Proceedings may not be instituted against a USSR people's deputy for a position he has expressed in his speeches and at the time of a vote on questions at issue at a sitting of Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet and its bodies unless he has engaged in actions which are directly prohibited by law.

The procedure of realization of the rights specified in this article is determined by this law, the standing orders of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, and other legislative enactments of the USSR.

Article 12. Right of legislative initiative of the USSR people's deputy

The USSR people's deputy has the right of legislative initiative at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and in the USSR Supreme Soviet, which may be realized in the form of the formulation of a question concerning the need for the elaboration of a new law and the submittal for examination by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet of draft new laws of the USSR and draft laws on changes in current USSR laws and also in the form of proposals concerning changes to current USSR laws.

Article 13. The deputy's inquiry

The USSR people's deputy or a group of USSR people's deputies have the right to address an inquiry pertaining to instances of violation of or noncompliance with the USSR Constitution, USSR laws and decrees, and other enactments adopted by the highest organs of state power and administration of the USSR and also pertaining to other questions of all-state significance at sittings of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the USSR Council of Ministers and leaders of other bodies formed or elected by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, and to the USSR president, at sittings of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

The deputy's inquiry is submitted in writing. The USSR people's deputy or, at his request, the chairman at a sitting of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet reads out the inquiry.

The state authority and official to whom the inquiry is addressed is obliged to provide an official answer to it. An answer in writing to the inquiry is presented within not more than three days or within a different period of time determined by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet, and is read out at the given Congress of USSR People's Deputies or session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The USSR people's deputy has the right to evaluate an official's answer to an

inquiry. A decree is adopted on the results of a discussion in connection with an inquiry.

The inquiry, the answer to it, and the decree of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or USSR Supreme Soviet adopted in respect of the results of examination of the inquiry should be published.

In accordance with Union republic legislation, the USSR people's deputy may submit an inquiry to republic and local organs of state power and administration.

Article 14. Examination of proposals and observations of USSR people's deputies submitted at sittings of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet

Proposals and observations expressed by a USSR people's deputy at sittings of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet or conveyed in writing to the chairman are examined by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet, or standing commissions of the chambers, or forwarded by them for examination by the appropriate state and public authorities and officials.

The state and public authorities and also the officials to whom the proposals and observations of the deputies have been submitted at sittings of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet are obliged to examine them within not more than one month and to communicate the results directly to the deputy and also the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Supervision of the examination and realization of the deputies' proposals and observations is exercised by committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet and standing commissions of its chambers.

Article 15. Activity of the USSR people's deputy in bodies of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet

A USSR people's deputy elected to bodies of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet is obliged to participate in their work.

A USSR people's deputy who is not a member of a USSR Supreme Soviet committee or standing commission of a chamber has the right to participate in their sittings, submit proposals, and participate in discussion of the matters at issue and the adoption of decisions on a nonvoting basis. In the event of disagreement with the decision of a committee or standing commission, a deputy may submit his proposal as a plenary amendment to the bill. Amendments submitted by a deputy are examined by the USSR Supreme Soviet, and a vote is taken on them.

A USSR people's deputy may be expelled from a committee or standing commission of a chamber for systematic nonparticipation in their work.

Article 16. Participation of the USSR people's deputy in fulfillment of assignments of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet and their bodies

At the behest of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet or their bodies, the USSR people's deputy participates in verification of fulfillment of USSR laws by state and public authorities and enterprises, establishments, and organizations. The USSR people's deputy notifies the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet or their bodies respectively of the results of the verification. If necessary, he submits proposals concerning removal of the shortcomings which have been revealed, the cancellation of unlawful decisions, and the institution of proceedings against persons who have broken the law and failed to fulfill decrees of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 17. Deputies' investigation

In accordance with a decision of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet and their bodies or on the initiative of a group of USSR people's deputies numbering not less than 100 persons, a deputies' investigation may be appointed. All state authorities and officials are obliged to render the necessary assistance in the investigation; at the demand of the USSR people's deputy or deputies' commission conducting the investigation they are obliged to make available without hindrance information and documents necessary for an objective study of the issue. No one has the right to refuse to provide the deputies conducting a deputies' investigation with explanations.

The results of the investigation are conveyed to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet or their bodies respectively.

III. ACTIVITY OF THE USSR PEOPLE'S DEPUTY IN THE ELECTORAL DISTRICT OR IN THE PUBLIC ORGANIZATION WHICH ELECTED HIM

Article 18. Authority of a USSR people's deputy in connection with work in the electoral district or in the public organization which elected him

For the purpose of exercise of his authority in the electoral district or in the public organization which elected him, the USSR people's deputy has the right:

to participate in the organs of state power and administration and the authorities of the corresponding public organizations at the time of examination of any questions affecting the interests of the electorate and members of the public organizations;

to participate in the organization and verification of fulfillment of laws and decrees of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet and their bodies;

to verify on his own initiative, creating commissions where necessary or enlisting representatives of state authorities and public organizations and people's control officials, information concerning a breach of laws and the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens and enterprises, establishments, and organizations, and a manifestation of red tape and bureaucratism;

to exercise supervision of the examination of the proposals, applications, and complaints which he has forwarded to state and public authorities and enterprises, establishments, and organizations and to participate in their examination personally. Officials of state and public authorities and enterprises, establishments, and organizations are obliged to render the deputy assistance in his supervisory activity;

to participate in the work of various associations of people's deputies, voters, public territorial self-government authorities, and meetings of labor collectives and citizens according to place of residence and servicemen by military unit.

Article 19. Examination by the USSR people's deputy of citizens' proposals, applications, and complaints

In the procedure determined by legislation the USSR people's deputy examines proposals, applications, and complaints addressed to him and takes steps for their correct and timely resolution; and receives citizens, studies public opinion, and submits proposals to the appropriate soviets of people's deputies and the authorities of the public organization which elected him and, if necessary, to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and other state and public authorities.

At the request of the USSR people's deputy leaders and other officials of state and public authorities and enterprises, establishments, and organizations are obliged to take part in a reception of the electorate which he conducts.

Article 20. Report of the USSR people's deputy to the electorate or the public organization which elected him

The USSR people's deputy is obliged not less than once a year to render account to the electorate of the district or the public organization which elected him and also to the outfits and public organizations which nominated him for deputy of his work and of the course of fulfillment of the election program and realization of his mandate.

A USSR people's deputy may render account also at the demand of a group of voters or members of the public organization which elected him numbering no less than 500.

The local authorities, public organizations, and the mass media established by the soviets of people's deputies and the corresponding public organizations provide for coverage of the USSR people's deputies' reports.

Article 21. Assistance to the USSR people's deputy in presenting reports and in meetings with the electorate or members of the public organization which elected him

The USSR people's deputy is ensured the necessary conditions for presenting reports and meeting with the electorate of the district or members of the public organization which elected him. At his request the presidium or executive committee of the corresponding local soviet of people's deputies or the local bodies of the public organization and the management of enterprises, establishments, and organizations allocate premises, notify the citizens of the time and place of the deputy's presentation of a report and his meetings with the electorate or members of the public organization, send at the deputy's invitation their representatives to participate in the meetings, and render other assistance.

At the request of the USSR people's deputy state authorities and enterprises, establishments, and organizations make available to him reference material and information necessary for the report and speeches.

IV. ORGANIZATION OF WORK WITH MANDATES

Article 22. Mandates to the USSR people's deputy

Commissions accepted by the candidate for USSR people's deputy at gatherings or conferences of the electorate of the district, and, in the case of his election from public organizations, at congresses, conferences, or plenums of their all-Union authorities, are the mandates to the USSR people's deputy.

Only commissions whose realization is within the jurisdiction of all-Union state or public authorities are regarded as being mandates to the USSR people's deputies.

Article 23. Collation and examination of mandates

The mandates of the electorate and the public organizations are collated by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers and presented to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The USSR Supreme Soviet may entrust to committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet and standing commissions of its chambers, the USSR Council of Ministers, and other all-Union state and public authorities the preliminary examination of the mandates and preparation of the appropriate proposals in respect of them.

With regard for the findings of committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the standing commissions of its chambers the USSR Council of Ministers submits a consolidated plan of measures pertaining to fulfillment of the mandates for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Upon the USSR Supreme Soviet's adoption of a decision on the inexpediency or impossibility of fulfillment of individual mandates the USSR people's deputy has the right to pose the question of additional study of such mandates and to submit them for repeat examination.

The mandates are taken into consideration at the time of elaboration of state plans of economic and social development and the compilation of the USSR state budget.

Measures pertaining to their realization are distinguished in the plans and the budget in a special section.

Article 24. Organization of fulfillment of the mandates

Fulfillment of the mandates accepted for execution by the USSR Supreme Soviet is ensured by the USSR Council of Ministers and other state and public authorities.

Supervision of fulfillment of the mandates is exercised by the USSR Supreme Soviet and its committees and standing commissions of the chambers and by USSR people's deputies.

The USSR Council of Ministers and other all-Union state and public organizations report to the USSR Supreme Soviet not less than once a year on fulfillment of the decisions pertaining to the mandates.

The committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the standing commissions of its chambers examine questions connected with the fulfillment of measures pertaining to the mandates and receive reports from leaders of the USSR Council of Ministers and other state authorities and officials.

Examination and realization contained in the mandates to candidates not elected deputies and also of the proposals submitted at election meetings and within the jurisdiction of republic and local soviets are organized by the corresponding republic authorities and local soviets of people's deputies. The republic authorities and the presidiums of the local soviets of people's deputies notify the citizens of the results of the examination and realization of such proposals directly.

Article 25. Participation of the USSR people's deputy in work with mandates

The USSR people's deputy participates in the collation of mandates and studies and discussion of the plan of measures pertaining to their realization, exercises supervision of the fulfillment, and notifies the electorate and public organizations of the course of fulfillment of the mandates.

The USSR people's deputy monitors fulfillment of the mandates on the instructions of the USSR Supreme Soviet or its bodies and also on his own initiative with the enlistment, if necessary, of specialists. The USSR people's deputy notifies of the results of the monitoring the USSR Supreme Soviet or its bodies and also the electorate and the pertinent public organizations.

Article 26. Glasnost in the work with mandates

The decisions of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted in respect of the mandates are to be published.

The mass media established by the soviets of people's deputies and the pertinent public organizations illustrate the course of fulfillment of the mandates of the electorate and the public organizations.

V. BASIC GUARANTEES OF THE DEPUTY'S ACTIVITY

Article 27. Guarantees of realization of the right of legislative initiative

The right of legislative initiative of the USSR people's deputy is guaranteed by:

obligatory examination of a proposal submitted by way of legislative initiative at a sitting of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet with the adoption of one of the following decisions: enactment of a law; adoption of a decision on the start of elaboration of a new bill; forwarding of the proposed bill for additional work to the pertinent committees and standing commissions; substantiated rejection of the legislative initiative;

the obligatory putting to the vote of proposals and also all amendments to a law submitted by a USSR people's deputy.

Article 28. Right of the USSR people's deputy to immediate reception by officials

On questions of deputies' activity the USSR people's deputy enjoys the right of immediate reception by leaders and other officials and also the right of unimpeded visits upon presentation of deputy's identification to all state and public authorities and enterprises, establishments, and organizations.

Article 29. Duties of officials pertaining to examination of appeals of a USSR people's deputy

The USSR people's deputy has the right to appeal to all state and public authorities, enterprises, establishments, and organizations and officials on questions connected with deputies' activity and to participate in the examination of the questions which have been raised. The said authority and official are obliged to give the deputy an answer to his appeal immediately, and if additional study of the corresponding question or verification are needed, within no more than one month.

Appeals by a USSR people's deputy on questions within the jurisdiction of the soviets of people's deputies and their bodies, ministries, state committees, and departments and councils of ministers are to be examined by these bodies. The deputy is to be notified of the day of their examination ahead of time.

Article 30. Right of the USSR people's deputy to demand an end to a breach of legality

The USSR people's deputy, as a representative of state power, has the right to demand on the spot an end to a violation, and if necessary, to demand of the appropriate authorities and officials that they put a stop to a breach of the law and the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens.

Officials of state and public authorities and enterprises, establishments, and organizations to which the demand of a USSR people's deputy is addressed are obliged to immediately adopt measures to end the violation, and if necessary, to institute proceedings against the guilty parties with subsequent notification of this to the deputy.

Article 31. Right of the USSR people's deputy to obtain and disseminate information

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium provides the USSR people's deputy with documents of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet and also information and reference material officially disseminated by government and other state and public authorities.

The presidium and the executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies and other state and public authorities and also officials are obliged, upon an appeal by a USSR people's deputy, to provide him with specialist advice on matters connected with deputies' activity and to immediately make available the information he needs.

To support his deputy's activity the USSR people's deputy has the right to use copiers and computers of enterprises and organizations which are located on the territory of the election district or which are part of the structure of the public organization which elected the deputy.

The USSR people's deputy has preference when it comes to speaking on matters of his deputy's activity in organs of the press established by the soviets of people's deputies or a corresponding public organization and on television and radio. Editing of the material submitted by the deputy without his consent is not permitted.

Article 32. Rendering of legal assistance to the USSR people's deputy

The presidiums of the soviets of people's deputies and their executive and administrative authorities, the management of enterprises, organizations, legal research institutions, and educational institutions and the law enforcement authorities render assistance to the USSR people's deputy on legal issues arising in his deputy's activity.

Article 33. Defense of the honor, dignity, and person of the USSR people's deputy

Public insults against a USSR people's deputy and, equally, slander in respect of him entail liability determined by law.

Pressure in any form whatever on a USSR people's deputy or his close relatives for the purpose of impeding performance of his deputy's duties or achieving the adoption of a decision in someone's favor is punished by corrective labor for a term of up to three years or a fine of R5,000-10,000.

Article 34. Immunity of the USSR people's deputy

The USSR people's deputy may not have criminal proceedings instituted against him and may not be arrested or be subjected to measures of administrative punishment imposed in legal form without the consent of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and when the latter is in recess, without the consent of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted in respect of a USSR people's deputy only by the USSR prosecutor general.

The taking into custody and, equally, inspection of the personal effects, baggage, transport, and residence or office premises of a USSR people's deputy are not permitted.

Proceedings may be instituted against a USSR people's deputy after the expiration of his term of authority on a charge of a breach of the law perpetrated in the period of performance of his deputy's authority only in the procedure provided for by law in respect of a USSR people's deputy.

Article 35. Procedure of obtaining consent to institute proceedings against a USSR people's deputy

To obtain the consent of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and when the latter is in recess, of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, to institute criminal proceedings against a USSR people's deputy, to arrest him, or to apply measures of administrative punishment imposed in legal form the USSR prosecutor general makes a submission to the USSR Supreme Soviet prior to the charging of the deputy, the issuance of an arrest warrant, or the forwarding of a case concerning an administrative offense to a court of law.

The USSR Supreme Soviet examines the submission within not more than one month.

If necessary, additional material may be demanded of the USSR prosecutor general. The USSR people's deputy in respect of whom the submission has been made has the right to participate in the examination of the issues. The USSR Supreme Soviet makes a reasoned ruling and within three days notifies the USSR prosecutor general of it.

The USSR Supreme Soviet may, with cause, revise its decision.

The USSR prosecutor general is obliged within three days from the completion of proceedings to notify the USSR Supreme Soviet of the results of the investigation or examination of the case.

Article 36. Guarantees of the labor rights of the USSR people's deputy and the rights of the USSR people's deputy from the ranks of servicemen and other categories of citizens whose service is regulated by service rules and regulations

In the period of his authority and also for two years following it a USSR people's deputy may not on the initiative of management be dismissed from an enterprise, establishment, or organization or expelled from a collective farm, other cooperative or educational institution, or transferred by way of disciplinary punishment to lower-pay work without the consent of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The USSR people's deputy from the ranks of servicemen and other categories of citizens whose work is regulated by service rules and regulations may not at the initiative of management or the command be dismissed, downgraded, or reduced in rank or also relocated without his consent. Conferment on him of officer rank and a special

rank equivalent of that of officer, according to the position he holds, may not be held back.

A USSR people's deputy exempted from production or office duties for the exercise of his deputy's authority is at the end of this term granted his former job (position), and given the absence thereof, another equivalent job (position) at the same or, with his consent, another enterprise, establishment, or organization.

A USSR people's deputy from the ranks of servicemen and other employees whose activity is regulated by service rules and regulations and who has been exempted from performance of his official duties is seconded to the USSR Supreme Soviet while remaining on active military or other service, and upon the expiration of the term of exempted work in the USSR Supreme Soviet and its bodies, is placed at the disposal of the pertinent ministries and departments for further service in the position which he held earlier or, with his consent, an equivalent or higher position.

The term of the authority of a USSR people's deputy is counted as being part of the overall and continuous work and service and length of work in his former specialty.

With an official taken on by way of appointment to a position held by a USSR people's deputy a labor contract is concluded which is canceled upon the deputy's return to his previous work.

Article 37. Assurance of the material and financial conditions for a USSR people's deputy's exercise of his authority

The USSR people's deputy is reimbursed expenditure connected with his deputy's activity in the procedure and the amounts determined by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The USSR people's deputy exempted from the performance of production or office duties and transferred to work in the USSR Supreme Soviet or its bodies is for the time of his exercise of his deputy's functions paid a wage in the amount determined by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The presidiums and executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies make available to the USSR people's deputy individual equipment and premises furnished with communications facilities for the exercise of his deputy's authority.

The USSR people's deputy has the right to special lodging in hotels.

Article 38. Right of the USSR people's deputy to free travel

The USSR people's deputy enjoys on the territory of the USSR the right of free travel on all inland rail, air, motor, and water routes and on all forms of urban mass transit, and also the right to the special acquisition of travel papers. These rights extend also to a person accompanying the USSR people's deputy who is an invalid group I.

The local soviets of people's deputies and enterprises, establishments, and organizations are obliged to make available to a USSR people's deputy transportation for trips in exercise of a deputy's duties.

Article 39. USSR People's Deputies' Leave

The USSR people's deputy is granted annual paid leave of 36 working days, except for instances where longer leave is provided for by legislation. The procedure of leave pay is determined by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 40. Granting the USSR people's deputy official accommodations

The USSR people's deputy elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet or its bodies and exempted in this connection from the performance of production or office duties who does not have a permanent residence in Moscow is granted temporary official accommodations for residence together with members of his family.

The accommodations occupied by the deputy and members of his family at his permanent place of residence is reserved for this period.

Article 41. Assistants of the USSR people's deputy

The USSR people's deputy has the right to have secretaries and assistants on the staff of enterprises, establishments, and organizations or on the staff, at the deputy's request, of the executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies for rendering him office management and scientific advisory assistance in the exercise of his deputy's authority.

The USSR people's deputy may also have assistants working on a voluntary basis.

The conditions and procedure of the work of assistants are regulated by labor legislation and the regulations governing assistants of the USSR people's deputy approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 42. Reimbursement of expenditure in connection with exercise of a deputy's authority

Expenditure provided for by this law, including that of enterprises, establishments, and organizations and also the local soviets of people's deputies, in connection with the exercise of a USSR people's deputy's authority is reimbursed from the USSR Supreme Soviet budget.

Article 43. Responsibility of officials for failure to comply with the requirements of this law

The Soviet state guarantees the USSR people's deputy the conditions for the unimpeded and efficient exercise of his authority and defends his rights, honor, and dignity.

Officials of state and public authorities and enterprises, establishments, and organizations who fail to fulfill their duties to the deputies, impede his work, and present him

with knowingly false information in violation of the guarantees of a deputy's activity are liable in accordance with the law.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR.
The Kremlin, Moscow, 31 May 1990.

Draft Law on Recall of USSR People's Deputy

90UN2112A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Jun 90 pp 1, 6

[Draft USSR Law "On Procedure for Recalling a USSR People's Deputy"]

[Text] The right to recall a USSR people's deputy is one of the most important provisions of Soviet democratism and guarantees true control over a deputy, and ensures his responsibility before the voters or the social organization that elected him.

Article 1. Basis for recall of a USSR people's deputy

A USSR people's deputy who has failed to justify the confidence of the voters or social organization which elected him, by virtue of nonfulfillment of his deputy responsibilities or violation of the USSR Constitution or USSR laws, may be recalled by decision of the voters or the social organization according to procedure as prescribed by this law.

Article 2. Motion to recall a USSR people's deputy elected from a territorial or national-territorial electoral district

A motion to recall a USSR people's deputy elected from a territorial or national-territorial electoral district may be introduced by assemblies (conferences) of workers' collectives, social organizations, collectives of secondary specialized or higher educational institutions, or assemblies of voters by place of residence, servicemen by military unit.

The motion to recall a USSR people's deputy elected from a territorial electoral district is submitted to the appropriate supreme soviet of Union or autonomous republic or its presidium, or to the kray, oblast, city (of a republic-subordinated city) soviet of people's deputies or its presidium.

The motion to recall a USSR people's deputy elected from a national-territorial electoral district is submitted to the appropriate supreme soviet of Union or autonomous republic, or to the soviet of people's deputies of autonomous oblast or autonomous okrug, or to its presidium.

In the event there are proper grounds for the motion of recall, the soviet of people's deputies or its presidium makes a decision on the formation of an okrug electoral commission within 30 days of submission of the recall motion.

Within 30 days of its formation, the okrug electoral commission makes a decision on convening a conference of okrug voters with respect to the recall motion to decide the matter of instituting recall of the USSR people's deputy.

Article 3. Motion to recall a USSR people's deputy elected from a social organization

The motion to recall a USSR people's deputy elected from an all-Union social organization may be introduced by rayon-in-city, okrug, oblast, kray, or republic electoral organ of the appropriate social organization.

The motion to recall a USSR people's deputy elected from an all-Union social organization is submitted to the higher-echelon electoral organ of the appropriate social organization.

In the event there are proper grounds for a recall motion, the all-Union electoral organ of the social organization makes a decision on the formation of an electoral commission within 30 days of submission of the recall motion.

Within 30 days of its formation, the electoral commission on elections of USSR people's deputies of the social organization makes a decision on examining the matter of instituting recall at a congress, conference of the appropriate social organization, or plenum of its all-Union organ.

Article 4. Guarantees of the rights of a USSR people's deputy in the examination of a motion for his recall

The okrug electoral commission or elections commission of the social organization provide notification of the recall motion presented and the procedure for its examination to the USSR people's deputy and to the Central Electoral Commission on Elections of USSR People's Deputies.

A USSR people's deputy has the right to present a written statement to the okrug electoral commission or the electoral commission on elections of USSR people's deputies of the social organization, as well as to make presentations at assemblies (conferences) of voters, in the press, on radio and television, with respect to the circumstances which serve as the basis for his recall motion.

If the circumstances serving as the basis for submission of a motion to recall a USSR people's deputy constitute the subject of judicial investigation, then the appropriate soviet of people's deputies, electoral organ of the social organization, or electoral commission suspend their examination of the recall motion until a final decision has been reached by the court in this matter.

Citizens who knowingly submit false information serving as a pretext for raising the issue of recall of a USSR people's deputy will be held responsible in accordance with existing law.

Article 5. Institution of a matter of recalling a USSR people's deputy

A conference of okrug voters has the right to decide a matter of instituting recall of a USSR people's deputy elected from a territorial or national-territorial electoral district.

A congress, conference of a social organization, or plenum of its all-Union organ have the right to decide a matter of instituting recall of a USSR people's deputy elected from the social organization.

A conference of okrug voters is held upon decision of the okrug electoral commission and is formed according to norms established by it in consideration of the number of voters residing in population centers located in the electoral district. Delegation of okrug voter representatives to the conference is conducted by assemblies (conferences) of labor collectives, by social organizations, collectives of secondary specialized and higher educational institutions, assemblies of voters by place of residence and servicemen by military unit, through open or secret balloting.

The conference of okrug voters is competent upon presence of a quorum of two-thirds of the total number of voter delegates and has the right to support a motion of recall or refuse to support it. Decision of the conference is made by a majority of votes of the total number of conference delegates through secret ballot. The decision adopted by the conference of okrug voters is reported in the press.

Article 6. Scheduling the vote on a matter of recalling a USSR people's deputy

The decision to institute a matter of recalling a USSR people's deputy is sent by the okrug electoral commission or elections commission of the social organization within five days to the USSR people's deputy and also to the Central Electoral Commission on Elections of USSR People's Deputies, which will check observance of the procedure for institution of recall within a 30-day period and schedule voting on the matter of recall.

The date voting on a matter of recall of a USSR people's deputy is to take place must be determined not earlier than 90 days and not later than 110 days from the time of institution of the recall matter.

Article 7. Campaigning for or against recall of a USSR people's deputy

Following scheduling by the Central Electoral Commission on Elections of USSR People's Deputies of the date to conduct voting on the recall of a USSR people's deputy, voters, labor collectives, and social organizations are guaranteed the opportunity to freely and comprehensively discuss questions related to the recall and also are afforded the right to conduct an unimpeded campaign for or against the deputy's recall at assemblies of voters, in the press, on radio or television.

The right to free campaigning at assemblies (conferences) of voters and the right to use the mass media are extended to a USSR people's deputy against whom a matter of recall has been instituted, as well as to his authorized representatives.

Campaigning is not permitted the day voting on the recall is to take place.

Article 8. Commissions and precincts for conducting the voting, lists of eligible voters and voters

Organization of the effort to recall a USSR people's deputy is the task of the okrug electoral commission or elections commission of the social organization.

In order to organize conduct of the voting on a matter of recalling a USSR people's deputy, voting precincts are formed not later than 35 days prior to the vote and precinct commissions formed not later than 30 days prior, by territorial or national-territorial electoral district. The formation and activity of commissions for conducting a recall vote, the formation of voting precincts, and the drawing up of lists of eligible voters and persons casting ballots from social organizations are accomplished according to procedure as established by the USSR Law "On Elections of USSR People's Deputies."

Article 9. The ballot

The ballot for voting on a matter of recall will indicate the last name, first name, and patronymic of the USSR people's deputy, the position he holds (occupation), his place of work, and residence.

The ballot for voting on a matter of recall is printed in the languages used by voters of the appropriate district.

Article 10. Voting and determining voting results

The voting on a matter of recall of a USSR people's deputy is conducted in secret. It is organized in accordance with the USSR Law "On Elections of USSR People's Deputies."

Voting procedure calls for the voter to cross out a deputy's last name on the ballot if he is voting for recall, or leave it alone if he is voting to keep him in office.

A USSR people's deputy is considered to have been recalled if more than half the voters, delegates of congresses or conferences of social organizations, or plenum participants of their all-Union organs listed on the voting registers vote for his recall.

A recall is considered to have been voted down if less than half the voters, delegates of congresses or conferences of social organizations, or plenum participants of their all-Union organs listed on the voting registers vote for his recall, or if participation in this vote comprises less than half the voters or persons voting from a social organization listed on the voting register.

In the event the same number of votes are cast for and against recall, the USSR people's deputy retains his office.

The okrug electoral commission or elections commission of a social organization may declare voting results invalid due to violations of the law.

Voting results are determined at a session of the okrug electoral commission or elections commission of a social

organization, entered into documentation, and sent to the Central Electoral Commission on Elections of USSR People's Deputies.

Based on the documents it receives from the okrug electoral commission or elections commission of a social organization, the Central Electoral Commission records the voting results. In the event it is determined the law has been violated and voting results are declared invalid, the Central Electoral Commission schedules a repeat vote, which is conducted within a two-week period under the provisions of this law.

Article 11. Expenses related to the conduct of voting

Expenses related to the preparation and conduct of voting on a matter of recalling a USSR people's deputy are incurred by the state.

Enterprises, institutions and organizations, state and social organs will afford premises and equipment necessary for the preparation and conduct of voting to the disposition of appropriate commissions.

During the period in which a USSR people's deputy against whom a matter of recall has been instituted—as well as his authorized representatives—are conducting meetings with voters on this question, they are released from their work, expenses being defrayed by the state.

Article 12. Appeal regarding violations of the law on procedure for recalling a USSR people's deputy

Statements and complaints that violations of this law have been committed are examined by the Central Electoral Commission on Elections of USSR People's Deputies, which makes the final decision on such matters.

In accordance with the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on publication of the draft Law on Procedure for Recalling a USSR People's Deputy, citizens, collectives of enterprises, organizations, and institutions will direct their proposals and observations on the draft law to the presidiums of the appropriate soviets of people's deputies or to the editorial staff of newspapers, magazines, radio and television broadcast services.

Generalized data on the content of proposals and observations regarding the published draft law are presented by the presidiums of republic and autonomous republic supreme soviets and by the central organs of press, radio and television to the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on the Workings of the Soviets of People's Deputies, Development of Government and Self-Government.

Law on Press, Mass Media Published

PM2106130790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 3

["USSR Law on the Press and Other Mass Information Media"]

[Text]**Chapter I. General Provisions**

Article 1. Freedom of the press

The press and other mass information media are free.

Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are guaranteed to citizens by the USSR Constitution, mean the right to express opinions and beliefs, to seek, select, receive, and disseminate information and ideas in any form, including the press and other mass information media.

Censorship of mass information is not permitted.

Article 2. The mass information media

In the present law, mass information means reports and materials publicly disseminated in printed, audio, and audiovisual format.

Mass information media means newspapers, journals, television and radio programs, documentary movies, and other periodical forms of publicly disseminated mass information.

Mass information media are represented by the editorial offices of the periodical press and of television and radio broadcasting (news agencies and other institutions engaged in the production of mass information).

Article 3. The language of the mass information media

The mass information media engage in their activity in the languages of the peoples whom they serve or whose interests they represent. The mass information media have the right to disseminate mass information in other languages.

The state guarantees the right of USSR citizens to use their native language and other languages of USSR peoples when receiving and disseminating mass information in conformity with legislation on the languages of USSR peoples.

Article 4. Production and economic activity

The editorial office of mass information media is a legal entity operating on the basis of its statutes.

The editorial office has the right to carry out production and economic activity in conditions of economic autonomy and economic accountability.

The procedure for the granting of state subsidies to mass information media is defined by legislation of the USSR and Union and autonomous republics.

Article 5. Impermissibility of abuse of the freedom of speech

The use of mass information media to publicize information containing state secrets or other secrets specifically protected by law, to call for the violent overthrow or change of the existing state and social system, to propagandize war, violence, cruelty, or racial, national, or religious exclusivity or intolerance, to disseminate

pornography, or to incite the commission of other criminally punishable acts is not permitted.

The use of the mass information media to interfere in citizens' personal lives or to infringe their honor and dignity is not permitted and is punishable in accordance with the law.

Article 6. USSR legislation and Union and autonomous republics' legislation on the press and other mass information media

Legislation on the press and other mass information media comprises the present law and other USSR legislative acts promulgated in accordance with it, as well as laws and other legislative acts on the press and other mass information media in Union and autonomous republics.

Chapter II. Organization of the Activity of the Mass Information Media

Article 7. Founding rights

The right to found a mass information medium belongs to soviets of people's deputies and other state organs, political parties, social organizations, mass movements, creative unions, and cooperative, religious, and other associations of citizens formed in accordance with the law, and also to labor collectives and citizens of the USSR over the age of 18 years.

Monopolization of any form of mass information medium (press, radio, television, or others) is not permitted.

Article 8. Registration of mass information media

The editorial offices of mass information media engages in their activity after registration of the mass information medium in question.

Applications for registration of mass information media aimed at a unionwide public are submitted by the founders to the organs of state management as laid down by the USSR Council of Ministers, while applications for registration of mass information media aimed at republican or local public are submitted to the appropriate executive and administrative organs. Applications for registration must be examined within one month of receipt.

The registration of mass information media aimed at republican or local public can be assigned to other state organs by Union and autonomous republics' legislative acts.

Mass information media aimed at the public abroad are registered with the USSR Council of Ministers or with Union republic Councils of Ministers.

The right to embark on the production of mass information remains valid for one year from the date of receipt of the certificate of registration. In the event of this time limit being exceeded, the certificate of registration is deemed to have expired.

Article 9. Application for registration of mass information media

The application for registration of mass information media must indicate:

1) the founder;

2) the title, language (languages), and location of the mass information medium;

3) the intended public;

4) the program objectives and tasks;

5) the mass information medium's proposed frequency of publication, maximum size, and sources of finance.

It is prohibited to make other demands in the process of registration of mass information media.

Article 10. Cases of dissemination of information without registration

The right to publicly disseminate information without registration belongs to organs of state power and management and other state organs for the publication of official normative and other acts and bulletins of judicial and arbitration practice.

Enterprises, organizations, and academic and scientific institutions have the right to produce and disseminate any information material and documentation necessary to their activity without registration. No registration is required for the production, by the use of technical means, of printed, audio, and audiovisual matter not intended for public dissemination or reproduced in manuscript form. No registration is required for mass information media producing printed matter in print runs of less than 1,000 copies.

Article 11. Refusal to register a mass information medium

Refusal to issue a certificate of registration of a mass information medium is possible only on the following grounds:

1) if the title of the mass information medium or its program objectives and tasks are contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 5 of the present law;

2) if the registering organ has previously issued a certificate to a mass information medium with the same title;

3) if the application is submitted within one year of the date when a decision on cessation of the mass information medium's activity came into force.

A refusal to effect registration is notified to the applicant in writing, indicating the grounds for refusal as stipulated by the present Law.

Article 12. Registration fee

A registration fee is charged for the issuing of a certificate of registration of a mass information medium according to procedures and size set by USSR or Union or autonomous republic legislation.

Article 13. Cessation of the production or publication of a mass information medium

Cessation of the production or publication of a mass information medium is possible following a decision by the founder, or the organ which registered the mass information medium, or the court.

The organ which registered the mass information medium or the court can stop its production or publication in the event of a second violation of the demands by the first paragraph of Article 5 of the present Law in any one year.

If a mass information medium is not produced or published for more than one year, a resumption of its activity requires a new registration certificate.

In the event that the founder decides to cease production or publication of a mass information medium, its editorial office labor collective or its editor (chief editor) has a preferential right to found a mass information medium with the same title.

Article 14. Appeal procedure against refusal to register a mass information medium or a decision to cease its activity

An appeal may be made to the court by the founder or the editorial office against a refusal to register a mass information medium, against a breach by a state organ of the one-month limit set for registration, or against a decision to cease the activity of a mass information medium, and the court will hear such appeals, including any property disputes, as provided by civil procedural legislation.

If the refusal to register a mass information medium or the decision to stop its activity is deemed to be contrary to the law, this entails the revocation of the contested decision. A revocation of a decision to cease a mass information medium's activity entails compensation for losses sustained by the founder, the editorial office, and the publisher, including loss of revenue.

Article 15. Founder, editor, editorial office, and publisher of a mass information medium

The founder determines the mass information medium's program (basic principles) of activity. The editorial office or other institution engaged in the production of mass information implements the program on the basis of professional autonomy.

The editor (chief editor) is appointed and dismissed by the founder of the mass information medium or is elected and dismissed under the procedure stipulated in the editorial statutes. The editor (chief editor) leads the work of the mass information medium's editorial collegium and editorial office and represents the mass information medium in relations with the founder, publisher, authors, state organs, social organizations, other associations of citizens, and citizens, and also in court.

The editor (chief editor) is responsible for ensuring that the mass information medium's activity complies with the requirements of the present law and other legislative acts.

The editorial collegium is composed according to the procedure stipulated by the editorial statutes. The chairman of the editorial collegium is the editor (chief editor).

The mass information medium's publisher may be the founder or may equally be a publishing house or other legal entity offering guarantees of material and technical backing for the production (printing, publication) of mass information.

Article 16. The editorial statutes of mass information media

The editorial statutes of mass information media are adopted at a general meeting of the editorial office's collective of journalists by a majority of votes in the presence of at least two-thirds of the collective, and are approved by the founder.

The editorial statutes regulate relations between the founder, editor (chief editor), and the editorial office, and the powers of the journalists' collective. The statutes include provisions on the procedure for the distribution and utilization of revenue earned through the mass information medium's activity, and other provisions.

The editorial statutes must not contravene the law.

Article 17. Production, property, and financial relations between the founder, the editorial office, and the publisher of mass information media

Production, property, and financial relations between the founder, the editorial office, and the publisher of mass information media are based on current legislation and contracts.

The contract specifies:

the funds for the maintenance of the editorial office;

the proportion of revenue (profit) from the activity of the mass information medium that is placed at the disposal of the editorial office, the founder, and the publisher;

the commitments of the founder and the publisher in providing appropriate production, social, and living conditions for the life and work of employees of the editorial office;

other conditions.

Article 18. Publication data

Each issue of a periodical printed publication must contain the following information:

1) title of the publication;

2) founder;

3) surname and initials of the editor (chief editor);

4) serial number of the issue and date of publication for periodical publications, as well as the signed-to-press time for newspapers;

5) index number of periodical publications distributed through circulation enterprises;

6) print run;

7) price (where a publication is commercially distributed);

8) address of the editorial office, publisher, and printing house.

On each occasion of going on the air or, where broadcasting is continuous, not less than four times every 24 hours, the television or radio broadcasting editorial office is obliged to announce the name of the television or radio broadcasting editorial office.

Article 19. Copyright and mandatory copies

Free copyright copies of periodical printed publications are sent immediately on printing to the All-Union Book Chamber, the USSR V.I. Lenin State Library, the M.Ye. Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public Library, the founder, and the organ issuing the registration certificate for the publication in question.

Copyright and mandatory copies of printed matter are also sent to other institutions and organizations according to procedures stipulated by the USSR Council of Ministers and the Councils of Ministers of Union and autonomous republics.

Article 20. Retention of television and radio program material

Television or radio broadcasting editorial offices must retain program material for one month after it is broadcast on the air, and must keep a registration log of programs going on the air without prior recording which shows the program's topic, its date and its start and end times, and the anchorman's surname and name. The registration log of such programs is retained for one year from the date of the last entry in it.

Chapter III. Dissemination of Mass Information

Article 21. Procedure for dissemination of mass information media output

The dissemination of the output of mass information media is carried out by the publisher directly or on a contractual or other legal basis by circulation enterprises, other organizations, or by citizens.

The dissemination of the output of mass information media without publication data is prohibited.

Article 22. Authorization of the dissemination of mass information

The dissemination of each individual issue (with its own publication data) produced by a mass information medium is permitted only after the editor (chief editor) has given authorization for its publication (broadcast).

The print run of a press publication is determined by the editor (chief editor) by agreement with the publisher.

The hindrance of the dissemination of mass information media output when done in compliance with the law or the confiscation of a print run or a part thereof are not permitted otherwise than on the basis of a legally binding court decision.

Article 23. Official announcements

The publication of official announcements by organs of state power and management is mandatory for mass information media founded by these organs.

The editorial office is obliged to publish free of charge and within a specified time legally valid decisions by a court or state arbitration organ that contain instructions stipulating the publication of such decisions through the said mass information medium in question.

Chapter IV. Relations Between Mass Information Media and Citizens and Organizations

Article 24. The right to receive information through mass information media

Citizens have the right to receive promptly through the mass information media reliable reports on the activity of state organs, social organizations, and officials.

The mass information media have the right to receive such information from state organs, social organizations, and officials. State organs, social organizations, and officials provide the mass information media with available reports and an opportunity to inspect documents.

An appeal against refusal to provide information that has been requested may be made by mass information media representatives to a higher-level organ or official, and afterwards to the court according to procedures laid down by the law on appeals against unlawful actions by organs of state management and officials which infringe citizens' rights.

Article 25. Use of copyright materials and letters

The use of works of journalism, literature, art, and science by the mass information media is permitted provided that copyrights are complied with.

No one has the right to oblige a mass information medium to publish material rejected by the editorial office, unless the law stipulates otherwise.

In the publication of readers' letters, the abridgement and editing of their text is permitted, provided that the sense of the letters is not distorted.

Article 26. Right to refutation and reply

A citizen or an organization has the right to request a mass information medium's editorial office to refute published reports that do not conform with reality or defame their honor and dignity.

The citizen or organization whose rights and legitimate interests have been infringed by reports published in mass information media has the right to have his or its reply published in the same mass information medium.

The refutation or reply is published, either under a special rubric or on the same page and in the same typeface as the report being refuted, as follows: Not later than one month following receipt of the demand in the case of newspapers, or in the next issue under preparation in the case of other periodical publications.

The refutation or reply is read out by the radio or television announcer in the same program or series of programs and at the same time, not later than one month following receipt of the demand. The right to read out the reply can also be exercised by the citizen himself or a representative of the organization demanding that a reply be published.

The editorial office is obliged to publish a reply running to not more than one page of standard typewritten text. No editing of the reply's text is permitted.

Article 27. Court hearing of an application to publish a refutation or reply

In the event that publication of the refutation or reply is refused or the mass information medium is in breach of the one-month time limit set for such publication, the citizen or organization in question is entitled to appeal to the court within one year of the date of publication.

The court hears the application to have a refutation or reply published by a mass information medium's editorial office according to procedures laid down by civil procedural legislation.

Article 28. Special cases of nonpublication of information

A mass information medium's editorial office or a journalist is not entitled:

1) to name a person who has provided information on condition that his name is not revealed, except when requested to do so by the court;

2) to publish information from a preliminary investigation without the written permission of the prosecutor, investigator, or person conducting the inquiry;

to publicize any information which could result in revealing the identity of a juvenile offender without his own consent and the consent of his lawful representative;

3) to prejudice in their reports the results of a judicial hearing of a specific case or otherwise to influence the court prior to its decision or sentence coming legally into force.

Chapter V. Rights and Duties of the Journalist

Article 29. The journalist

In the present law, journalist means a person engaged in the gathering, creation, editing, or preparation of material for a mass information medium and associated with the said medium through labor or other contractual relations or engaged in such activity with its authorization.

Article 30. The journalist's rights

A journalist has the right:

1) to seek, obtain, and disseminate information;

2) to be received by officials in connection with the exercise of his professional duties as a journalist;

3) to make any recordings, including recordings made using adiovisual equipment and movie and still photography, except when otherwise provided by law;

4) on presentation of his credentials as a journalist, to be present in natural disaster areas and at rallies and demonstrations;

5) to ask for specialist assistance in checking facts and circumstances in connection with material available to him;

6) to refuse to put his name to material contrary to his convictions;

7) to remove his signature from material whose content, in his opinion, was distorted in the process of editorial preparation;

8) to stipulate anonymity.

A journalist also enjoys other rights granted to him in accordance with the present law.

Article 31. Accreditation of journalists

The mass information media may, by agreement with state organs and organs of social organizations, accredit their own journalists to those organs and organizations.

Organs that have given a journalist accreditation are obliged to notify him beforehand of sittings, conferences, and other events and to provide him with stenographic transcripts, protocols, and other documents.

Article 32. The journalist's duties

A journalist has the duty:

1) to implement the program of activity of the mass information medium with which he has a labor relationship and to take guidance from the editorial statutes;

2) to check the authenticity of the information he reports;

3) to satisfy requests by persons providing information that they be identified as authors if such information is being published for the first time;

4) to refuse an instruction given to him by the editor (chief editor) or editorial office if it entails an infringement of the law;

5) to respect the rights, legitimate interests, and national dignity of citizens and the rights and legitimate interests of organizations.

A journalist also takes on other duties stemming from the present law.

Chapter VI. International Cooperation in the Sphere of Mass Information

Article 33. International treaties and agreements

International cooperation in the sphere of mass information is carried out on the basis of international treaties concluded by the USSR and the Union republics.

If an international treaty by the USSR lays down norms different from those contained in the present Law, the norms of the international treaty apply.

The mass information media, journalists' professional organizations, and other creative unions participate in international cooperation in the mass information sphere and, for this purpose, can conclude agreements with foreign citizens and organizations.

USSR citizens have the right to access to information from foreign sources, including direct television broadcasting, radio broadcasting, and press.

Article 34. Activity of representatives of foreign mass information media and diplomatic and other missions of foreign states in the USSR

The legal position and professional activity of foreign correspondents and other representatives of foreign mass information media accredited to the USSR, as well as the information activity of diplomatic, consular, and other official missions of foreign states in the USSR, are regulated by USSR and Union republic legislation in conformity with international treaties of the USSR and the Union republics.

Chapter VII. Liability for Infringement of Legislation on the Press and Other Mass Information Media

Article 35. Grounds for liability in respect of breaches of legislation on the press and other mass information media

Abuse of the freedom of speech, dissemination of information which does not correspond with reality and defames the honor and dignity of a citizen or organization, and pressure on the courts by journalists, entail criminal, administrative, or other liability in accordance with USSR and Union republic legislation.

USSR and Union republic legislation can institute liability for other breaches of legislation on the press and other mass information media.

Liability for infringement of legislation on the press and other mass information media falls on officials of state and social organizations, as well as on the editorial office and editor (chief editor) of a mass information medium and the authors of disseminated reports and materials.

Article 36. Impermissibility of interference in the activity of mass information media

Any hindrance by officials of state and public organs of journalists' professional activity or coercion of journalists to disseminate or to refuse the dissemination of information entails criminal liability and is punishable with a fine of up to 500 rubles [R].

Article 37. Liability for illegal compilation and dissemination of mass information

The compilation and dissemination of output by a mass information medium, either without it being registered in accordance with the present law or following a decision to cease its production or publication, entail administrative liability punishable by a fine of up to R500 imposed by a people's judge and confiscation of the print run of printed or other output.

The commission of a second infringement of the first paragraph of this article within any one year entails criminal liability and is punishable with a fine of up to R1,000 with or without confiscation of technical facilities belonging to the culprit and used for the compilation and dissemination of information.

Article 38. Cases when liability for the dissemination of information which does not conform with reality is lifted

The editor (chief editor), and equally a journalist, is not liable for the dissemination of information which does not conform with reality by a mass information medium:

1) if this information was contained in official reports;

2) if it was received from news agencies or the press services of state and public organs;

3) if it is a verbatim reproduction of speeches by people's deputies at congresses and soviet session or by delegates

at congresses, conferences, and plenums of social organizations, or of official statements by officials of state and public organs;

4) if it was contained in authors' statements which have gone on the air without being prerecorded, or in texts not allowed to be edited in conformity with the present law.

Article 39. Payment of moral damages

Moral (nonmaterial) damages suffered by a citizen as a result of the dissemination by a mass information medium of reports that do not conform with reality and that defame the honor and dignity of a citizen or inflict other nonmaterial damage on a citizen are paid by a court decision by the mass information medium and also by guilty officials and citizens. The size of payments for moral (nonmaterial) damages is determined by the court.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR
Moscow, The Kremlin, 12 June 1990.

IZVESTIYA Says Stalin Changed Birth Date

LD2406123690 Moscow TASS in English 1126 GMT 24 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 24 TASS—Stalin was born on December 6, 1878, rather than on December 21, 1879, as was officially stated in all biographies of the "leader of all peoples", the newspaper IZVESTIYA reports today.

It quotes archive materials proving that Stalin deliberately changed the date of his birth in his party documents as early as 1921 and 1922.

"It is known that Stalin never did anything without a reason," IZVESTIYA says. "However, one cannot rule out the simplest reasons, namely that he wanted to appear younger in the eyes of other people.

"One thing is certain—only a man, who firmly knew that no one would dare doubt that he was not born on December 21, 1879, could arbitrarily change the date of his birth."

Gorbachev Awards Statistics Committee Employees

LD2006140290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president of the country, has awarded a group of workers of enterprises, organizations, and institutions of the USSR State Committee on Statistics with orders and medals for the successful preparation and conducting of the all-Union population census.

Letter to Gorbachev From Underrepresented Workers

PM2106084190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jun 90 Second Edition p 6

[Unattributed report: "Open Letter"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] A group of communist workers at the Perm "Motorostroitel" Production Association have sent an open letter to Comrade M.S. Gorbachev expressing concern over the fall in the numbers of the working class and kolkhoz [collective farm] peasantry represented in party and state elective organs.

Esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich!

We were prompted to send you this open letter by the crisis situation in the country and the party. In this situation the voice of those who bear the brunt of perestroyka and its associated economic problems—workers and the kolkhoz peasantry—is being heard less and less.

Workers and peasants accounted for just 11 percent of the last CPSU Central Committee, and in the CPSU as a whole workers account for 29.1 percent and kolkhoz members for 7.7 percent (according to figures provided by IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS No. 4, 1990). Of the 420 delegates engaged in drawing up documents at the 19th all-Union party conference only 5 percent were workers (RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR No. 2, 1990). The results of the election of delegates to the 28th party congress have shown that there are virtually no workers among them.

What is going on? It seems to us that, all other things being equal, the reason lies in the different initial opportunities available to workers and peasants in comparison with leaders, the creative and scientific intelligentsia, and party committee secretaries.

No, we are not questioning the election results nor trying to set one social group against another, but, since we proclaim ourselves in our policy documents to be a "party of the working class and all working people," at this turning point we should involve as extensively as possible in party leadership precisely those on whom the achievement of concrete results by perestroyka will depend.

Unfortunately, the elections to the congress are over. The CPSU Central Committee could have rectified the situation. In our view, it is necessary to turn to V.I. Lenin's proposal which, regrettably, has still not been implemented.

We refer to the proposal to increase worker representation on our party's Central Committee and Central Control and Auditing Commission "in order to enhance the prestige of the Central Committee, to carry out serious work to improve our apparatus, and to prevent conflicts among small Central Committee units becoming too important for the fate of the party." Later, continuing his "Letter to the Congress," V.I. Lenin wrote: "Our party is entitled to require 50-100 Central Committee members to come from the working class and can obtain these numbers without excessively taxing its powers... Our party would become a thousand times more stable thanks to such a measure."

In the article "How To Reorganize the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate" V.I. Lenin proposed that delegates to the 12th party congress choose 75-100 new members of the Central Control Commission from among workers and peasants.

Under present-day conditions, in our opinion, this would mark the introduction in top party organs of a quota for workers and kolkhoz members corresponding to their percentage representation in the CPSU. The introduction in this way of the principle of representative democracy would allow us to avoid the party being governed "on the workers' behalf" and let us switch to real participation by the workers themselves in running party affairs.

The objection that workers' interests can be successfully defended by representatives of the intelligentsia, that workers' educational standards are lower, and that they cannot always speak clearly can be answered as follows. Workers' educational level today is higher than it was in 1922, when the "Letter to the Congress" was written. Yes, workers and kolkhoz members cannot always speak well (which is why they often lose out in election campaigns, incidentally). But we have no lack of common sense and we can tell good from bad. Nobody can talk about our problems better than us, and it will be primarily the working class that will have to pay for a wrong decision.

Our proposal was supported by the 23d Perm Oblast party conference.

Of course, in order to prevent so-called "apparatus placemen" getting through we need to work out and set up a mechanism for nominating people for elections at grass roots level—in the form of special workers and peasants electoral districts, for instance.

Today it would be right to simply invite worker and peasant representatives to take part in the work of the 28th CPSU Congress.

In our opinion the fate of the party, of perestroyka, and ultimately of the country will depend on whether these proposals are supported or not. [letter end]

The open letter from the communist workers was supported by more than 2,000 motor workers.

Ryzhkov Chairs Conference on Aid for Disabled

PM2506081790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jun 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Conference in USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] How are we to ensure social protection for disadvantaged citizens and the disabled in the conditions of the transition to a regulated market economy? This question was discussed 21 June at a conference under N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Leaders of central economic departments and republic labor and social insurance bodies participated.

The conference participants examined proposals on improving the system of grants paid to families with children and discussed questions of state policy guaranteeing the social protection of disadvantaged citizens. Great importance in resolving this question is attached to the clear demarcation of the authority and also the rights and responsibilities of the USSR, the Union republics, local organs of power, and labor collectives.

The conference also examined a concept for basic guidelines of state policy on problems of invalidism. The concept is aimed at creating economic and legal guarantees for the disabled to play a full part in society's life. This involves, in particular, equal opportunities with other citizens for obtaining education and professional training and job placement for the disabled. In addition provision is made for providing skilled prosthetic and orthopedic help and taking account of the needs of the disabled in the construction of housing and production buildings, in transportation and cultural establishments, and in the organization of leisure and physical culture and sports activities.

Belousov Receives Siemens Chairman in Moscow

LD2206031890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1435 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, 21 Jun (TASS)—Today Igor Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received K.-H. Kaske, chairman of the board of the firm "Siemens".

In the course of the conversation which took place in a businesslike, friendly atmosphere, an exchange of opinions took place on the questions of the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in the production of communications equipment, medical equipment, and equipment for power stations and transport.

Mr. K.-H. Kaske presented to the USSR Ministry of Health a gift from the firm of "Siemens" of a multipurpose, ultrasonic medical diagnostic unit.

Igor Belousov expressed gratitude for the gift which will be handed over to one of the children's medical institutions.

Lukyanov, Medvedev, Biryukova Attend Soiree

LD2206031190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 21 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] Today, a ceremonial soiree has taken place in the Hall of Columns of the House of Unions in Moscow, devoted to the 80th [posthumous] birthday of Aleksandr Trifonovich Tvardovskiy, the eminent writer and poet. [passage omitted]

Comrades Medvedev, Lukyanov, Biryukova, Aytmatov, Nishanov, literary and art figures, and public representatives were present at the soiree. [video shows Zalygin reading his speech on the rostrum below portrait of Tvardovskiy with a figure "80" and a laurel branch. On the rostrum are (from left to right on the screen): Lukyanov, Biryukova, Medvedev, the speakers' microphone, Nishanov, and Aytmatov]

Impressions of Donetsk Miners Congress Viewed

PM2106114090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jun 90 Second Edition pp 1, 3

[PRAVDA correspondent I. Tikhomirov report: "Miners' Concerns"]

[Text] Donetsk—The first congress of the country's miners was in session for five days in the Donetsk "Yunost" Palace. Its opening was preceded by heated polemics about the date and venue. The Ministry of the Coal Industry and the trade union Central Committee proposed meeting in Moscow in two months' time. The strike committees insisted that the congress should be convened in a mining area, and immediately.

At the opening of the congress the delegates honored the memory of those who died in the accident at the "Vorkutinskaya" pit. The next morning, tragic news arrived from the "Zasyadko" pit, which is located not far from the "Yunost" Palace. During the days of the congress three miners died, at the Donetsk pit named for the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Ukraine, the "Stashkov" pit, and the "Geroi Kosmosa" pit, belonging to the "Pavlogradugol" Association.

As was noted in one of the supplementary reports, in the last 10 years the incidence of accidents with a fatal outcome in the country's coal industry has increased 50 percent, and we have a firm hold on the "lead" in these tragic statistics. There are many reasons for this. In the developed capitalist countries dangerous and unprofitable mines are closed, the general level of mechanization and automation of coal extraction is considerably higher there, and equipment is replaced more frequently.

Last year's wave of strikes showed the risks inherent in procrastination in resolving this and a great many other problems. But the USSR Council of Ministers resolution that was adopted at that time, as nearly every speaker who mounted the congress platform stressed, is not being satisfactorily fulfilled. The miners have not received genuine autonomy, and the social amenities in mining cities and settlements and the conditions of work, daily life, leisure, and medical services are not changing.

So there were more than enough reasons to bring the congress forward. Furthermore both in the auditorium and in the lobbies complaints could often be heard that it should have been convened... a year earlier. Yet a criticism was made from the platform: The congress was poorly prepared, and therefore is premature. The speaker got the "slow handclap." But in the end the delegates were forced to agree that the criticism was fair.

On the eve of the congress representatives of the organizing committee gave assurances at a press conference that the delegates will devote the main attention to discussing the miners' social situation, the course of fulfillment of Council of Ministers Resolution No. 608, and the sector's transition to market conditions, and the trade union question will not be central.

The opposite proved to be the case. But there were useful supplementary reports from Doctor of Economic Sciences G. Guberna and Deputy Minister N. Garkavenko and memorable speeches by V. Trashchenko, a drift miner from Prokopyevsk; M. Lubenets, mining foreman from Dzerzhinsk; N. Fesenko, chairman of the labor collective council at the "Artemugol" Association; and several others. A terrible warning was heard more than once: In free market conditions many pits will be closed, being unable to stand up to competition. This, you would think, requires a quest for concrete solutions. But very few of them were proposed. And not because they are unknown to science or to the sector leadership. The virus of distrust got in the way.

A characteristic trait: The organizing committee contracted with an independent "specialist in a well regulated economy," one B. Stefanovich, for a considerable sum of money to analyze progress in fulfilling Resolution No. 608. Stefanovich, having collected into a brochure some generally available documents, cited several negative facts which are also common knowledge, but attributed the blame to those who signed the documents. The resulting conclusion was "profoundly scientific." To a buzz of approval from an electrified audience, the speaker described the Communist Party as bourgeois and said that it has never defended the workers' interests. As a counterweight, he recommended to those present the "truly Marxist" party of which he himself is one of the initiators. When the delegates asked the new messiah for the text of his research, B. Stefanovich demanded a more impressive sum in addition to the thousands of rubles he had already received from the organizing committee.

Given this approach to seeking ways out of the critical state the sector is in, success can hardly be counted on. Apart from the paid messiah in the shape of Stefanovich, the miners' congress also had visits from the leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, a representative of the Ukraine's Rukh, and a great many other officials from new parties and trade union movements.

A pair of resolutions appeared, adopted on different days but similar in thrust. One demands the immediate resignation of the government because it has failed to lead the country out of the economic crisis and has not fulfilled Resolution No. 608, adopted during last year's strikes. The second was patently prompted by the speech at the miners' congress by Nikolay Travkin, chairman of

the Democratic Party of Russia, who called on communists to leave the CPSU. "We do not regard the CPSU in its present form," it says, "as our party."

A total of 308 delegates voted for the resolution (with 116 against, and 17 abstentions). The pressure from the presidium, which wanted it to be adopted, was blatant. Only four delegates (on the basis of the number of microphones in the hall) received an opportunity to express their attitude to the document. Attempts by about 10 delegates to take the floor were cut short by "technical means"—the presidium gave instructions to switch off the microphones. In the end many of the congress participants, including the Luganskoye delegation, declared a minority position.

The organizing committee's initial assurances that the question of the trade union would not be central, were not realized. On investigation it turned out that the congress was convened specifically for that purpose. Since the propositions were kept secret, blunders followed one after another. On the point of voting for the immediate formation of a new independent trade union, the delegates stopped themselves just in time: Who gave them the right to decide such an important question on the spur of the moment?

After stormy debates, another vote was needed. A decision that satisfied the majority was finally adopted literally in the final hours of the congress. A resolution was adopted on preparing for the creation of an independent miners' trade union. Miners will discuss in every collective what its structure should be and who can join. And only after that will the collective opinion be discussed at the next miners' congress. It was decided to convene it in Moscow in August. Every collective is to delegate one delegate, the sole condition being that his post should be no higher than section chief. The agenda for the second congress will basiclaly repeat the agenda of the one that has just ended.

This last point prompts the reasonable question: Did the delegates spend a whole week talking, for nothing?

"The congress was not properly prepared," V. Denyayev, secretary of Chelyabinsk territorial committee, said. "There was not enough analysis, and there is a sense of dissatisfaction."

S. Oleksyuk, a mine worker from Karaganda, has his own opinion:

"We worked chaotically, constantly breaking into emotionalism. There are concrete proposals, but not many. Sometimes the discussion of the most important issues was superficial, yet we became bogged down on trivia, wasting time to no purpose."

Assessments differ. Hardly surprising—the congress was far from simple, its progress was complex. Despite the modesty of its practical results, it demonstrated convincingly that the miners have gotten over their strike sentiments, but the politicization of the miners' movement is gaining strength. Whether this strength will be constructive or destructive, only time will tell. One thing is now clear: It must be reckoned with.

Film Union Congress Elects New Leadership

90UN2095A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 7

[Article by M. Murzina: "New People to Tackle New Problems"]

[Text] ...It was a little bit sad nonetheless. It is always sad when a parting comes about unavoidably and inescapably. All of those assembled during these three days in the auditorium of the Moscow Central House of Cinematographers for the Sixth congress, which was held one year before the appointed time, understood that this "crew," this secretariat, and this union itself would very soon cease to exist. The confirmation of the new status of the Union of Cinematographers and the reelection of its head were on the agenda.

Traditionally they expected a "battle" and a storm at the congress. However, the first day passed with exceptional calm; there was humor and lyricism: the tenor of summary reports by Elem Klimov and Andrey Smirnov, who shared equally the heavy burden of power in the union throughout these four years, was so lively, sincere, and personal. As one of them observed, "the artist's view of holding meetings is sad" in general and on all occasions. In the lobby a replay of the recordings of the Fifth Congress of the USSR Union of Cinematographers, which is memorable for its revolutionary-romantic and iconoclastic spirit, provided a nostalgic background: This set of people—were they not passionate, naive, and bold at the time? Following two reports a witty movie skit was shown on the screen in the auditorium. After all, those assembled may have been holding a meeting, but they were artists nonetheless!

They became somewhat relaxed and started smiling, and it looked like the presentations had nothing to do with "the period under review," serious results, prospects, miscalculations, and the acute problems left on the agenda. So they started calling the congress "classical" and "toothless..." The first day did not see the sensations expected. Perhaps, only the upbeat, businesslike, and smooth presentation of USSR State Committee for Cinematography Chairman A. Kamshalov was somewhat crumpled toward the end: Several questions were asked from the floor about a situation to which an article in IZVESTIYA was devoted a month ago ("Arriflex in Storage," No. 134). For eight months now, the State Committee for Cinematography has been "keeping back" expensive imported film equipment, having resolved in a pertinent order to use it as a contribution to a joint enterprise and make it the foundation of an equipment-leasing facility at the Moscow "Moskinap" Plant. They did not let A. Kamshalaov leave the speaker's stand; representatives of Mosfilm, Armenfilm, Gruziya-film, and Tsentrnauchfilm asked him questions:

There is a catastrophic shortage of equipment; at studios they have waiting lists for it which are months long. Meanwhile, the equipment purchased with state-allocated hard currency which was not even earned by the organization is left unused for a long period of time!

In a response letter from the State Committee for Cinematography to the editorial office, the chief of the leasing center in question and the director of the "Moskinap" Plant argued passionately in favor of creating the center, supporting this by the need of local studios for equipment—if this is so then surrender it, distribute it to the studios! We must say that the answers of the State Committee for Cinematography chairman did not seem convincing to the audience (the editorial board did not publish the official response for the same reason): Supposedly, all the studios have received their equipment in full, and the "remaining" eight imported cameras were given to "the leading directors" whose names incidentally he could not give, citing lack of necessary documentation. He justified the creation of a joint enterprise with the "Arri" Company by "the development of further prospects for cooperation and production." The conflict is still under way: The last meeting of the secretariat before the congress sent a letter on this topic to the chairman of the People's Control Committee. The State Committee for Cinematography is drawing up another response...

Nonetheless, this sharp moment did not change the course of the congress. However, in the morning of the second day a letter to the congress from director B. Abdrashitov, secretary of the Board of the Union of Cinematographers who is now shooting a new movie, was read—a harsh letter criticizing the union which, in his opinion, has turned, as he sees it, into an organization which has contracted the "apparatus" disease, and expressing his apprehension about an attack on the art of cinematography by the market, economic accountability, commerce, and hasty, pseudo-revolutionary ideas...

A discussion of the results of a four-year "period of transition" ensued. Many people referred to this: The sociopolitical actions of the union command nothing but respect—bringing back to life an entire segment of our cinematography, "shelved" films (there are more than 250 of them), the adoption of a bonus added to the retirement benefits of union members, the emergence of new cinema festivals, steps aimed at the withdrawal of the state from the entire system of cinematography, the irreversible liberation of the artists from the power of officials, and the elimination of interference "from on high" in the creative process... E. Klimov said: "I hope that it will be a little bit easier for the colleagues who replace us."

However, it will hardly be easier. Substantial changes in cinematography have given rise to new problems—a market with its harsh rules, the onslaught of "video piracy..." The most difficult issues remain unresolved: first of all, a reform of movie distribution, a copyright law... Finally, there are issues which arise in conjunction with the Law on Progressive Income Tax adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the laws being prepared which envisage taxes on creative-arts unions, organizations, and their enterprises. The congress came up with the initiative to call for holding an all-Union protest action on 28 June—a five-minute strike which not only creative-arts workers should join. After all, something very important is at issue—the attitude toward art. The USSR Ministry of Culture supported the action of the Union of Cinematographers and other unions. A declaration to this effect was adopted by the congress.

The tone of the congress was traditionally political: On the initiative of Georgian cinematographers a letter to the president of the country about the situation in Lithuania was adopted. Subsequently, the Lithuanian director G. Luksas spoke sincerely and warmly: "All of us depend on each other, and friendship unites us." Let us note once again cooperation and the spirit of mutual understanding which are so characteristic of the cinema community but rare at present: All republics sent representatives to the congress. This is an expression of the desire to stand together regardless of everything. Really, the outcome of the congress itself—the election of 46-year old Davlatnazar Khudonazarov, a director and cameraman from Tajikistan who has made documentaries and feature movies, and a USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, to the post of chairman of the new union (it was resolved not to change the name) by an indisputable majority (400 votes against more than 30)—was a result of this.

Four candidates remained following a stormy discussion of the draft new Statute of the Union of Cinematographers, the adoption of the new status of the cinematography union on a federative-contractual basis (in this matter, the creative-arts union also led the way), the nomination and presentation of 17 candidates, and a multitude of withdrawals (E. Klimov, A. Smirnov, E. Ryazanov, V. Abdrashitov, E. Shengelaya), and the result was as described above.

Two deputies of D. Khudonazarov were elected—Andrey Razumovskiy (chairman of the recently created Association of Independent Cinematography) and movie script writer Mariya Zvereva. What will the union become during their expected two-year reign? Davlat Khudonazarov said: "Continuity is the main point for me in this position."

...When the Dushanbe events began, Davlat was at a movie festival in West Berlin. Having just arrived from there, he immediately flew home and came out to the square, to the crowd, to the people. He pleaded with them and calmed them down. He knelt: "If you need a life to take, take mine." The people followed him, and everything ended in a peaceful rally. Andrey Smirnov recounted this at the congress, despite Davlat's objections, and after he was elected. However, we considered

it possible to refer to this story here because it is very significant for the personal and civic profile of Khudonazarov.

The congress ended on an optimistic note, unexpectedly for many people, including the new head of the union. The first plenum of the new leading organ, the council of federations, was to be held the next day. There are new people. Are there new solutions? New problems?

Protests Planned Over 'Tragic' State of Culture

LD2506142390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1333 GMT 25 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondents Galina Vinitskaya and Boris Lavrenyuk]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Jun (TASS)—Every show, concert and performance in the Soviet Union on the evening of 28 June will break off for five minutes in an attempt by the country's creative intelligentsia to draw attention to the calamitous state of culture in the USSR. Throughout the day rallies, meetings, petitions, and other events will be organized in defense of culture in creative unions, journalists' collectives, publishing houses, museums, libraries, clubs and parks.

This was announced at a press conference in Moscow today, involving USSR Culture Minister Nikolay Gubenko and heads of creative unions and USSR state committees.

Describing the state of culture in the country as "tragic," Nikolay Gubenko noted that the numerous decisions adopted in the past few years on the development of culture and national education have remained a dead letter. Just as 10 years ago, Gubenko said, only 1.2 percent of the state budget is spent on culture. Many towns have no theater, museum, concert, or exhibition halls. There are thousands of settlements and villages with no clubs. The printing industry and paper production are in a calamitious state, jeopardizing the publication of newspapers, journals, and books. Talented musicians, performers, and artists continue to leave the country in search of fairer appreciation of their work.

A week ago USSR cultural workers adopted an appeal to the USSR president, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Supreme Soviets of Union and Autonomous Republics expressing the hope that priority would be given to the development of Soviet culture.

The initiators of the "five-minute silence" believe a law on culture is needed, or rather a law on assistance for culture. The speakers at the press conference suggested various ways of improving things in the cultural sphere, in particular, by developing sponsorship and by providing tax benefits for enterprises, organizations, and individuals contributing to the financing of culture.

Civilian Sports Plane' Incursion Monitored

LD2206114890 Moscow TASS in English 1057 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 22 TASS—"Soviet anti-aircraft defences acted correctly when they spared violator of the Soviet frontier Schneider, who landed his sports plane at Batumi Airport. The plane had been detected and weapons timely readied. Therefore it is wrong to look for culprits," Lieutenant-General Yevgeniy Timokhin, deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Soviet Anti-Aircraft Troops, told a correspondent of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA newspaper.

"It was a civilian sports plane, not a military aircraft, so nobody intended to down it, although it has been under observation from [word indistinct] throughout its flight," Timokhin said.

"In accordance with the amendment adopted by the 25th session of ICAO Assembly on March 10, 1984 and signed by the USSR, we must not fire on civilian aircraft in flight, except for cases when such a plane constitutes a threat to the USSR. This was not the case," the general said.

"As regards radar systems, our radars, regrettably, are not sensitive to such objects. To detect such aircraft, radar stations should be spaced several kilometers from one another. This would require billions of roubles, and we cannot afford such sums. This is also unnecessary," Timokhin said.

Economic

Abalkin Addresses Graduates of Economics Course

PM2506135190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jun 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Swelling Cadres' Numbers"]

[Text] The latest student graduation took place at the USSR Council of Ministers Academy of the National Economy 22 June. More than 150 economic leaders of various levels received diplomas on graduating from the academy, including enterprise and production association directors and leading specialists from central and republic economic departments, state and territorial management organs, and economic organizations.

The meeting's participants were addressed by Academician L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Academician A.G. Aganbegyan, the rector of the academy. The graduation was attended by ministers, leading scientists, government apparatus personnel, and representatives of public organizations.

The academy's graduates pointed out in their speeches that a great deal has changed over the past year at the Academy of the National Economy. The substance of the tuition and the renewal of the teaching process have reflected the problems and contradictions inherent in the

restructuring of the national economy and economic management. They underlined the importance of concentrating the efforts of the academy's graduates and their association on fulfilling the government program for the transition to a regulated market economy.

Trade Unionist on Change to Market Economy

LD2206131190 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] In conditions when the country will be going over to a market economy the Soviet trade unions will have to build, in many respects, a new mechanism for protecting the interests of the people. That has been stated by the chairman of the Central Council of the Soviet Trade Unions, Gennadiy Yanayev. To protect the people from the spontaneity of the market and fluctuation of prices the trade unions have prepared draft laws on employment and on compensating the incomes of the population. Both documents have been studied by the International Labor Organization. Gennadiy Yanayev also believes that a general agreement should be signed between the country's government and the Central Council of the Trade Unions on a major social and economic questions.

Inter-Union Economic Relations Discussed

LD2506195290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] At the session of the State Commission on Economic Reform in the USSR Council of Ministers, relations between the Union, the union republics and the country's regions under market economy conditions were discussed today. Our correspondent Valeriy Kiosa, who has just returned from the session reports.

[Kiosa] The question which was examined at this session could be regarded as vitally important for the way we will live tomorrow. The issue is what sort of economic system will exist in the near future, how will the Union, the union and autonomous republics and the regions coexist in the all-Union market? As is known, the country's Supreme Soviet has already adopted the whole package of economic laws in which the principles of these relations are defined. However, now the question is to create the mechanism to implement these laws. The first attempt to create such a mechanism has been made by the State Commission on Economic Reform which has prepared a draft decree on some measures to restructure the relationship between the Union, the union and autonomous republics within the market. The main stress of this document is on the denationalization of property. We all know what damage the state monopolism has done to us. Now we are talking about creating diversity of types of property. Who should be doing this task?

The commission has suggested creating a special body to manage state property, a property bank of some sort, and the all-Union funds for the all-Union matters: for innovations, for ecology, for regional development, etc. A very sharp discussion ensued today practically on all aspects of this document. Questions like which state property is to be sold and which should be transferred into the property of the republics without compensation, who will be selling and who will be buying? Opinions differed. The most polarized view points have been expressed on many issues, from the total unacceptability of the document to possibility of accepting it with some cardinal changes. Summing up today's discussion Leonid Abalkin stressed that the work on improving this document will be hard because a lot will depend on what sort of the new Union treaty there will be, and this does not exist yet. However, to wait till it appears is impossible because life must go on, the economy must function, otherwise there will by economic chaos.

One more thing. The deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers has expressed serious concern about some positions which are now appearing in the relations between some republics. According to him, attempting to increase the republic's profits only through its sovereignty can lead to economic and trade wars between the different regions of the country which, of course, is extremely undesirable. So, as a result of the today's discussion a decision has been made for the moment just to consider the document which has been prepared by the commission and to continue to work on it with the compulsory participation of representatives of all the Union republics.

Problems of Soviet Passenger Fleet Outlined

PM2206154390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with Nikolay Tsakh, USSR deputy minister of the maritime fleet, by IZVESTIYA correspondent I. Fedorov; place and date unspecified; first paragraph is introduction: "Passenger Fleet... Without Any Ships?"]

[Text] According to data provided by the USSR Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, a total of 36 obsolete passenger transport vessels have been written off in our country in the last 10 years. Five diesel ships are due to be written off this year and a further nine next year. No replacements of this class of vessel are expected in the near future. IZVESTIYA's correspondent asked Nikolay Tsakh, USSR deputy minister of the maritime fleet, to comment on the situation.

[Tsakh] We currently have only 46 diesel ships, which is just over 40 percent less than in 1970. The situation is no better with ships used for coastal transportation: "comets" and ferries. We wrote off 185 of these ships during the 12th Five-Year Plan period and we now have 300 of them left. We would need 169 new ships to make up the shortfall in capacity, but at best we will get no more than 60.

[Fedorov] What is the reason for this situation?

[Tsakh] There is no clear program for replenishing the passenger fleet. The Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry is not geared to building passenger ships and refuses to manufacture them. We have had many meetings with the leaders of this ministry, held joint collegium sessions, talked to representatives of plants belonging to the ministry, and even tried to hammer out an agreement whereby they would build only the hull while foreign firms would be responsible for fitting the equipment, but all in vain. Following our latest appeal to the government, the USSR State Planning Committee sent us an answer saying: "A minimum supply of passenger vessels is envisaged in the 13th five-year plan period."

The only country that still supplies us is Yugoslavia. However, because of the negative balance of trade with that country, the purchase volumes are constantly diminishing. It was planned to obtain 10 ships from Yugoslavia in the coming five-year plan period but, following additional talks, we have agreed to five—although in reality we will get no more than three, and those not before the mid-nineties.

The result is that we have to resort increasingly often to chartering foreign ships. We have already spent some 900 million foreign currency rubles in this way. If there is no change in the situation, charter expenditure will top the R1 billion mark in three years.

[Fedorov] Is there a way out of this critical situation?

[Tsakh] If we are to make up the shortage of passenger ships, the government will have to allocate approximately R1 billion—in hard currency. We appreciate that this kind of money cannot be found at present. That is why we are proposing an alternative option.

The Ministry of the Maritime Fleet earns something in the region of 50 million foreign currency rubles every year from passenger transportation. This profit must be left at the disposal of the ministry for several years at least. We could buy two or three first class ships with this money during the five-year plan period, and even five or six if we bought them on credit on the basis of future income.

What is more, we propose a joint venture with foreign companies that will make use of obsolete ships: they could be overhauled and put to sea under a "third" flag. This would produce an additional currency source.

The main point must now be made clear: the maritime fleet can and must develop itself. But we must have our hands untied, be rid of extortionate budget payments, and be allowed to work freely on the world market. Otherwise, we will essentially be forced to curtail maritime passenger transport in the coming years.

Agricultural

Locusts Threaten Crops in Kustanay Oblast

OW 2606060290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 24 Jun 90

[I. Dvorkin video report; from the "120 Minutes" program]

[Text] International experience indicates that damage done to agricultural crops by an infestation of locusts can assume disastrous proportions. The fact is that locusts advance at a rate of 30 km per day. Sometimes trees even break under the weight of a besieging swarm. [video cuts to show Dvorkin talking to two men in the open]

[Begin video report] On last day of a business trip, we were sought out early in the morning in our hotel by Vladimir Pavlovich Volkov, chief agronomist of a plant protection station. He was very uneasy.

[Begin Recording] [Volkov] In the fields of Zatobolskiy sovkhoz [state farm] we found the egg sacs of locusts. Their density per square meter of perennial grasses was between five and eight sacs, which in principle amounts to—if we figure there is an average of four egg sacs with 50 eggs in every sac per every square meter—that means trouble for the future harvest. If we do not prepare the soil against the locusts in time, our future harvest will be eaten.

[Dvorkin] Who is hindering your work, then? What are you lacking?

[Volkov] What is hindering us are limitations on the use of aircraft. We cannot manage against the current number of locusts with equipment on the ground, without using aircraft. It is an outbreak, a breeding ground, it is a, well....

[Dvorkin interrupts] If you cannot prepare the soil, what will happen next year, aside from the fact that the entire harvest for this year will be eaten?

[Volkov] Our work will increase several times over.

[Dvorkin] So, the population of this kind of locust will simply increase?

[Volkov] Absolutely.

[Dvorkin] Will this mean trouble for years to come? What do you think?

[Volkov] If, at this moment, this year, we do not make every effort to combat these locusts, if we do not change our agricultural technology, then it will be a long-term problem.

[Dvorkin] So, you are suggesting using a plow instead of a subsurface cultivator [ploskorez], and then we could get rid of this problem?

[Volkov] Yes, I am suggesting that, on those plots of land—per our recommendation, by which I mean the plant protection station—on those plots which are

heavily infested with locusts, we should turn the soil with a plow. Agronomists, the farm's chief agronomists, do not pay much attention to us or our recommendations. [end recording]

The agronomists are not at fault. They would gladly carry out those recommendations. But, there are not enough plows being produced. Only subsurface cultivators are used in the virgin lands. The layer of soil is not turned over, but simply undercut below the surface. [video shows locust on a leaf, An-12 crop duster flying over field] A disaster has occurred, and there are no plows and not enough spraying devices for use on the ground against the locusts. But, the use of aircraft is forbidden by the State Committee for Protection of the Environment. They cannot be used closer than 10 km from an inhabited area—an ecological standard to prevent people from being harmed. But, a misfortune is imminent. [video shows aerial views of crop fields, larvae, and hatching locusts in a class container]

Back in Alma-Ata, our cameraman, Gennadiy Shalabayev, took these shots. Look! The insects have spent several days without food, without water, you could even say without air, and they continue to hatch relentlessly. They have a frightful power to survive. Now imagine, when this black force appears in the fields. Agronomists have estimated that, on 80,000 or even on 100,000 hectares, all the grain and grasses will be devoured. That is thousands of tons of grain. But, Kustanay is the bread basket of the republic and of the entire country. So, once again for the umpteenth time we are not ready for an extraordinary situation, for a struggle against pests at an ecologically modern level. [end video report]

To add to what you have just heard, the Kustanay Oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] has decided to use aircraft in order to save the grain and has called in the most skillful pilots in order to do as little harm to the environment as possible. But, the problem remains.

Combine, Gas Shortages Threaten Harvest

PM2506094190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 21 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] What you have heard in the previous report, I am referring to the establishment of the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences, is certainly good news. But here is a report from the fields that is, alas, alarming. On the Don combines are standing idle because of a lack of spare parts. Although the harvest is quite good. But in Zaporozhye Oblast there is a different problem. No gasoline. Look at the reports from our own correspondents.

[Reporter N. Chebotarev, identified by caption] [video shows grainfield] Look at the grain. Look at the ears. Good lord, I cannot remember grain like it even last year. The grain is similar on the Don. But will we be able to harvest it? There is a shortage of combines on kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms]. Yes, we do not have enough Don and Niva combines [video shows yard full of combines], although we were saying we had too many last year and the year before that. "Rostselmash" is operating, but where are the combines? Here they are, all over the plant yard, with parts missing. Here are the files. Thousands of orders for combines that have not been met. Thousands of them. It is the first time "Rostselmash" has been in this position on the eve of the harvest.

[A.I. Mityukhin, "Rostselmash" production director, identified by caption] All the combines which we have produced during the first six months have parts missing. Take the Niva, for instance. There are 500 combines here which lack oil cooling systems, which have not been delivered from Smolensk. There are also 200 Niva combines which lack 5/300 belts which should have been delivered by the Cherkessk industrial rubber plant. And there are 200 Don combines standing around because of systematic failure by the Belotserkovskiy industrial rubber plant to supply 1500 and 3/600 belts. We could dispatch 1,000 combines but for the missing parts. Our people have called on Voronin, Mostovoy, Ryzhkov. All kind of conferences have been held at various levels, all kinds of decisions have been adopted, but in real life nothing has changed.

[Reporter B. Mushastikov, identified by caption] This year the oblast has nearly 900,000 hectares of grain. According to the experts, most farms have quite a good harvest. [video shows fields] The optimum estimate is that 7,400 trucks will be needed to ensure a loss-free harvest, and a substantial harvest of 2.8 million tonnes is expected. Not one of them is operating at the moment. Ambulances and vehicles delivering bread to the population and milk for processing are finding it hard to get gasoline. Incidentally, on the kolkhoz named for Frunze, where we filmed this report, milk purchased from the population had to be sent to the hog farms.

[Mushastikov] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, what is the problem with gasoline in the oblast. Why is transport at a standstill?

[V.M. Golovko, chief of oblast "Zaporozhnefteprodukt" association, identified by caption] The gasoline situation in the oblast is disastrous. At the moment the oblast's kolkhozes and sovkhozes are short of 2,500 tonnes of gasoline. Each rayon has on average 20-30 tonnes, no more. We are only supplying ambulances, special transport, and milk tankers. All other transport in the oblast has stopped.

Scientific

'Cosmos-2084' Satellite Launched 22 Jun

LD2506162690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1545 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, 25 Jun (TASS)—It has become known here that an artificial earth satellite, Cosmos-2084, was launched in the Soviet Union on 22 June 1990 from a Molniya rocket carrier.

The satellite was placed in an uncalculated orbit with the following parameters: initial paeriod of revolution—98.2 mins; apogee—756km; perigee—590km; orbital inclination—62.8 degrees.

At present there is no contact with the satellite, and work is being carried out both to estabish contact with it and track it.

Officials Deny 'Disastrous' Situation on 'Mir'

LD2506212190 Moscow TASS in English 2115 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 26 TASS—Soviet space official denied a newspaper report on the return of cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyov and Aleksandr Balandin had been delayed due to a "disastrous situation aboard the Mir space station."

The crew's return has been postponed from July 22 to August 1.

Mission control officials told Soviet television on Monday that reports about the destruction of Mir's heat insulation were "incompetent" in technical terms.

"It is foolish to dramatize the situation, since it is within what normally happens," officials said.

"There are several sheets—ripped off screens of vacuum and heat insulation. In order to determine what caused this and prevent this from happening in the future, one, maybe two, space walks will be needed," they said.

The crew were happy about the change in the programme, and enthusiastically accepted "interesting work" that is "slightly different from life inside the station", they said.

Cosmonauts are used to completing things. They want to know what caused the problem.

Cosmonaut Explains Delayed Return

LD2606022090

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1700 GMT on 25 June, in its "Vremya" newscast, broadcasts a video report by correspondent S. Slipchenko on an alleged complication which had arisen on the Mir orbiter and that the planned return to earth by the crewmen had been postponed for that reason.

The video begins with a shot of a TV monitor showing a cosmonaut at work inside a space vessel. Slipchenko reminds the viewers that it has often been reported that Soviet space missions are distinguished by their flexibility—with launches and landings being recheduled. He says that the start of a piloted expedition and the return of a Mir crew has been postponed again, and asks why. The video then shows cosmonauts Solovyev replying.

"Well, in part as a result of a request from the crew," Solovyev says, "and at the request of representatives if industry for whom we are working, the expedition has been extended by a week. Initially we planned the start of the replacement expedition for 22 July, and now the decision has been taken to [word indistinct] on 1 August. But generally, this extension is explained by the fact that we would like to do more for the earth. On the Kristall module, there is pretty good equipment and technological equipment, pretty good equipment for relief-photography of the earth's surface. Having returned to earth, we want to have more material for analysis."

Slipchenko goes on to say that a report appeared in the Soviet press that the landing had been tied up with great difficulties and that for this reason the expedition necessary for an EVA [extra-vehicular activity] in order to repair a serious, almost catastrophic situation on board in the words of the press, is being postponed. Is that how things are, he asks?

Solovyev replies: Oh no. That is certainly not how things are, and I would not like to get into some kind of polemics with Western and our own agencies. All the same, the thing is that we do nevertheless have torn-off burdocks as we call them—screens for vacuum and heat insulation. In order to unequivically establish why this happened and to ensure that it does not happen in future, it is necessary to carry out one and perhaps even two EVA's, Solovyev says. And so, in a certain way, the program has changed after all. The crew were quite happy about this inasmuch as this is interesting and, it is interesting work, he says, a little different from the routine inside the station. And in the middle of July we are planning to carry out such an operation, an EVA, basically for an inspection—why this happened, in order to draw our conclusions on earth. The video shows computer graphics showing the offending panels tearing off a space vessel.

In conclusion, V.D. Blagov, deputy flight manager, is interviewed saying that when such an inspection EVA is carried out, repairs will probably be done also to return the panels. In response to Slipchenko, both Blagov and Solovyev criticize the way in which technically imcompetent journalists have confused and overdramatized the situation.

New Engine Developed For Il-114 Airliner

LD2506113990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Summary] The "Klimov" scientific production association in Leningrad has developed an engine for the new airliner Il-114, which is now undergoing flight tests. Until recently, the enterprise specialized in engines for military aircraft. The first batch of engines has been handed over to the aircraft builders.

Electron Beam Experiments Aid Space Research

PM2206121690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0504 GMT 16 Jun 90

[Program by Vitaliy Sevestyanov: 'Man, Earth, Universe']

[Text] [Sevestyanov] The next chapter in our program is dedicated to a very interesting subject, namely the development prospects of a whole direction in space, in particular the search for constructive solutions in external installations for radio communications, antenna installations. That is an enormous problem. Let us recall, for instance, the experiment conducted in space with the KRT-10, when a space radio-telescopic aerial 10 m in diameter was unfolded in space and successful experiments were conducted with it. But when they jettisoned it, the aerial caught on the stern of the station, and Valeriy Ryumin, having moved along the station and reached it, worked with watchmaker's precision in throwing off the aerial, thus practically saving the station.

Well, the constructive search for solutions to this technically complex task have led to a completely amazing solution. It turns out that you can make a radiating and receiving aerial which will have no structure of any kind; it will be purely a beam of charged particles radiated by an electron gun, and the structure of the beam itself constitutes the structure of the aerial. This new amazing direction in space technology is gradually moving from the experimental stage to practical application. But, first, of course, there was an experiment, the Fokus experiment. But this experiment has an important future. Since 1987 up to this day, a group of scientists from the Moscow Institute of Radio Technology, Electronics and Automation, led by Professor Boris Aleksandrovich Snedkov, doctor of technical sciences, has been working on the experiment along with the cosmonauts. [video shows two spacemen handling a white box, presumably inside a space station; close-ups of EVA [extra-vehicular activity]; cutting to Sevastyanov interviewing Snedkov and Trubitsyn in studio]

I wanted to ask you to tell us about this equipment. What is the essence of the idea which has now been checked out in practice and what are the prospects for its future use.

[Prof. B.A. Snedkov, doctor of technical sciences—identified by caption] The exploration of space has opened up a unique opportunity to build equipment using propagated electron beams. Special equipment is being built for generating the electron beams. And we've had a great deal of work to do. This is connected equally with the associated systems, that is, electron beam modulators and power sources, which transform the station's low voltage into high voltage, and with the development of the so-called electron guns.

[Sevastyanov] Boris Aleksandrovich, what you are saying immediately puts me on guard, with television viewers in mind. I hear terms like "gun," "electron beams"—our television viewers may get the impression that we are talking about beam weapons. Let us make it quite clear what kind of an experiment this is, what its aims are, and what we hope to gain from this experiment.

[Snedkov] I see what you mean. I can state outright that when it comes to weapons, electon beams are very powerful beams. We are dealing exclusively with low-power beams for research purposes from which we hope to obtain specific information.

[Sevastyanov] I understand, you hope to obtain information in the course of the experiment, but what is the purpose of the experiment?

[Snedkov] There are all kind of purposes.

The primary purpose which is being pursued using this equipment is to create electron-beam aerials. If we look at the structure of an aerial, it has some kind of current carrying and conducting surface or wires. The radiation results from the electric current which flows through this metal structure. In space it is possible to create such aerials without metal structures, using merely the movement of the electron beam. To be able to transmit intelligence, you appropriately modulate such an electron beam.

[A.V. Trubitsyn, senior scientific employee—identified by caption] But unfortunately in our dense atmosphere, electron beams travel only short distances. They scatter, disintegrate, and rapidly decay due to [word indistinct] processes. But in space, where the pressure is smaller by a factor of 10 to negative five, six or seven, or even less, these electron beams can travel very significant distances. Admittedly, there are factors which prevent us from propagating the beams in the direction we want. For instance, the earth's magnetic field. It bends electron beams along the magnetic lines of force. There is also the Coulon's repulsive forces which strive to scatter and break up the beam. But, there are means which make it possible to transport the electron beam in the set direction, in particular the introduction of an accompnaying magnetic field. [video shows diagrams of magnetic lines of force around the earth]

[Sevastyanov] How was the experiment carried out and what were the results? What could you tell the viewers?

[Tribitsyn] The source equipment—I can show you a few photographs we have brought along—at the heart of the equipment, if I may put it so, is the electron gun. Here it is in the photograph, and here it is in real life. [video shows photograph of a vacuum valve with the front end surrounded by a cylindrical wire cage; pair of hands

handling a valve some five inches long, with a lateral metallic protrusion] The electron gun. It is a unique assembly, built especially for this equipment. It is made up of the electron gun itself—that's the conventional term with this type of equipment, the vacuum bulb and the depressurization device.

[Snedkov] This device makes it possible to try the equipment out on earth, because had the gun not been protected by this evelope we wouldn't have been able to turn the equipment on under real earth conditions.

[Tribitskiy] I ought to note that all the preceeding experiments that were carried out on geo-rockets had guns of simpler construction, which were less economical, less effective and did not make it possible to attain the power needed for an electron-beam aerial, for effective radiation of radio waves.

When the electron beam is emitted at right angles to the geomagnetic lines of force it is bent by the magnetic lines of force in accordance with the well-known laws of physics and it is received by collectors which make it possible to diagnose the beam's propagation in the space environment.

Well, I should say that having discovered this new scientific direction, which is led by Boris Aleksandrovich, we are also looking to the future and searching for other areas of application for our equipment.

[Sevastyanov] And could you tell us what is the significance of these potential electron aerials?

[Snedkov] We think that these electron aerials could be used in those ranges of frequencies and in those instances where for one reason or another it is difficult to install the classic equipment or where it is ineffective. In particular, this concerns long waves, especially the lower end of this range, where you need large-sized aerials, and in the microwave range, where you have to focus a fairly narrow electromagnetic wave and where you also need large-sized reflectors which are in use now. We think that using such long-wave aerials, electron-beam aerials, we can observe the earth's geodynamics.

[Sevastyanov] Could you elaborate on this?

[Snedkov] Yes, I can try and explain a little.

We are assuming a model in which movements of tectonic rocks in the earth crust create electric potentials. And these potentials, like in a capacitor plate, are reflected in the earth's ionosphere. And these potentials reflected in the ionosphere could be read off using the electron beam, this intelligence could be read off.

[Sevastyanov) Every time you orbit the earth.

[Snedkov] Every time you orbit the earth and you can take a map of it.

[Sevastyanov] And how wide will the reception band be here?

[Snedkov] We think that over 24 hours we could observe changes in these potentials, which could tell us something about geodynamic activity.

[Sevastyanov] That is to say this is....

[Trubitsyn] It's dynamic, large-scale cartography.

[Sevastyanov] And this application could now be included in the plans, as an experiment?

[Snedkov] Without a doubt.

(Trubitsyn] And it's already included.

[Sevastyanov] And what are the future prospects for using this or similar equipment?

[Trubitsyn] To reach the stage of industrial specimens and to build operational systems of transmitting intelligence with electron-beam aerials.

[Sevastyanov] But let us get back to the question of immediate plans.

[Snedkov] We are planning to deliver Spektr equipment at the end of this year. It will differ....

[Sevastyanov, interrupting] Deliver to the Mir complex? Aboard a cargo craft?

[Snedkov] That's right, with complete full-scale tests. And this Spektr equipment is a stronger beam source, because we have to probe the upper layers of the ionosphere and emit a sufficiently strong beam, so that the reception of the intelligence is more reliable.

[Trubitsyn] The main thing is that we have experimentally confirmed the principles which will form the basis of electron-beam transmitters. Now we can say that these principles have been confirmed, that the chosen technical solutions have been justified in practice and have proven that that they will work. For instance, the emitter apparatus has been working successfully since the moment the Mir station came into operation. The apparatus is working reliably, without malfunctions which, of course, makes us very happy. There was a fairly complex operation to install the Arfa-E equipment which was delivered to the Mir complex in August by a cargo craft and then taken into open space and installed on the outer surface in a pre-prepared location, connected to the on-board electric power network, to the radio-telemetry system, and the command radio link. [video shows close-ups of EVA]

The appearance of the long lifespan orbital station Mir is well known. It has a great many protruding structures, including the solar pannels and various aerials for various radiotechnical systems, for communications, for docking, for navigation and so on. Well, obviously the maneuvers which are necessary in docking and in orientation require a great number of aerial systems, a whole aerial field on the orbital station. Clearly a possible replacement of the classic aerials with electron-beam aerials is going to give us advantages, in mobility, and in

the speed of unfolding the aerials. For an electron-beam aerial this means just pressing a button and the aerial is ready for work.

[Sevastyanov] I would like to draw the following conclusion here. Of course this means getting new technology, it is a leap forward. But this does not just apply to orbital stations; these aerials could be installed on all our automatic craft, on satellites which relay information, communications satellites, satellites which convey intelligence they receive on earch. So in spite of the fact that your invention cannot be used here, on earth, it could do a good service in space.

[Trubitsyn] Precisely—in space, including in the geostationary orbits.

[Sevastyanov] I wish you success.

[Trubitsyn, Snedkov] Thank you.

Petrovskiy, IAEA Head Discuss Chernobyl, Treaty

LD2506173590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1607 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, 25 Jun (TASS)—A meeting between Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, and Hans Blix, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), took place today. In the course of a thorough conversation, the issues of the USSR's interaction with the IAEA, in particular, aspects related to eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station accident were discussed.

The Soviet side stressed the great importance of the ever increasing involvement of the agency in problems related to ensuring mankind's requirements in power and the safety of atomic power engineering and to improving the ecological situation in the world. The Soviet Union's readiness to actively assist in the future too, in implementing the agency's programs as the issues of handling and burying radioactive waste, was confirmed.

Issues relating to the preparations for holding the 4th conference to examine the effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in August-September were discussed.

Agreement Signed With French Science Firm

LD2506221590 Moscow TASS in English 2208 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 26 TASS—The production of medicinal preparations, the organisation of safe chemical production and the intensification of Soviet agriculture on the basis of French technologies will be priority directions in the cooperation between the French concern Rhone-Poulenc and the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology. This is recorded in an agreement signed here on Monday.

Commenting on the agreement, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister and the committee's chairman Nikolai Laverov told TASS that, according to this document, the French concern's cooperation with Soviet partners would deepen, including the creation of joint enterprises. Out of numerous spheres of cooperation, only six remained in the agreement. On the present stage they are of special interest for both sides. These included catalysis, membrane technologies protecting the environment, pharmacology and gene engineering. Thus, the cooperation beween the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology and Rhone-Poulenc, started twenty years ago, entered a new stage, Laverov stressed. It is very important for both sides, because it is aimed at developing new science-intensive technologies.

Coordinated projects on Soviet territory will be financed in the Soviet currency, Laverov said. If the need arises to import equipment, Soviet organisations will try to reduce hard currency expenditures to the minimum.

Laverov received on Monday Rhone-Poulenc President Jean-Rene Fourtou, who gave to the USSR as a gift 500,000 francs worth of new medicinal preparations.

Military

Yazov, Yeltsin Attend Graduation Ceremony

PM2606084190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jun 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Oliynik: "Good Luck, Lieutenants!"]

[Text] It has become a good tradition to hold a sendoff ceremony for Kremlin officer cadets in the country's main square. And so, the 113th graduation ceremony of the Moscow Higher General Military Command School named for the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet was again held in Red Square yesterday.

...1000 hours in the morning. Young lieutenants in dress uniform are lined up in ceremonial formation by the Kremlin wall. The gold on their brand new shoulder boards is gleaming in the sun and the faces of the graduates reflect unconcealed joy. There are quite a few representatives of military dynasties in the ranks of the graduates. They include Lieutenant S. Budennyy, grandson of the famous Civil War military leader Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budennyy; Lieutenants O. Vershinin, M. Yermakov, V. Nechayev; and many others.

Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense; B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet; G.Kh. Popov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet; Colonel General N.V. Kalinin, commander of Moscow Military District; Colonel General V.A. Vostrov, chief of the Ministry of Defense Main Administration of Higher Educational Establishments; and other leaders have arrived for the young officers' gala graduation ceremony.

A rally devoted to the graduation of young officers was held. Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense; B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet; and Lieutenant General A.S. Noskov, the school's director, warmly congratulated the lieutenants on their successful graduation from one of the country's oldest military training establishments and the beginning of their service as officers in the Soviet Armed Forces which, just like our society, are currently going through a difficult period of revolutionary renewal of socialism.

The young officers laid flowers at the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

After the gala ceremony, Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, and B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, answered numerous questions from the young officers and journalists. Replying to a question from a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent on what he understood by serving the fatherland, B.N. Yeltsin replied: "The officer corps of the Soviet Armed Forces plays a decisive role in the strengthening of the defense capability of our country, including Russia. I hope that the Kremlin graduates, just like all Soviet officers, will serve the motherland in line with the best traditions of the Russian Army. But the motherland must also take care of its armed defenders. The upcoming military reform, together with other fundamental changes, must also give consideration to the problem of the military's human rights and ensure their social protection. The RSFSR Supreme Soviet will spare no effort in this respect."

Readers Split on General Makashov Speech

PM2606095190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jun 90 First Edition p 1

[Roundup of readers' reactions: "Telephone Feedback Line"]

[Excerpt] After the speech of Colonel General A. Makashov at the Russian party conference the telephone feedback line was white-hot, you could say. Our readers' opinions are sharply divided, ranging from unconditional support to outraged disagrement with virtually the general's every word. Lieutenant General (retired) Yu. Duk, serviceman D. Vodyasov, worker K. Gruzdev, pharmacist N. Zaremba from Moscow, Captain First Rank V. Kireyev from Vladivostok, Lieutenant Colonel V. Vyaltsev from Orel Oblast, Captain First Rank A. Naugolnyy from Lvov, N. Pankratova from Frunze, and other comrades believe that the "colonel general expressed openly and clearly what millions of Soviet people are thinking" (we quote pensioner V. Mikheyev from Nizhniy Tagil). The following people resolutely disagree with this assessment: Senior Lieutenant of the reserve K. Chuprin from Baku, worker V. Dovlatyan from Kramatorsk, teacher G. Lysenko from Dnepropetrovsk, Colonels N. Pustovoy and A. Zhadichev from Moscow, and many others. Colonel of the reserve A. Chelkin from Moscow, for instance, believes that "General Makashov's speech casts doubt on the Army's loyalty to perestroyka." [passage omitted]

Army Communists' Precongress Tasks Discussed

PM2506104190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jun 90 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "In the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. A Time for Concrete Actions"]

[Text] The question of lessons learned and conclusions drawn from the report and election campaign in the Army's and Navy's party organizations and the tasks of the concluding phase of preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress, were discussed at a sitting of the Main Political Directorate Bureau. Army General A. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, summed up the results of the discussion.

It was noted that the report and election campaign was an important phase in the preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress. It showed the increased standard of the organizational and political work of the majority of political organs, party committees and bureaus in holding meetings and conferences on a renewed democratic basis, as well as the extensive discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress and the draft CPSU Statutes, and the formation of corps of delegates from the Army and Navy.

An unusual and difficult political examination has been passed. It was stressed in Lieutenant General V. Grebenyuk's report and in speeches by Comrades N. Moiseyev, V. Rodina, N. Kovalenko, and others, that the vast majority of communists supported the fundamental provisions of the precongress documents amid free and frank discussion and pluralism of opinions. Attempts by individuals to compromise the party, pursue a policy of depoliticizing the Army and eliminating political organs and party organizations, and set the officers' cadres against the military leadership, were neutralized. Concern for the preservation and strengthening of party unity, expressed in the CPSU Central Committee Open Letter to the country's communists "For Consolidation on a Principled Basis" was met with understanding.

Communists put forward over 5,000 proposals on the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform and the party statutes and on general party and Army questions. They were all summarized and presented to the commission for preparations for the 28th party congress.

Reports by political organs, party committees, and bureaus and communists' discussions were marked by critical analysis of party political work, constructive proposals, a demanding attitude toward the apparatus of the political organs and the elective aktiv with respect to speeding up the restructuring processes and by the effectiveness of political influence on the training of troops and naval forces, and the strengthening of military discipline.

The work of practically all the political organs and the vast majority of party committees and bureaus was positively assessed. The activity of the political department, whose chief is Colonel L.V. Romanov, as well as the work of 46 party committees and bureaus, was said to be unsatisfactory. There was a vote of no confidence in the ability of certain secretaries of party committees and party commissions to head party collectives again. This was for various reasons. However, the main one was that communists do not want to reconcile themselves with formalism, bureaucratism in party work, and indifference to people.

The new mechanism for conducting the election of the party aktiv and of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, ensured that such elections were democratic, and that every communist was included in this process. Up to 70 percent of party organization and party commission secretaries were elected by direct secret ballot on a contested basis. The primary party organizations nominated 5,794 candidates for 269 congress delegate mandates.

At the same time the reports and elections exposed the inertia of certain political organs and party organizations in the transition to political methods of leadership, and their unpreparedness to wage a political struggle in the new conditions. A number of places did not manage to move away from habitual patterns and overorganization, to take a new look at problems that have accumulated in party organizations and military and labor collectives, nor to make constructive decisions.

The tranquil tone of a number of reports and speeches by communists, including some leaders, during their analysis of party influence on the growth in troops' combat readiness, on proficiency, and on the strengthening of discipline, is caution-provoking. The results of the winter period do not correspond everywhere to the set tasks. As was noted, in a number of okrugs, groups of forces, fleets, and associations, there has been no increase in the number of communists who came up to the mark. At the same time, parasitic sentiments and a desire to make all complaints and address all suggestions to the center, while analyzing one's own possibilities and reserves only superficially, prevailed here and there.

The participants in the sitting cited the insufficiently deep analysis of the party organizations' ideological life as one of the weak points in the reports and elections of party organs. The battle for people's minds and sympathies under conditions of the developing multiparty system and of the difficult ideological situation in individual regions where troops are stationed, is acquiring particular significance. And we must not hope or expect that all the questions will be solved by the 28th CPSU Congress. In the education of communists and of all personnel the political organs and party organizations must proceed on the basis of the idea that ideological work is now becoming a top-priority direction in their everyday activity.

The Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate Bureau has recommended to the political directorates of branches of the Armed Forces, okrugs, groups of forces and fleets and to the political organs of formations and combined units, and of military training institutions and establishments to thoroughly analyze the results of the report and election campaign, the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, and to learn the necessary lessons and derives the necessary conclusions.

It has been proposed that experience accumulated, and communists' opinions and suggestions as well as the provisions of the CPSU Central Committee precongress documents be actively used to deepen the restructuring of party political work in the Army and Navy.

At the concluding stage of preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress, work on the discussion of the party program and statutes in party organizations and in officers', soldiers', and labor collectives must be continued. By comparing them with other platforms in a reasoned way, communists and Army and Navy personnel must be convinced of the vital need for consolidation on the basis of the ideas of the CPSU and renewed socialism, and people's faith in the party's real possibilities of overcoming the crisis situation in society must be confirmed. To this end, experience acquired in the course of precongress work from creative discussions, roundtables, and from other active forms of ideological influence upon public opinion must be augmented.

The Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate has been instructed to organize meetings between military delegates to the congress and members of the USSR Defense Ministry Collegium and the Main Political Directorate Bureau, during which there will be discussions with delegates on the package of proposals and observations from Armed Forces communists on the draft CPSU Central Committee platform and the draft party statutes, and on general party and military questions for their implementation during the Russian Party Conference and the CPSU Congress' work.

Bearing in mind the wishes of communists, it has been proposed that working groups be formed for the preparation of the draft new instructions to the CPSU organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy and the provisions on political organs, which, it is proposed, will subsequently be submitted for extensive discussion in the Army and Navy party organizations, and in military collectives.

A question for special consideration is the responsible attitude of communists in leadership and management organs with respect to the numerous proposals and critical observations voiced at meetings and conferences. It is essential—at all levels—to urgently examine questions connected with fulfilling communists' instructions and to inform the authors without fail about the decisions adopted.

It has been recommended that political organs and party committees display initiative in the examination, by military councils and communist-leaders of rear services and housing construction organs, of questions of making

maximum use of locally available opportunities to decrease social tension and eliminate shortcomings in the troops' everyday conditions and trade and medical services for servicemen and their families.

We are faced with a large volume of work in training the newly elected aktiv and involving it in active work, taking account of restructuring experience accumulated and the new tasks connected with the implementation of military reform. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind as a task of paramount importance the strengthening of organizational and political unity and the ideological and moral purity of the party ranks in the Army and Navy. The reasons why individual servicemen, workers, and employees are leaving the CPSU must be thoroughly analyzed, and likewise the reasons for the slackening of the work on the selection of rew replenishments for the party; ways of overcoming passivity, indifference, and ideological vacillations among some of the communists must be urgently sought.

Crucial tasks face the military press organs at this complex time, as public opinion concerning key questions of party and military building depends to a significant degree on them. On the path to the 28th party congress, they are called upon to unite communists from the Army and Navy on the CPSU Central Committee Platform and to raise the prestige of the Armed Forces in society.

The 28th CPSU Congress lies ahead. It must resolve many questions which are crucial for the future of the party and for society's prospects. The Army's communists have clearly stated their positions which their emissaries will take to the CPSU's supreme forum. They believe that the congress decisions will become the basis for the consolidation and rebirth of the party as the political vanguard of the working people and that they will provide clear guidelines for further progress along the path of perestroyka in society and in the USSR Armed Forces.

Baltic Republics

Landsbergis Meets With Gorbachev in Moscow

LD2606114590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1125 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, 26 June (TASS)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev today received Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, in Moscow. A TASS correspondent was told at the Lithuanian permanent mission that the one and one-half hour discussion took place "at the invitation of the Soviet president."

The mission's press secretary said that, at the the meeting, "problems of bilateral relations, possibilities for talks, and proposals and demands to Lithuania by the USSR concerning a moratorium on its declaration of independence were discussed."

Landsbergis arrived in the Soviet capital today and immediately after his meeting with Gorbachev departed by air for Vilnius, where the Lithuanian parliament this evening begins discussion of the issue of a moratorium on the act of Lithuanian independence.

Bilateral Ties Viewed

LD2606124790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1159 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Text] As we have already reported Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania, is on a visit in Moscow today. Talks took place in the Kremlin; M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR; and Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, were representing the USSR side and the side of the republic of Lithuania was represented by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council; Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council; and Egidijus Bickauskas, republican representative in the Soviet Union.

Problems of bilateral relations were discussed at the talks, which lasted for an hour and a half. Questions relating to possibilities of negotiations beween the USSR and Lithuania, demands and proposals to Lithuania by the Soviet Union were touched upon.

Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council, is to return back to Vilnius today and is expected to take part in the work of the plenary session of the Supreme Council.

Landsbergis, Prunskiene Receive Citizenship Papers

LD2606003790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2045 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] I, Vytautas Landsbergis, in accepting the certificate of a citizen of Lithuania, pledge to observe the laws of the Lithuanian Republic and to honor my state's independence and its territorial integrity. Such was the pledge signed by the chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, [word indistinct] this honorable document, marked with number one.

Today, at the Vilnius City local government meeting hall, Arunas Grumadas, chairman of the Republic Capital Government's Council, also presented Lithuanian Citizen's Certificates to Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene, a large group of deputies, and members of government.

Vytautas Landsbergis, who spoke at the close of the ceremony, emphasized the fact that the presentation of the Lithuanian Citizen Certificates marked one very important step toward the realization of a Lithuanian Citizenship Law. May this become a stage of reflection and self-determination during a period of citizen harmony, he said. Vilnius City Mayor Vytautas Narmatonis greeted those assembled.

Discussion of Moratorium Continues in Lithuania

LD2506191890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 25 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] As you know, the acts of independence proclaimed by the Lithuanian parliament have become a stumbling block in relations between the Lithuanian Republic and the USSR leadership. A week ago, Kazimiera Prunskiene's government proposed that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declare a moratorium on these acts of independence for the duration of the talks between the Lithuanian state and the USSR leadership. However, the Lithuanian parliament rejected these proposals, taking a negative attitude to them. The majority of members of parliament, supported by the Sajudis public movement, declared these acts to be inviolable. Discussion of this question is still continuing in commissions of the Lithuanian parliament. Meanwhile, President Bush's administration does not want to take a definite position in the question of granting the USSR most favored nation status and makes it dependent upon the outcome of events in Lithuania. In the opinion of the newspaper NEWSDAY, Lithuania ought not to be turned into an important factor of Soviet-U.S. relations. Trade relations cannot depend on any national problem in the USSR, the newspaper stresses. However, it has to be admitted that relations between the nationalities remain as before are a most acute problem in our country.

Prunskiene Remarks on Moratorium, Negotiations

LD2606100290 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 24 Jun 90

[Prunskiene recorded remarks in Lithuanian with superimposed Polish translation]

[Text] [Announcer] During a brief visit to our country the Lithuanian premier, Mrs. Kazimiera Prunskiene, granted an interview for the television news. She began with a reply to a question of whether she was not afraid,

that after resuming negotiations with Vilnius, Moscow could multiply obstacles and prolong the talks without limit.

[Prunskiene] It will not be difficult to test Moscow's intention, because when the moratorium is in force a step will have to be taken by Moscow to revoke the blockade. The conditions for negotiations will have to be agreed upon, and the negotiations must begin. The moratorium is to take effect from the beginning of the negotiations. It is obvious that there will be no negotiations if force is used. What are we risking? The act is more a a political then legal nature, and it has already played its political role. The legal status of Lithuania remains unchanged.

[Announcer] Mrs. Prunskiene, asked about prospects for Polish-Lithuanian relations replied:

[Prunskiene] I have heard with satisfaction both Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Foreign Minister Skubiszewski confirming that there are no territorial claims toward Lithuania. They both see good prospects for cooperation, and in effect support the independent Lithuanian state, which sets a good foundation for our good future neighborly relations.

[Correspondent] In your opinion how long would it take for Lithuania to become a fully sovereign state?

[Prunskiene] This is a difficult question. I think, that a first stage of negotiations would determine the length of a transition period. It would probably be no shorter than the end of 1991. Well, it is to early to talk about it as it will depend on political processes in the whole of Europe.

[Correspondent] We wish for you, that it will happen as soon as possible. Thank you.

Lithuanian Envoy Views Moratorium Proposal

LD2606012390 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Lithuania's permanent Representative in Moscow, Egidijus Bickauskas, said that the Lithuanian government proposal on the moratorium is a fine [word indistinct] step that does not obligate Lithuania in any manner. Further hesitation may be disastrous for us, stated Egidijus Bickauskas. He noted, however, that it is important to weigh everything and not to make any hurried decisions.

Prunskiene Previews Supreme Soviet Discussion

LD2606001890 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] In Prunskiene's opinion, tomorrow will be marked by heated discussions. Deputies will put forward their proposals and an editorial commission will probably be set up to prepare the resolution.

According to Kazimiera Prunskiene, a total of seven resolution draft proposals have been prepared, supplementing the government proposal with various conditions. Included among those seven drafts, the prime minister said, are some which are sufficiently close to the moratorium variant proposed by the government.

In discussing what the final text of the resolution might be, Kazimiera Prunskiene declared that in her estimation it will probably be a supplemental, generalized government formula. However, a possible time limit on negotiations with the Soviet Union may be defined, or some other condition may be raised with reference to the moratorium's coming into force.

On the other hand, the prime minister expressed her apprehension by stating that if there are too many such conditions, such a resolution may become meaningless.

The question of how much this or that condition helps or hinders the start of negotiations is most important. Meanwhile, the government proposal has received world approval, in principle. Kazimiera Prunskiene discussed this at a newss conference, today. [passage omitted]

Prunskiene said the results of this discussion were not bad. However, she added that it was difficult to predict today what the possible outcome of the balance of forces will be. If our proposal is rejected, in principle, she said, I would ask those who would do that, what they propose for consolidating Lithuanian independence? How they will resolve the Army, border, and our economic problems, which are at an impasse even now, asked the prime minister. If there exists a better way to begin negotiations with Moscow than that proposed by the government, the prime minister has no plans to take over [words indistinct]. [passage omitted]

The initial negotiations, since agreement was reached on the duration of their transition period, probably would last two to three months, perhaps even less. [passage omitted] However, these are the more remote perspectives, which will follow in the event that the Lithuanian Supreme Council accepts the government proposal to announce a moratorium of the Independence Act for the duration of negotiations with Moscow.

The Lithuanian prime minister understands the moratorium as a temporary nonutilization of our rights and opportunities. Are we making use of our opportunities today, for example, to cross the border freely, both diplomatically and economically speaking? Have we provided guarantees for our young men, so that they will not have to serve in the Soviet Army, asked Kazimiera Prunskiene. These are only declared rights and opportunities; in other words, we shall not make use of them during the negotiation period, so that later, following an agreement, we could make use of our rights and opportunities in a totally independent manner.

The moratorium proposed by the government is a matter that harms neither the nation nor dignity, said Kazimiera Prunskiene. Political work on the Independence Act

has been already completed, practically. It has been consolidated not only in consciousness, but also in national documents which are untouched by the moratorium. That is why it is currently vital to proceed in taking a practical step toward consolidating this act.

More on Session

LD2506174990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1635 GMT 25 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Ustsila]

[Text] Vilnius, 25 Jun (TASS)—The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet intends to discuss the proposals of the republican government tomorrow regarding the declaration of a temporary moratorium on the act of independence, which was adopted by the republican parliament on 11 March this year, for a period of negotiations with the Soviet Union. An agreement on this was reached at the joint sitting of the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and the government of the Lithuanian Republic today.

Moscow proposed the introduction of a moratorium on the act of Lithuania's independence as a condition for the beginning of negotiations in the course of which the issues of relations between the USSR and this Baltic republic are to be settled.

Participants in today's session also discussed the situation in Lithuania's agriculture on the eve of the coming harvest. They described this situation as "difficult" because of the shortage of fuel, which is caused by the fact that its delivery to the republic from other regions of the country has been suspended.

A campaign for presentation of provisional certificates of Lithuanian citizenship also began in Lithuania today. The first to receive them were members of the government and a group of deputies of the Supreme Soviet. This week it is planned to start the mass presentation of certificates to young men of military call-up age, which, in the opinion of the parliament, will help them avoid call-up for service in the Soviet Army. According to a resolution by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet of 19 June "on procedures for application of Articles 7 and 35 on citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic," it is explained that "a person who has acquired citizenship from the Lithuanian Republic is considered to have lost citizenship from other states." Citizenship in the Soviet Union is, of course, what is in mind.

Fuel, Gas Shortages in Lithuania Discussed

LD2606120690 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] The harvesting is under great strain here in Lithuania because of the economic blockade. The vital shortages of fuel and petrol were discussed today at the joint sitting of the Lithuanian parliamentary and governmental leadership.

The present stocks of petrol are going to suffice till the beginning of July in agricultural regions of Lithuania. And the stocks of diesel fuel will most probably end in the middle of July. The lack of engine oil is critical too: 38 out of 44 regions in Lithuania are out of engine oil stocks.

Some direct agreements have been signed with the Soviet suppliers of all products; however, the blockade of the railways put an end to all direct contacts.

The Lithuanian fuel amalgamation will be able to provide the collective and state farms with only 2.5 percent of the necessary petrol and only with 12 percent of diesel fuel. No diesel oil is going to be supplied at all.

More on Gas Supply

LD2306141990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0430 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] ELTA reports—Information has been received from the Soviet Union that all enterprises supplying Lithuania with liquified gas were undergoing planned preventive repairs. It is already known that for this reason the supply has been substantially disrupted. As already announced, because of this the government commission for regulating the economic situation has decided to limit from today the supply of liquified gas to the inhabitants.

Owners of private cars using gasoline will be able to purchase 35 liters of liquified gas per month up to 23 July.

The territorial production gasification directorates, together with the rayon local governments, will decide how to limit the supply of liquified gas to the inhabitants in their service zones.

Other stocks of fuel are being exhausted, too. Fuel stocks accumulated in the Lithuanian countryside before the beginning of the blockade are already low, and the summer work on the farms is very intense: Haymaking is lagging behind; the harvesting of crops is approaching. So far about 40 percent of the required diesel fuel have been accumulated. The stocks of petrol, if the situation does not change, will be sufficient only up to the beginning of July.

An intensive search for direct links both with individual republics and with various organizations is taking place. Many of them wish to agree to help us on the basis of direct exchange, but this is hampered by a strict blockade of the railway transport. Farms and other agricultural organizations are advised to carry out a more active search of mutual links.

There are as yet many disorderly stores of oil products in the countryside. Rational use is not being made of powerful machinery. Local governments should in the best possible way ascertain the situation in their rayons and mediate that the farms assist each other. The farms are advised to establish how many horse-driven grass

cutting machines and scythes are at their disposal. It will not be possible to send to each farmstead a combine to thresh the crops. It is useful to remember previous actions of collective assistance in the countryside.

Antiblocakde Commission on Economic Situation

LD2606015890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2100 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Report from Vilnius by correspondent Elyana Kurkletite, identified by caption; from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] And now about Lithuania. Our correspondents there still have not found fuel for travelling, therefore the reportage was shot on the premises of their Vilnius Bureau.

[Kurkletite] The Lithuanian public is still trying to clarify the meaning of the temporary moratorium on the act of restoring independence for the period of the talks with the USSR. Today the issue of the moratorium was discussed at a joint meeting of the Presidium of the republican Supreme Soviet and the government. Deputies are supposed to start discussing the issue at a plenary meeting of the session tomorrow. The governmental anti-blockade commission met today, too. It was announced there that the last reserves of diesel fuel and lubricating substances are being exhausted, something which may have a negative effect on hay mowing and the drying of new harvest grain. This month, the republic received as little as 45 percent of the promised liquified gas. I think that the following piece of news will be of interest, too: an association of the homeless has been sent up in Lithuania. The first conference of the association has been held. Participants stated there they represent almost 20 percent of the Lithuanian population. According to the association's status, those Lithuanian residents can be regarded as homeless who live in hostels, in basements, or other premises not fit to accomodate people and not complying with sanitary-hygienic standards, and also adult children residing with their parents, in short, all those who have to live in conditions detrimental to physical and psychological health. So, the new association is to defend the social rights of such people.

More on Blockade

LD2506121690

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0900 GMT on 25 June carries a report by Vytas Usas from an antiblockade commission session. Usas says that it was stated at the commission session that gas had been supplied according to the fixed rate. Three million cubic meters of gas per day has been used by the Azotas production enterprise. Only 45 percent of the promised amount of liquid gas has been supplied this month.

The deputy minister of agriculture voices his concern about the rapidly diminishing supplies of gasoline, diesel oil, and machine oil, which will greatly affect harvesting work. The operation of crop dryers will become impossible. A. Brazauskas, chairman of the commission, repeats that he does not see any possibility of receiving supplies of fuel. Other members of the commission report that as a result of fuel shortages, delays in delivering building materials to building sites and goods to shops have increased. In some rural areas milk purchases from farmers have stopped because it cannot be delivered to milk processing combines.

Poll Shows Improvement in Communist Party Rating

LD2606111990 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 26 Jun 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] As an INTERFAX correspondent reports, a regular sociological survey in Lithuania has shown that the republic's government has more support than its parliament. The poll was carried out by the public opinion poll center of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences. The government has a rating of 53 and parliament 33. The premier, Kazimiera Prunskiene, and her deputy, Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the independent Lithuanian Communist party, occupy the first two places in the top ten most popular politicians in the republic. Prunskiene has a rating of 61, and Brazauskas has 50. In this the fifth poll which has been carried out from October of last year, Brazauskas is in second place for the first time.

Prunskiene has dislodged not only him, but also Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Landsbergis' rating, in comparison with the previous poll, has fallen from 45 to 28, and in the results he was only in third place. Observers note that Vladimir Berezov and Justas Paleckis, secretaries of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, have made the top ten. During the poll the popularity of Lithuania's political parties and movements became clear. The results show that in comparison with May, the Communist Party of Lithuania as a whole remained at the previous level, whilst that of Sajudis fell considerably.

Report on Prunskiene 25 June News Conference

LD2606064790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0550 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Kazis Ustsila]

[Text] Vilnius 26 June (TASS)—"In order to have genuine statehood, it is not enough merely to declare it: it must be consolidated, and the path to this lies first and foremost through the East," said Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene, clearly with relations with the Soviet Union in mind.

She was speaking at a press conference on Monday evening, after the Presidium of the Supreme Council and

the government of this Baltic republic had agreed to put to today's meeting of parliament the question of a temporary moratorium on Lithuania's 11 March Act of Independence. This is being done at the suggestion of the republic's government.

Moscow is making a moratorium a condition for starting talks, during which the relationship between the USSR and Lithuania should be sorted out. The moratorium would last only as long as the talks went on.

In the opinion of the head of the Lithuanian government, both sides are striving to start talks, and both are setting down certain conditions for this. The proposed temporary moratorium, she thinks, could be a specific step for Lithuania, which "would maintain our sense of dignity and at the same time help in starting to tackle the problems that have built up."

Prime Minister Prunskiene reported that the issue of the moratorium would be discussed at today's evening sitting of the parliament, but she considers that this discussion will not be completed until some sort of decision is made. Deputies will probably express their proposals and doubts, after which a drafting commission will be set up and the government's proposal "will be embellished and defined more precisely and conditions will be agreed..."

Those taking part in yesterday's sitting also discussed Lithuania's agricultural situation on the eve of the approaching harvest—which they called "complex" in connection with the fuel shortage caused by the suspension of its delivery to the republic from other regions of the country.

The drive to confer "temporary identification documents for citizens of the Lithuanian Republic" began in Lithuania yesterday. Members of the government and the group of deputies of the Supreme Soviet were first to receive them. It is planned to begin the mass conferment of identification documents on young men of call-up age this week—which, in the parliament's opinion, will help them to avoid the call-up to service in the Soviet Army. According to the decision of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet adopted on 19 June "on the procedure for applying Articles 7 and 35 on the citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic", it is explained that "an individual acquiring citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic is considered to have lost citizenship of another state"—of course, it is citizenship of the Soviet Union which is meant.

Prunskiene Discusses International Visits

LD2206211890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1600 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Excerpts] [passage indistinct] I must state singlemindedly that the question of Lithuania is an international question that does not concern us alone. A state does not sprout up like a mushroom and start existing. Thus, the state will truly become a state and it has to consolidate itself on a world scale, and that has its own course and traditions—that which is now taking place in Lithuania.

I also must state, without modesty in this instance, that I had to accomplish quite a lot, beginning with my visit to Scandinavia, and later to North America and the Western states, and now Greece, where a very diverse plan evolved, after a fashion, even with certain [word indistinct] from the Eastern side [word indistinct] this time. Since the USSR ambassador tried to participate in certain meetings, however, in such a quiet and favorably disposed observer's capacity, which exerted an unusual, even a surprising influence. Also, many USSR journalists were present there, including a TASS journalist and an IZVESTIYA and television correspondent. In other words, an international deliberation took place on this type of neutral ground. Since the inviting side was personified by a big businessman, a billionaire, (?Alacouzas), who owns the most politically sizeable newspaper, that exerts a major influence upon the government. Government figures used to attend his receptions, ambassadors of other countries and, according to the impresssion I received, which was also borne out by journalists, this is, in practice, I would say, no less significant than [word indistinct] government. This constitutes financial government, which has a great deal of influence, not only in Greece. [passage omitted]

We have enacted a multitude of agreements, starting with the aforementioned oil agreement to a very diverse assortment of other branches [of industry]. Thus, in July, even today, I have extended several official invitations, to enable these individuals to come here. Enthusiasm abounds, in the sense that the formation of their economy also comprises denationalization and privatization, which are taking place very swiftly. Their reforms also are directed toward economic activation and international trade activation. They also exhibit great interest in associating wth us, envisioning a program on an international scale, of ties and cooperation between north and south. Whereas, Lithuania and Greece and [word indistinct] the same time zone and a straight line of transport extends from Athens through Lithuania to Helsinki; in other words, there are trade ties in keeping with their great classic tradition of navigation. [passage omitted]

Thus, we must take such steps, in accordance with the advice of the whole world, that would facilitate the solution of all these questions, in a manner acceptable to all. Namely to all, since by being in confrontation with world desire, with European common interests and [word indistinct] expressing our will and our categorical stance against those limits and that framework, which are being set up by those architects of the new Europe, who are letting even us, to partake in consultations very concretely, while this is all [words indistinct], to state our will, is totally unrealistic and [word indistinct]. [passage omitted]

Lithuania Annuls Resolution on Polish Region

LD2206151690 Warsaw PAP in English 1338 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] Vilnius, June 21—The Lithuanian Parliament deemed as illegal and ineffective the resolution of the Vilnius Regional Council of People's Deputies of May 24, 1990, proclaiming Polish national and territorial region as part of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic in the Vilnius area.

About 300,000 Poles live in Lithuania and most of them in the Vilnius and Solechniki areas. Relations between Poles and Lithuanians worsened considerably after the Sajudis Movement was set up in Lithuania and particularly after making Lithuanian the official language.

Independent Party Leader on Lithuanian Issues

PM1906181190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Algirdas Gricius, member of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and first secretary of the Vilnius Party Gorkom, by INTERFAX correspondent Renat Abdullin, place, date not specified: "Politics Must Be Realistic"]

[Text] [Abdullin] What kind of policy would the independent Lithuanian Communist Party pursue if it had a majority in parliament?

[Gricius] First, I would not want even the renewed, independent Lithuanian Communist Party to have a majority in parliament at this stage in the restoration of Lithuanian statehood. I can even briefly explain to you why. There are still plenty of people in our ranks who compromised themselves and the idea of Lithuanian independence in the years when we were not a party but a kind of state organization. So I believe that at present we do not have the moral right to govern the republic.

[Abdullin] But, nevertheless, if we theoretically contemplate this possibility, how would the Lithuanian Communist Party try to establish Lithuanian statehood?

[Gricius] I think that the 11 March act on the restoration of independence is not a bible by which we must constantly swear. Of course, it is very important for the Lithuanian people from a purely moral point of view, but in political terms this act must be interpreted—while Lithuania's real statehood is being restored—as something allowing Lithuania to establish the most effective, mutually acceptable relations as an independent state both with the East and with the West. It seems to me that, at the start of its activity, our parliament turned to the West 100 percent and, by leaving the Union leadership in the shape of Gorbachev no room for maneuver, immediately placed us in a disadvantageous position. We laid all our cards on the table, i.e. we proclaimed independence and immediately began to adopt certain legislative acts which the USSR simply exploited in order to take appropriate measures against Lithuania. Admittedly, of course, I do not agree with the introduction of an economic blockade and some other sanctions against our republic.

I say again that the 11 March act is a document which cannot be abolished but which can be interpreted in different ways for a transitional period and period of talks. And if we are going to theoretically imagine the independent Lithuanian Communist Party in power, it would certainly approach the question of restoring Lithuanian statehood in exactly this way.

[Abdullin] What do you think of V. Landsbergis as a politician?

[Gricius] People in Lithuania now jokingly say that we have "Landsbergisites" and "Brazauskasites," i.e. people who support either Landsbergis or Brazauskas. I am not a 100-percent supporter of the views of either of them.

I can see that Brazauskas has definite strong points as a man who understands Lithuania's economic problems. But I can also see his weak points as a politician, which become apparent at certain moments when he is not very clear in what he says, which is immediately seized on by his opponents.

I see Landsbergis as a politician who calculates several steps ahead. But I do not see him as someone who really understands Lithuania's economic position and it seems to me that his policies do not always consider the needs of the ordinary individual, the working man. He is a dual personality, which, on the one hand, Lithuania needs, as it personifies "Sajudis" and the former "Sajudis" Seimas. He has, of course, contributed a great deal to Lithuania's rebirth. But, on the other hand, some of the decisions made by parliament under his leadership do not seem to me to be the best.

As a person, I am not able to give an objective assessment of Landsbergis as a politician today. History will judge which of his decisions were right and which were possibly wrong. I think that we can judge politicians by their ability to consider the various events taking place in the country and the world and their ability to react to them.

I think that during the activity of the present Supreme Soviet other acts could be adopted that would strengthen our positions and lead us by a shorter route to talks with Moscow. I am a realist. I understand that the first embassy to be established in Vilnius will be a Soviet Embassy rather than an American, French, or British one. And the first documents that will give us the possibility to really speak of an independent Lithuanian state will also be signed in Moscow.

Lithuania Commemorates Nazi Invasion

LD2206220890 Moscow TASS in English 2141 GMT 22 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Serafim Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius June 23 TASS—The day of commemoration and sorrow was observed in Lithuanian on Friday on the initiative of the Civic Committee of the Lithuanian Republic on the occasion of the 49th anniversary of the treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Rallies were held in the republic and flowers were laid at the tombs of Soviet soldiers, guerrilla fighters and Soviet power activists in Lithuania. On the decision of labour collectives, mourning flags were hoisted on building of enterprises and institutions.

Opening a rally at the Antakalnis cemetery of Vilnius, Professor Ju. Jermalavicius, deputy head of the Civic Committee of the Lithuanian Republic, said: "This day will remain forever in the memory of the Lithuanian people. During the first days of the war 5,000 Soviet power activists in Lithuania were killed by bourgeois nationalists. A total of 370,000 people were killed by Nazis and their accomplices during the war. It is painful for us to see that fascist elements are getting more active in the republic. They desecrate tombs of Soviet soldiers and destroy monuments to organisers and leaders of the democratic and communist movements in Lithuania, the way it happened in Kaunas recently, and threaten communists with assassination. We should strongly oppose their actions."

Independent Party Central Committee Plenum Held

PM2606090590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jun 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent I. Teterin: "Plenum Held"]

[Text] Tallinn, 25 Jun—A plenum of the (coalition) Communist Party of Estonia Central Committee was held here yesterday to examine questions of preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress and confirm the Estonian communists' platform at the all-Union party forum. H. Roots, secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, delivered the report. The consolidated platform submitted to the plenum participants defines the political line of the Estonian Communist Party delegation at the 28th CPSU Congress, defending the principle of the autonomy of the republican communist party.

A number of fundamental elements of this platform come down to the following. On the plane of state building the communists assert that Estonia could belong to the USSR if this decision accords with the Estonian people's fundamental interests. Here the system of Estonia's treaties with the other Union republics and with the center must be radically improved. In the field of party building the delegation will defend the idea of the CPSU's transformation into an alliance of independent communist parties. The following decision is also notable—to refrain at the congress from unproductive criticism of the CPSU leadership and the Central Committee Politburo in order to take a deeper look at the reasons for the decline in the Communist Party's prestige in society. On the tactical plane the Estonian communists' delegation will amalgamate at the CPSU congress with the democratic forces represented at the 28th congress.

Prepares for Congress

LD2506184690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1550 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] Tallinn, 25 June. (TASS)—TASS correspondent Albert Malovryan reports: The current plenum of the coalition Central Committee of the Estonian (independent) Communist Party [CPE] in which the theses of the CPE Central Committee for the 28th CPSU Congress were discussed has taken place. In particular, it has been stressed that the course towards sovereignty adopted by a number of the Union republics is putting the republican communist parties into essentially new conditions.

A statement "on the Status of the CPE and its participation in the 28th CPSU Congress" has been adopted. It states that the delegates for the 28th CPSU Congress who were elected at the 20th CPE congress in March represent two-thirds of the CPSU members in the republican party organization. They are going to the congress in order to evaluate the CPSU activities, and to offer their suggestions on the subject of its future.

The plenum also adopted a staement "on property relations in Estonia." The participants consider the course of partial denationalization and privatization of state property as reflecting the CPE program. But at the same time concern has been voiced that such processes, when are not controlled by the state, can lead to intervention by foreign capital in Estonia and turn it into a semi- colony. Considering the special importance of a fair solution to this problem as well as the importance of this issue for the future development of Estonian society, the plenum decided that there is a need for a referendum. According to the participants' opinion, without wide popular discussion, decisions that are adopted could exacerbate social injustice and increase tension in the republic.

Secretary Gives Report

LD2606052290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2100 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Video report from Tallinn by correspondent V. Velman, identified by caption; from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [Velman] The sixth plenum of the independent Estonian Communist Party Central Committee took place in Tallinn today. Harry Roots, secretary of the Central Committee, who gave a report at today's plenum, noted that the Estonian communists who adhere to the position of independence and sovereignty are sending their delegates to the CPSU congress not because they seek to split the party but because they wish to clarify the principles of party policy which find support among most strata of the Estonian population. This has been reflected in the following way in the

plenum's theses: The future fate of the CPSU cannot be separated from the model of the economy and state structure chosen by society. By opting for a market economy and pluralism of forms of ownership, society inevitably opts for a multiparty system. The course of republics towards sovereignty puts republican communist parties in new conditions, too.

Participants in the plenum also adopted a resolution on cooperation with democratic forces and a declaration on property relations in Estonia. [video shows plenum proceeding]

Pro-Union Plenum Views Congress Proposals

LD1506214890 Moscow TASS in English 2041 GMT 15 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[Text] Tallinn June 15 TASS—The seventh plenary meeting of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, favouring organisational and ideological unity with the Soviet Communist Party, was held here today.

In addition to Estonian communists' proposals to the 28th Soviet Communist Party Congress and issues connected with sending a delegation to the Russian Communist party conference, participants adopted an address to the republic's parliament.

They demanded that the parliament express its attitude to the World Congress of Estonian Participants in World War II. The congress, to be held in Parnu District, is expected to be attended by former servicemen of the 20th Estonian SS Division, police battalions and Omakaitse [Estonian Home Guard formed by Germans to fight at the rear] formations, although Nazi and their collaborationists' crimes stand condemned by all progressive people.

The republic's united work collectives union, including mainly centrally subordinated enterprises and the union of Great Patriotic War and Soviet Armed Forces veterans and soldier-internationalists union, oppose the congress.

The information evoked stormy reaction at the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee coalition bureau meeting. The majority called for denouncing Nazism and the given congress.

Result of Estonian Party Split Discussed

PM2606105790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent I. Teterin under the general headline: "At Communist Party Congresses"]

[Text] Tallinn, 20 Jun—Yesterday 183 delegates to the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress met here to discuss the situation in the republic's communist party and to adopt a number of programmatic and tactical documents.

I recall that the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress held in March led to the republic's communists splitting into two camps. Two central committees emerged in the party: one a coalition, the other upholding ideological and organizational unity with the CPSU. What have been the results of the split? In the past three months the crisis in the party has only gotten worse. The Estonian Communist Party has turned into an insignificant opposition force. Thousands of communists, seeing how the leaders of the two hostile central committees are competing with each other, are simply turning in their party cards. Nor have the hopes of the "coalition group" that the proclamation of the Estonian Communist Party's autonomy would enhance its prestige borne fruit. Under the banner of "autonomy" it has so far proved possible to attract no more than 5 percent of the communists who were Estonian Communist Party members as of 1 January 1990.

This was all discussed very critically in the report by A. Gusev, secretary of the Estonian Communist Party (united with the CPSU) Central Committee. Making a detailed analysis of the political situation in the republic, he reaffirmed that the communists meeting here will uphold the republic's sovereignty within the framework of a new Soviet federation, oppose the "capitalization" of the economy, and support communists who could lose their jobs in state organs and institutions because of their political convictions. At the same time, the keynote speaker devoted an excessive amount of attention to criticizing his ideological opponents in the party for their "apostasy" and "usurpation" of rights to party property.

I nonetheless think that the conservative trend present at the concluding session of the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress does not yet reflect the range of opinions held by Estonian communists. The Estonian Communist Party should have a future as well as a past.

Estonian Foreign Policy Council Formed

LD2306213990 Tallinn Estonian Television Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] A foreign policy council of members of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia and of the Estonian Committee has been set up at the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Estonia, with the following members: Lennart Meri, Marju Lauristin, Trivimi Velliste, Indrek Toome, Ignar Fjuk, Kalju Oja, Enn Poldroos, and Professor Hain Rebas.

The task of the council is to generalize and coordinate basic stances in the foreign policy of the Republic of Estonia on the level of executive authority. This is of particular importance in the situation where the Baltic crisis has soared to the level of world politics and precise and systematized cooperation of all democratic forces serves as a precondition to the restoring of Estonian independence.

Latvian Supreme Soviet Takes Economic Measures

PM2506133590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Single Edition p 12

[Report by unidentified TASS correspondent: "Prices Raised"]

[Text] Riga, 20 Jun—By a decision of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, tobacco prices have been doubled and not increased by 50 percent, as proposed by financial experts. Prices of alcoholic drinks will be increased by 30 percent, with beer prices doubling.

In turning Latvia into a bad place for smokers, the deputies were guided by good intentions. The money will go to set up a nonbudget social assistance fund. Calculations were approved showing by what amounts pensions, grants, maternity allowances, and the pay of low-paid workers will increase.

The Latvian financial experts first tried to find the money for this purpose back in December. But the old Supreme Soviet categorically stated that people would see such a measure as a desire by the republic's parliament and government to tackle economic problems at the people's expense. It was proposed that people be persuaded of the need for such a step and that the question be raised again if it met with understanding and support.

The Latvian Supreme Soviet made another decision which will net R807 million and, at the same time, eliminate the budget deficit of R156 million. Parliament suspended on the republic's territory the operation of one article of the union law on the USSR State Budget for 1990. It set a 57.5 percent normative for deductions from turnover tax and income tax paid into the Latvian budget. The deputies resolved that the entire income tax on workers and employees should remain in the republic and that turnover tax be set at 82.1 percent. Tax paid by owners of transport will no longer be paid into the country's budget. The plan is that it, too, will be used for Latvia's needs. According to some deputies, there could be a "price war," after all, a number of republics have long criticized the Baltic republics for using cheap cotton, coal, tobacco, and other raw materials to produce expensive articles with a high turnover tax that is highly profitable for the producer of the finished product.

It should be added that no "Zhiguli" car has a chance of being filled up with gasoline in Latvia. Drivers, confident that they would obtain the promised 60 liters in June, have been left with empty tanks.

Week's Proceedings in Latvian Supreme Soviet Noted

PM2506144790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jun 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Work of Session"]

[Text] Riga, 22 Jun—Latvian Supreme Soviet deputies devoted the bulk of their time this week to financial matters. A law on the republic's budgetary rights was adopted on the first reading. The main point in this law is the principle of the autonomous formation of republic and local soviet budgets; funds can also be allocated for joint "interstate" targeted programs.

As already announced, the session suspended the operation on Latvian territory of one article of the union Law on the USSR State Budget for 1990. The deputies decided to leave all income tax and the so-called transport tax within the republic and increase the proportion of the turnover tax transferred for the republic's needs.

On Wednesday morning many deputies appeared in the conference hall clutching cartons of cigarettes. The day before they themselves had doubled the cost of tobacco products and had rushed to the local kiosk to stock up with the goods that are subject to the price hikes before 1 July when the resolution comes into force. Ordinary smokers have been deprived of this opportunity—the stores are empty. Lovers of lively parties are also spared any trouble: There are no alcoholic beverages, which have rocketed 30 percent in price, nor beer, which has doubled in price, to be had in the stores. But the financiers are full of optimism.

The question of deputies' material security is progressing with greater difficulty. A.V. Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, said the following 4 June: Parliamentarians' pay must be reviewed. Unlike Lithuanian, Estonian, and USSR people's deputies, who have monthly wages of R500, this sum is R650 in Latvia. Lithuania and Estonia allocated R150 and R100 per month respectively for a deputy's expenses, while Latvia has set this figure at R200. The session came back to this problem once again this week. Deputies asked to be given a list of members of the apparatus of the Latvian Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers in order to compare the salaries of the legislative and executive. Information about the Presidium apparatus was prepared, but they did not get as far as discussing the matter.

The USSR president's proposal to freeze the Declaration on the Restoration of Latvian State Independence throughout the period of talks was not included on the agenda or examined. However, journalists were convinced that the parliament would voice its attitude to this initiative. After all, D. Ivans, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Latvian People's Front, told them this at a press conference after the close of the Baltic Assembly last Saturday. "Vremya" program viewers also heard this. The local television studio clarified the situation when it broadcast the opinion of Ya. Dinevich [name as transliterated] leader of the People's Front group of deputies: Talks can be held "without preliminary conditions."

Latvian Supreme Soviet Considers Legislation

LD2206222590 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0900 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, at its regular session, discussed questions concerned with future legislative work of the Supreme Soviet. The Presidium resolved to introduce on Monday [25 June] for discussion by the deputies the following agenda for the week: a draft resolution on material provision for deputies, on the activities of political parties and other public political organizations in the republic's state administrative organs and law protection establishments; a draft law on amendments and additions to the labour code of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic; draft rules for the public consultative Council of Nationalities of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet; as well as a draft law, in the second reading, on the rights of the budget of the republic of Latvia, and a draft resolution on the ethics of deputies. On Tuesday at 1900 the Supreme Soviet will hear a report from the government of the republic, to be presented by Ilmars Bisers and the chairman of the Security Committee, Edmunds Johansons. The Presidium resolved, in accordance with a demand from deputies, to include on the session's agenda the question of the liquidation of the system of privileges and prerogatives. The Presidium's session examined several questions connected with deputies' activities. The Presidium confirmed (Viktors Kalnins-Daugmalis) as the editor of the newspaper of the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers of the republic, and (Sarmite Elerte) as the first deputy editor of this publication. In the course of the session the presidium of the Supreme Soviet Presidium also formed several working commissions.

Latvian Party Congress, Referendum Reviewed

90UN2100A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 13 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by V. Proskura under the rubric "Report in Detail": "Latvia: A Referendum Is Needed"]

[Text] **Riga—"The Committee for the Defense of the Constitutions and Rights of Citizens of the Soviet Union and the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] has been receiving numerous letters and appeals from labor collectives, inhabitants of the republic, and groups of deputies of local soviets firmly demanding the repeal of the 'Declaration of Independence' adopted by the Latvian Supreme Soviet. According to an ukase of the country's president, the declaration does not have any legal force. On their own initiative hundreds of thousands of Latvian SSR inhabitants have already signed a demand that a national referendum on the future status of the republic be conducted. They believe that ignoring the ukase of the president of the USSR will lead the republic into a social and political impasse, result in serious intensification of social dissension and confrontation between nationalities, and lower the standard of living for the entire population."**

(From a report of the press center of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee)

The party press published this appeal to the Latvian Supreme Soviet (with a copy to the president of the USSR), signed in the name of the republic's Committee for the Defense of Rights by its chairman, A. Rubiks, on the eve of the resumption of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress. As we have already reported, there were plans to dedicate the second stage of the forum of Latvian communists to developing an ideological and organizational concept for the republic's Communist Party delegation to the 28th CPSU Congress. But the tense social situation and the complicated political situation made changes necessary. A. Rubiks, who currently occupies two posts—first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the republic's Committee for the Defense of Rights, gave the report "On the Tactics of the Latvian Communist Party at the Present Stage."

Some local observers have evaluated the new program proposed by the Communist Party Central Committee as "a long-range plan of party efforts to provide for the agitational and organizational activities of the Committee for the Defense of the Constitutions and Rights of Citizens of the Soviet Union and the Latvian SSR." Actually, together with the United Council of Labor Collectives [OSTK] the Latvian Communist Party has become one of the most important founders of this public group, and the leader of the communists was unanimously elected its leader.

The new mass movement, which originated in the republic as a logical reaction to the separatist activities of the current Latvian leadership, gave this task to the Latvian Communist Party as the leading force of political opposition. The OSTK and the International Front of Latvian SSR workers are also headed by communists. But the new platform of actions which the Communist Party is developing is broader than tactical outlines for today and tomorrow.

In short, the essence of this program is as follows. For now the main task of communists is agitation for a referendum. If the population of Latvia rejects the decision of the "majority faction" in the current parliament, then the workers together with the Communist Party have the right to demand that the Supreme Soviet resign and that new elections be conducted. If the people speak out in favor of secession from the USSR, the communists will submit to the democratically expressed will of the masses and will act with regard for the circumstances.

However, these circumstances may take various forms. Even today the aggressive, radical wing of the NFL [People's Front of Latvia] is raising the question of the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet and the election of a sejm—as the parliament in bourgeois Latvia was called. In addition, there are plans to deprive those who remain citizens of the Soviet Union of their electoral rights.

True, both A. Gorbunov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and Prime Minister I. Godmanis are speaking out in favor of the "zero variant." That is to say, in their words, if a resident of the Latvian SSR makes the appropriate request he will be able to become a citizen of the republic of Latvia. However even the liberals in the leadership of the ruling bloc consider it "intolerable" for a "territorial subunit of the CPSU" to retain the rights of a political party in an "independent state."

A month and a half of parliamentary activity by the "Equality" faction, which is supported by the Communist Party, has shown the impossibility of having any practical influence on the process of hurriedly rubberstamping the daily national and state sociopolitical decisions in the republic's Supreme Soviet. True, thanks to the direct radio transmissions of the course of the session, the communist departments have been able at times to use the tribune to popularize their views and to struggle for popular opinion. But the authorities have had second thoughts—the transmissions were broken off and the voice of the opposition was not to be heard on the air. An unprecedented anticommunist hysteria has been unleashed, as the delegates to the party congress noted.

The latest decree of the Latvian Supreme Soviet was directed at taking the Communist Party's publishing base from it. That was the underlying reason for this "legally binding act." The Riga Press House, where the editorial boards of the republic's newspapers and journals are concentrated, belonged to the Publishing House of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, and later—in accordance with a ruling of the USSR Council of Ministers—it was transferred to the newly formed Latvian Publishing House of the CPSU Central Committee. Now the republic's Council of Ministers has been commissioned by the votes of the deputies of the ruling coalition to "'take... ownership' of the Party Publishing House" and "provide for its administration."

The congress of Latvian communists also focused attention on questions of the workers' social protection. They are quite urgent: The "new economic policy" of the republic's leadership is directed at curtailing the industrial sectors subordinate to the Union. The report and the speeches of the delegates are emphatic: There are assertions to the effect that only the so-called immigrants will be affected by unemployment and will be forced to leave the republic, and those who make these assertions are doing nothing more than deceiving their own people. Any attempts to "assign" unemployment along lines of nationality will have catastrophic consequences for society.

Having affirmed their loyalty to ideological and organizational unity with the CPSU and to federative relations with the USSR, the Latvian communists decided to call off most of the approaching celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the restoration of Soviet power in the republic.

Party Renewal Discussed at Riga Conference

LD1506154690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 15 Jun 90

[Text] Topical questions of the democratization and renewal of the party were the focal point at a scientific-practical conference which has taken placed in Riga, the capital of Latvia. It was attended by delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from the communist parties in the Baltic republics and also Belorussia and Kaliningrad oblast, and by social scientists, secretaries of city and rayon party committes, and the party aktivs of those regions.

An appeal that was adopted to the communists in the Soviet Baltic republics says that they should appreciate with all seriousness the whole complex situation that has been created, in which the question of the existence of the Soviet socialist system in the Baltic region is at stake.

Latvian Government Ethnic Makeup Examined

LD2006233590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 20 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of Latvia completed the formation of the republic's government today.

[Correspondent N. Kasyanova] The new cabinet of ministers of Latvia wil perhaps be known in the republic's history as the government of a crisis period, because it is facing extremely difficult tasks: To implement measures which make it possible to extricate the republic's economy from its present crisis situation and to stabilise the political situation. Is Latvia's new, essentially monoethnic government capable of this? After all, this is a republic where almost 48 percent of the population are of different nationalities and over 34 percent of them are Russians.

[Begin recording] [Ya. V. Dinevichs, leader of majority group in Latvian Supreme Soviet] I believe that it is parliament, not the government, which must deal with these problems of interethnic relations and so on. The government is the executive body. It has to tackle the economic problems which are being put forward here now on the decision of parliament. Thus, it is perhaps not so important that it is more or less monoethnic. However, I believe that there should have been representatives of other nationalities in this government as well.

[S.L. Dimanis, leader of the Equality group] The chairman of the Council of Ministers has formed his team. That is his right. I think that life will show to what extent this government is capable of action. It is rather hard to say now. Its first steps have struck me as fairly authoritarian. I mean that the ideas about a market economy which were floating in the air before the formation of the government have now, apparently, been forgotten. [end recording]

[Kasyanova] The conflict situation which had arisen in the republic's interior ministry has also been resolved. Comrade Bakatin, the USSR interior minister, has confirmed Alois Vaznis, who had been appointed by the Supreme Soviet. As the local press reports, it is possible that the militia wil be reorganized into a police force. [Video shows parliament in session; separate interviews between correspondent and each party leader]

Latvian Deputies Do Not Discuss Gorbachev Appeal

LD2206223490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] This week the deputies of the Latvian Supreme Soviet have devoted most of their time to republican financial matters. The law on the budget rights of Latvia was adopted in its first reading. The proposal by the USSR president to freeze for the duration of the talks the declaration on the restoration of the state independence of Latvia was not included on the agenda and was not discussed.

Differences Over Latvian Referendum Noted

PM2206140390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jun 90 First Edition p 3

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel M. Ziyeminsh report "From Riga" under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Two Views of a Referendum"]

[Text] The Committee for the Defense of Citizens' Rights and the USSR and Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitutions recently urged people to determine their position on the question of the republic's future status. It was noted that the committee has received more than 305,000 signatures from the republic's inhabitants demanding that a referendum on the republic's status be prepared and held; this is the express will of more than 16 percent of the voters. According to existing legal norms, this number of signatures is sufficient for the question of preparing and holding a referendum on the republic's status to be raised before the country's president and the Latvian parliament. It was also underlined that sending a letter to Moscow and to the republic's parliament does not mean an end to the collection of signatures.

It is the aim of all the committee structures at local level to convey to each supporter the idea of the need for a referendum. The Latvian Committee—a structure set up by the Citizens of Latvia Congress —has a different viewpoint on this topical question for the republic. It was set out in the press by this committee's chairman, Aigar Irgens.

If a referendum is organized, he said, we must say outright that only Latvian citizens have the right to participate in the referendum. It must be held in the presence of international security forces and international observers. All USSR troops must be withdrawn from Latvian territory before then.

Things were not of course confined to verbose statements. Citizens' committees have begun a campaign to collect signatures demanding that the republic's Supreme Soviet prevent the adoption of a law on citizenship prior to the election of a "legitimate Sejm"—that is, by that section of the republic's population who were Latvian citizens prior to 17 June 1940. The sheets of signatures also demand that any treaty with the USSR on a renewed federation or confederation be eschewed.

Change of Latvian Komsomol's Name Reported

PM2206122790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jun 90 p 1

["Own Information" report: "I Am Not Going to Leave the SPML..."]

[Text] As of today the Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] no longer exists in Latvia. Instead there is the League for the Progress of Latvian Youth [SPML]. In principle, it is the same organization or rather what is left of it, because the Komsomol's ranks have lost over 100,000 members in the past two or three years. The renamed "Komsomol" now has around 200,000 members on paper. But that is on paper only, because reregistration is still only being planned.

The vote on the change of name was taken at a conference of the republican Komsomol organization which, admittedly, little more than 200 of the 370 elected delegates attended. Will the change of "nameplate," or the economic program that has been adopted, change the situation? One would like to hope so, especially since the SPML will remain a federated subject [subyekt federatsii] of the Komsomol advocating the "creation of a society of democratic socialism by parliamentary means."

Latvian Procuracy's Legal Status Queried

90UN2076C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 29 May 90 p 3

[Statement by Latvian SSR Procuracy: "From the Republic Procuracy Collegium"]

[Text] Complying with the tasks assigned to it under the provisions of the USSR Constitution and the Latvian SSR Constitution, the republic Procuracy will henceforth safeguard the socioeconomic, political, and personal rights and freedoms of all citizens of Latvia and the legitimate interests of society and the labor collectives. This was the subject of discussion in the Latvian SSR Procuracy collegium.

The priority tasks for the Procuracy are to improve the effectiveness of supervision to ensure observance of the law with respect to the fight against crime, which is significantly on the increase, and to ensure public safety for the population in coordination with organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Committee for State Security.

At this time the Procuracy, as the organ that supervises at the highest level compliance with the laws of the USSR and of the Latvian SSR in the republic, is in its practical activity encountering growing complexities resulting from the contradictions between a number of all-Union and republic laws.

In connection with the publication by the president of the USSR of the ukase "On the Declaration of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet 'On Restoration of the Independence of the Latvian Republic'" the USSR procurator general has issued the Latvian SSR procurator with instructions to appeal immediately unlawful actions and decisions by state organs and officials made on the basis of any legal enactment that is at variance with the USSR Constitution.

The Latvian SSR procurator is obliged to do this and will raise the issue for the legislative organs with respect to bringing republic laws and all-Union laws into line.

The collegium believes that in a rule-of-law state all collisions with respect to the law should be removed by decision of the legislative organs. This position also applies fully to the legal status of the republic Procuracy. Until they have been resolved on a legislative footing, disagreements regarding decisions and actions can lead to a split among Procuracy workers and seriously undermine superivision of the observance of legality and have an adverse effect on ensuring law and order in the republic, and may entail undesirable consequences for citizens.

[Signed] The Latvian SSR Procuracy.

RSFSR

Yeltsin Gives Interviews on Current Issues

Armed Forces

PM2506180990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jun 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, by own correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Oliynik and Central TV correspondent V. Ionov on 23 June in Moscow under the rubric "Topical Interview:" "B.N. Yeltsin: 'The Army and the People Have a Single Destiny'"—first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] As we have already reported, B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, took part in the routine graduation ceremony of the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School named for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in Red Square 23 June along with Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, member of the Presidential Council and USSR defense minister. After the ceremony a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent and a journalist from the Central TV program "I Serve the Fatherland" interviewed the chairman of the Russian parliament.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Boris Nikolayevich, the recently ended first RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies devoted a great deal of attention to the Army and its urgent problems. How do you view the further development of the Armed Forces, taking account of Russia's sovereignty and the sovereignty of the other Union republics?

[Yeltsin] The main event at the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies was, as is well known, the discussion of the question of Russia's state sovereignty and the adoption of a resolution demarcating functions between the republic and the center. This clearly stated which functions Russia would voluntarily hand over to which Union administrative organs, and what would be left under its own control. Along with a number of other Union ministries these prerogatives have remained, in particular, with the USSR Defense Ministry—a key link in safeguarding the defense capability of our country, including Russia. At the same time, our congress resolved to introduce into the republic's government the post of RSFSR defense minister without portfolio to coordinate actions with the Union Defense Ministry.

As for the prospects of developing the Army and Navy, I cannot conceive of such a prospect without profound military reform based on a new defensive doctrine and the principle of reasonable sufficiency. It is clear that reform should not lead to a reduction in the country's defense capability or a weakening of the Army. At the same time, it should radically transform the current system of defense building, implement the profound democratization of military service, significantly cut Armed Forces numbers, and fundamentally improve social protection for all categories of servicemen. The Russian parliament will uphold precisely these positions and struggle for the social rights of the fatherland's protectors. The Army and the people have a single destiny.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Could you discuss in more detail the functions of an RSFSR defense minister; and do you already have a candidate for that post?

[Yeltsin] The functions of the republic's new defense minister will have to be clarified by the Russian parliament. In the most general terms I see them as follows. Above all, the post should be held by a civilian, and the ministry's small apparatus (no more than 20 people) could and should be made up of military specialists and experts in various spheres of military building. The minister's duties would mainly be to coordinate actions with the Union Defense Ministry, including the combat readiness of troops deployed within Russia, the draft, the implementation of major troop exercises, transfers of contingents of troops, and so forth. You will agree that the Russian parliament is not indifferent to the fate of

those servicemen who, for instance, might suddenly be redeployed to "quell" the latest interethnic conflict, as has been the case in the past. Now that each republic will be participating in military building on a real basis, the Army, in my view, will not be used to resolve tasks that are foreign to it.

It would be premature, I think, to answer the second part of your question. After a short recess the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session will start work and, I hope, confirm the future Russian defense minister. Only then will his name become known.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] During the elaboration of military reform the idea of switching to a professional army is being put forward. What is your attitude about that?

[Yeltsin] I am firmly convinced that the future lies with a professional army, in which standards will be set by high-class specialists and professionals. Clearly, this will not happen at once but gradually—since it is a difficult process that affects the careers of hundreds of thousands of servicemen and their families.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The decision to set up so-called "national formations"—allegedly to protect republics' sovereignty—is now being discussed more and more frequently in a number of republics. What would you say on this score?

[Yeltsin] I could answer briefly that I'm against the creation of such formations. However, the question probably requires a more extensive answer. Of course, each republic has had and continues to have its own historical, political, and ethnic features that have influenced the demand to change the procedure for military service by young men of the indigenous nationality—I'm no longer talking about the notorious "bullying" in the Army or the sharp deterioration in interethnic relations (remember the events in Baku, Yerevan, and Ashkhabad). This and many other things, I think, have prompted the most radical circles in certain republics to think about the need to set up "national formations" and their own "armies" and to pin the defense of their sovereignty on them. I think that splitting up the Army along ethnic lines could lead to a sharp undermining of our country's defense capability. Moreover, a return to national formations in the conditions of the current exacerbation of interethnic relations is fraught with severe and negative consequences for the peoples themselves.

At the same time, I advocate that those representatives of indigenous nationalities who, by dint of their political, physical, or religious features, cannot serve in the Soviet Armed Forces should be able to serve on an alternative basis within their own republic.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] One last question, Boris Nikolayevich. There is the concept of serving the motherland. What would you include in it?

[Yeltsin] Serving the motherland is in the best traditions of the Russian Army. I would add to this merely that the fatherland should also be properly concerned about its armed protectors. The problem of the rights of military men should be a key point in the forthcoming military reform along with other fundamental changes in our Army and Navy. The Russian parliament will uphold the rights of the fatherland's protectors.

Russian Sovereignty

LD2506184190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 25 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Over the past few weeks the news programs have been full of reports about the work of the country's parliament and the congresses Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic People's Deputies and Russian Communists. Our program has precisely given priority to these. This is understandable, for these major events will probably influence to a great extent the political destiny of the whole country. Now, judging by all appearances, a short period of calm has arrived in the state's political life. In just a week the 28th Congress of the CPSU opens, and in the program today is an interview given by Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, to Aleksandr Tikhomirov, Central Television's political observer.

[Begin recording] [Tikhomirov] Boris Nikolayevich. The declaration of sovereignty which you adopted at the congress; I have gained the impression that very many of the deputies understand this—sovereignty—in different ways. Some understand it as an opportunity to revive Russia's statehood, while others understand it as an opportunity to create a certain mold from the Union bureaucratic structures, to transfer them to within Russia, and thereby to ensure work and positions for themselves etc. But how do you understand Russian sovereignty?

[Yeltsin] First, I think that gradually, after some time, everyone will have the same understanding, when we begin to implement these principles which are contained in the declaration that has been adopted on Russia's state sovereignty. For all of these 73 years Russia has not had statehood. It was an adjunct of the center and all of the failures, even, which took place at the Union level were always identified with Russia, as if Russia were to blame for everything in general. Therefore, even from this point of view, Russia should have both its own borders, its own sovereignty, and its independence, in virtually everything apart from that share which we leave to the center. Not a large share, as we decided in the resolution on the division of functions—six Union ministries. If I imagine sovereignty, it is nevertheless sovereignty—or, to be more precise, it is not expressed like that—the rights of the citizen, the maximum degree of indedpendence for enterprises, independence for soviets at the rayon, town and oblast level, and a Russian center with little bureaucracy. That is, the functions of the

Union bureaucracy will not turn into a Russian bureaucracy. No, in that case we would not have achieved the right result. But the decentralization which has taken place, precisely, both through the Union and through Russia and the main center of power will have gone down to the people. So, all the time the individual here has worked for the state—and there have even been such slogans—and not the state for the individual. And it should reach the individual.

But even over all those five years of perestroyka, however, we have been constantly introducing half-measures which are not radical enough. We have built a bridge stretching to the middle of the river, and have stopped there. And the people's situation has not improved, quite the contrary. Because earlier they used to cross the river in a boat but then, expecting the bridge to be completed soon, they abandoned the boat and it fell apart. But there is no bridge yet. After five years the people's conditions have deteriorated.

[Tikhomirov] Boris Nikolayevich, to complete the construction of the bridge, a budget of one's own is needed. After all, Russia's budget has always been thoroughly dissolved, on the whole, in the Union's budget; it has been paid into the common purse. How can we manage to single out Russia's share?

[Yeltsin] Well, according to calculations, which, I think, are far from comprehensive, R70,000 million and, of course, a very considerable share of millions in hard currency leave Russia. This first move is that the Russian Bank is now separated by the new decision adopted at the congress in which we both participated. It says that, following the delimitation of functions between the Union and Russia, the Russian Bank is separated from the Union Bank and is under the command of the Supreme Soviet, not of the Russian government. In other words, the process of paying into the Union budget bypassing Russia will now be eliminated. And now we will no longer simply pay the Union a certain amount demanded by the center, but will pay only for specific programs in accordance with precise calculations and toward each budget item in accordance with precise calculations. And I think this will amount not to 70 but, maybe, 20,000 million, so as to stop feeding that bureaucratic dome. Russia will feed only the organizations it needs.

[Tikhomirov] That is to say apart from the Ministry of...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] And separate the budgets clearly.

[Tikhomirov] That is to say, apart from, say, the Ministry of Defense, the KGB, the Ministry of Civil Aviation, as we have put it in this decision on the separation of functions, all the rest, everything that is on the territory of Russia, is Russian?

[Yeltsin] It is Russian, and we must now work out a mechanism for the direct transfer of this immediately into Russian ownership. We are now, the Supreme Soviet will now begin working, and this mechanism will begin to be worked out and the appropriate laws will be specifically adopted for each area. But these principles have been adopted and this declaration, well, other republics in our country have also begun to adopt it and there is no going back now. And we have held a long session to-day with Comrade Silayev for this; the whole structure of power is being changed in a very serious way, once again bringing it closer to the person. There is half the number of ministries, the number is down to half, Silayev has half the number of deputies, all the deputies are being changed in full, absolutely all the ministers are being changed. That is to say, the cabinet will be renewed, it will be younger, it will be more radical, more bold, so that...

[Tikhomirov interrupting] That is to say the ministers, too, are younger than Silayev?

[Yeltsin] And they are also younger than I am.

[Tikhomirov] Good. Boris Nikolayevich, tomorrow you have a press conference starting at 1830 on the first program of Central Television.

[Yeltsin] Yes.

[Tikhomirov] And I want to say to you, thank you.

[Yeltsin] Thank you. [end recording]

Party, KGB

AU2606094190 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 23 Jun 90 p 1

[Report on interview with Boris Yeltsin by Laszlo N. Sandor; in Moscow, date not given: "Exclusive Interview With Boris Yeltsin—The KGB Did Not Congratulate the RSFSR President"]

[Text] We can only avoid a split in the party if we recognize the existence of different platforms. Differences of opinions should be treated as a natural phenomenon within the party, and these political platforms should not be discarded as a foreign body—Boris Yeltsin declared in an interview granted to MAGYAR HIRLAP by means of the NOVOSTI press agency.

[Sandor] What is your opinion about the founding session of the Russian Communist Party?

[Yeltsin] There is no sense in holding congresses and party conferences which only elect the leading bodies of the party and distribute seats—Boris Yeltsin said, not concealing his fear that the Russian party conference might also end with such a "distribution of seats."

[Sandor] You are particularly well-known for your radicalism....

[Yeltsin] I am now learning the art of compromise. I must do my best to find the proper tone with various political groupings, for the benefit of joint activity. We did not follow the example of the Congress of Soviet People's Deputies, which "eliminated" the inter-regional

group at the very moment of its inception. At present, there are almost 30 groups of deputies active in the highest body of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

[Sandor] Following your election as president of the RSFSR, you mentioned a few organizations, including the Defense Ministry, which congratulated you on your election. Has the KGB also congratulated you?

[Yeltsin] No—Boris Yeltsin said, who immediately following his election perhaps decided to create a special unit responsible for the personal security of the head of the RSFSR. This unit will fall under the jurisdiction of parliament and will be independent of the KGB.

Moscow Radio Reports on 'Statement of 22'

LD2606060890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0400 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Excerpt] Today the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA devotes a lot of attention to the outcome of the Constituent Congress of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Communist Party. In particular, it publishes the Statement of 22, which was read out at the party's constituent congress despite the protests of many of those present in the hall. It says: We young communists who, to some extent, represent the future of our party, want to express our attitude towards the congress. While acknowledging the fact of the creation of the Communist Party of the RSFSR, we cannot fail to see that this problem—which has been dragging on right from the very outset—is today being tackled in artificially created haste, which rules out the possibility of an objectively regulated resolution being adopted. We note that the discussion at the congress has provided no answer to the key question of the principles governing the organization of the Communist Party's work, its ideological basis, and the RSFSR Communist Party's place on the political map of Russia. The situation at the congress convinces us that objectively, the leading bodies of the Communist Party are being set up to counterbalance the Congress of People's Deputies. And generally, this is a all-out attack by the forces of conservatism on the leadership of the party and the state, on the general secretary of the Central Committee and the country's president, and is a decisive attempt on their part to halt the democratic processes in the party and society. The success of this attack can have but one result—a split in the party, the withdrawal from its ranks of the progressive-minded members and honest rank and file members, and ultimately the very isolation of the party from society. [passage omitted]

Further Reportage on Polozkov News Conference

PM2406175690 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Jun 90 Single Edition p 5

[TASS report on 23 June press conference given by I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee: "Russian Communist Party: The Leader's Position"]

[Text] The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party is being set up during a period of transition from one condition of society to another. This has a substantial impact on the choice of its structures and the determination of its strategic line and forms and methods of work. But we expect the vast majority of delegates to the founding congress will agree that it will be a Communist Party of the socialist choice, true to the ideas of October, and that Marxist-Leninist theory and socialist ideals will remain its basis. That is the opinion of I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee.

Soviet and foreign journalists had been waiting to meet with him from first thing in the morning on 23 June—from the moment his election was announced. That is only natural—the activity of such a major political force as the Russian Communist Party will to a large extent determine the future of the entire republic. What is the new leader's position?

In his opinion Russia is becoming an equal among equals. It was hitherto in a special position—a situation which came about historically. The Soviet Union was formed through the affiliation of the republics to the Russian Federation at different times. It was affectionately called the "elder sister," but nonetheless it did not have its own state status, its own state and political structures or legal foundations. Now, at the Congress of People's Deputies, a Law on RSFSR Sovereignty has been adopted.

Now, too, the CPSU is equal with other political parties and currents. It has voluntarily renounced the monopoly of power. We will have to master a very difficult art, and learn to work in conditions where legislation and the approaches to the socioeconomic system in general are changing. For this reason our own congress, I.K. Polozkov said, has been very heated, active, and sometimes contradictory.

The Russian Communist Party still has to acquire forms and methods of work, he went on. It is therefore our task to "suck in" to its working organs the most active, bold, and thinking people who are able to promote perestroyka processes in our Communist Party, in the republic, and countrywide.

Many people recently, the speaker said, have been inclined to assess me as a right-wing conservative. But the elections showed that people of radical views also voted for me. I think the speculation on this point will soon die down. Much work lies ahead to consolidate all the forces of perestroyka in the party. Here I will rely on the opinion of the broad public, he stressed.

Answering a question about his political reputation, I.K. Polozkov observed that in his opinion his reputation did not suffer as a result of his withdrawal during the elections to the post of chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. As for his relationship with B.N. Yeltsin, the first secretary of the republic Communist Party Central Committee noted that there are no grounds for confrontation.

In a complex period when the new economic mechanism is not yet in action and economic relations have not become established, it is important more actively to set the Communist Party in motion as a powerful structure for resolving the tasks facing the republic.

In conditions in which the country is preparing for the transition to a market economy footing, it is important, I.K. Polozkov believes, not to be too hasty in choosing a concrete program of action. The states that are now developing most successfully accumulated experience over decades. We find ourselves in more complex conditions. It is therefore dangerous now to take any ill-considered step, which could be the cause of a social explosion. If the RSFSR government, which is headed by I.S. Silayev, succeeds in formulating a more acceptable program than that proposed by the USSR Council of Ministers, we will support it with pleasure, he said.

As for the development of private ownership in the USSR, in the opinion of the Russian communists' leader, it could develop in the shape of small-scale enterprise. After all, capitalism has not rejected our experience of socialization of ownership of the means of production in large companies. Why should we discard something positive that it has developed? Marxist-Leninist theory should not be treated as "rote-learned dogma." Great potential in scientific thinking accumulated over many years is now available. Critical assessments from those whom we only recently regarded as "enemies" should also be taken into account, he said.

Answering a question about his attitude toward people of opposing views, in particular Shatalin, Andreyeva, Lysenko, and Rodionov, the first secretary of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee said that he will try to establish contact with them in order to exchange opinions. I respect them as committed people who uphold their own view. But it will be better if as a result of our dialogue they soften their positions, he noted.

I.K. Polozkov considers the depoliticization of the Army and the KGB to be impossible. As he put it, they fulfill tasks set by the government. And in any state the organs of administration are always politicized in one way or another. Consequently servicemen fulfill a political function.

Can a member of the CPSU living in Russia not join the RSFSR Communist Party? Only the 28th congress can answer this question, the speaker said. It must discuss whether we will have a single Statutes, Program, and communist membership card. Apart from that, the exchange of a large number of various documents lies ahead in the grass-roots organizations. During this period it is necessary to put the question: will the communist remain a member of the RSFSR Communist Party.

I.K. Polozkov acknowledged the existence of the danger of a split in the party. Nonetheless, he said, "this threat is not yet upon us." Criticism from right and left is not a disaster. "The Communist Party is a highly tenacious system, and there is no need to rescue it yet," the leader of the Russian communists stressed.

Polozkov Says 'No Confrontation' With Yeltsin

LD2306082690 Moscow TASS in English 0808 GMT 23 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondents Boris Zverev and Ivan Ivanov:]

[Text] Moscow June 23 TASS—Ivan Polozkov, whom the founding congress of the Russian Communist Party elected first secretary of its Central Committee told journalists that the Russian party organisation would "most actively participate in bringing home to people and implementing the decisions made by the First Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies, which ended its work on Friday.

Touching upon interaction with the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and its chairman Boris Yeltsin (Polozkov was Yeltsin's rival in the struggle for the leading post in the Russian parliament), the leader of the republican Communist Party said: "We had no confrontation with Boris Yeltsin, this is why I believe there is no need for me to suggest anything for consolidation. We shall simply work together."

In the first interview in his new capacity, Polozkov said that he is feeling the burden of responsibility. Asked about his first steps as the Russian Communist Party leader, he replied that it was necessary to complete the work of the congress "in a good manner and without conflicts." Polozkov said he intended to take steps to avert a split in the party according to different platforms. He would like to see "all thinking forces in the party rally in the interests of the party."

Polozkov was asked about his reaction to the statement made at the congress on Friday, alleging that the election of Polozkov, believed by some people to be a conservative, will lead to a mass of people leaving the party ranks. Polozkov replied: "I do not believe that party organisation will begin acting like this in protest, unless these party organizations are provoked deliberately by some forces."

Russian Party Issues Resolution on Mass Media

PM2506133790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jun 90 Second Edition p 2

["Resolution of the RSFSR Communist Party Constituent Congress on the Attitude of the RSFSR Communist Party Constituent Congress Toward the Russian Federation's Mass Media"]

[Text] A political party cannot operate efficiently without its own mass media. Under conditions of an emergent multiparty system, the polarization of interests and opinions, and the intensification of the political struggle, this truth is acquiring special topicality.

The congress considers it necessary to clearly define its positions of principle concerning the Russian mass media.

The congress supports the proposals of the First Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies and of Russia's public on the creation of a full-blooded system of the republic's mass media, to include the formation of independent television and radio broadcasting, a movie studio, a news agency, and book and newspaper publishing houses and the publication of new newspapers and journals.

The congress:

—supports the right to copublication of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and appeals to the CPSU Central Committee to approve the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee as copublisher;

—considers it necessary to form new press organs of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee—a newspaper and a sociopolitical journal—and to create a publishing house of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee to produce newspapers, journals, political literature, and belles lettres.

Party Issues Resolution on Union Program

PM2506105590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jun 90 Second Edition p 1

["Resolution of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party on the Draft Program Statement for the 28th CPSU Congress and the Draft CPSU Statutes"]

[Text] 1. The Constituent Congress of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party basically supports the provisions of the draft program statement for the 28th party congress and the draft CPSU statutes.

2. The congress entrusts the editorial commission with conveying the criticisms and suggestions of participants in the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party concerning the draft program statement and the draft CPSU statutes to the preparatory commissions of the 28th party congress and considers it expedient to publish the draft program statement for the 28th CPSU Congress and the draft CPSU statutes in the central party press no later than one week before the congress opens.

Karavayev, Gorbachev Discuss Military Issues

LD2306010690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2226 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Remarks by Artillery Commander Karavayev and USSR President M.S. Gorbachev at constituent congress of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party Congress in Moscow on 22 June—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Karavayev] Delegate Karavayev from the Western group of troops, commander of an artillery brigade. Comrades, I am sorry that I am boring you here today, but I must say what I have been asked by those who elected me, and make a number of proposals. Comrades, as we are meeting, news about mass disorders is coming in from Estonia. Fascism is raising its head. This is nothing but a demonstration of permissiveness and political provocation. I believe that we need to give these events the evaluation that they deserve, and I demand that an end be put to them. We are concerned about the easiness with which the government accepts unilateral initiatives. Thus, Comrade Shevardnadze recently made a declaration to the whole world about the unilateral reduction, by the end of this year, of a large number of tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe. This initiative was not worked on in the Ministry of Defense. Yet tens of thousands of servicemen and our families are affected by it. It would be desirable to hear a response from Comrade Shevardnadze. I propose the following addition to the Draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee, where it concerns foreign policy: Following the words: reduction of armaments and armed forces to a level of reasonable sufficiency, continue with the words: having first ensured that all social questions affecting the category of service personnel concerned have been resolved.

Comrades, the number of legal violations against officers and warrant officers is on the increase. The number of unsolved crimes is growing. I believe that a serious approach to resolving this question is long overdue, both from the point of view of imposing order locally and with regard to the passing of a law in the USSR Supreme Soviet on defending the honor and merit of Soviet servicemen. And I call on Comrade Communist Sobchak to convey this request to the Supreme Soviet and then report back to us at the 28th CPSU Congress. We would like to hear at the congress, at the 28th party congress, hear when we are to have a truthful history of the state and the party; We would like to have an objective assessment of the state of affairs in the Armed Forces which we can offer to the people so that the people can decide whether we deserve such insults. We would like to know whether our position at the Vienna talks is correct. Have we not conceded too much to our adversaries? In my view, nobody is better placed to do this than communist Moiseyev, chief of the general staff.

We need to hear a general summing-up concerning the working experience of party organizations in the Armed Forces, since at this time of troubles, only 14 communists are leaving the party. And then a decision is needed on whether we need political organizers and party organizations. I believe it essential that a state commission be set up to study the real state of affairs concerning social provision for servicemen and their families and for Afghan war veterans and invalids. A report should be presented on this to the next congress of USSR people's deputies. I am sure the result will be amazing. We should stop making a distinction between war veterans and war

invalids. They are all pensioners. Let us get this sorted out once and for all. They should all be able to live like human beings. [applause] Thank you.

I suggest that the government should require local executive committees to pay off housing debts to the USSR Defense Ministry, and to reorganize the 300—I repeat, 300—military construction detachments for the building of residential blocks which are currently distributed around various ministries, rather than disbanding them as is now envisaged.

Just now, many have on their lips the question: who is the Army today? I state that the Soviet soldier will not follow behind demagogues and reformers of adventurist persuasions. He is able to think soberly and exclude extremes. Service to the fatherland and defense of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, especially in such a complicated situation, is our great policy and military duty.

Thank you for your attention. [applause] [passage omitted]

[Gorbachev] Just a minute, a minute, a minute. I have had to react in some way—and Comrade Karavayev has expressed many very important proposals, and I think that we have to fix our position somehow, and maybe we will act in this way: We will instruct the drafting commission to examine the proposals expressed by Comrade Karavayev, and prepare some proposals on this account, because this concerns the supreme bodies of power and the president and other bodies. It is necessary that the comrades first of all examine and report their considerations and recommendations to us. That is how should it be, is it not? [passage omitted]

Russian Party Conference 'Leading Organs' Listed

PM2106082790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Jun 90 Single Edition p 1

[Unattributed report listing membership of functional committees elected at conference of Russian communists which opened in Moscow on 19 June: "The Leading Organs of the Conference"]

[Text] **Presidium**

M.S. Gorbachev, Yu.V. Botintsev, B.N. Yeltsin, N.I. Kalinina, B.U. Kazimova, D.N. Kugultinov, A.I. Lukyanov, Yu.A. Manayenkov, A.V. Osinkin, N.I. Ryzhkov, V.M. Ryabkov, I.S. Silayev, V.A. Starodubtsev, Yu.B. Stepanov, G.I. Usmanov, V.N. Fedorov.

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Chairman: G.M. Khodyrev

Commission members: Ye.D. Arsentyev, A.I. Belov, I.G. Berezhnoy, L.B. Butovskiy, A.A. Volkov, L.N. Gladysh, V.L. Govorov, V.S. Goncharov, Ye.T. Guryev, N.M. Denisov, Ye.G. Dzansolov, V.V. Yevdokimov, A.S. Yevtikhov, N.M. Ivanov, B.P. Kalistratov, N.T. Kolpakov, V.A. Kryukovskikh, Yu.I. Makarov, G.L. Markov, V.P. Mukhachev, V.I. Ozhegina, V.V. Panchenko, A.P. Petrov, B.D. Podovalov, Ye.M. Podolskiy, L.V. Potapov, Yu.N. Prokopev, B.Ye. Pyankov, N.F. Ratushnaya, V.I. Saranskikh, D.P. Storozhenko, Ye.V. Toropov, N.G. Tropin, P.G. Pukanov, R.G. Tsukanov, A.S. Shabunin.

'Apparatus' Seen as Force Behind Russian Party

PM2106141190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jun 90 p 1

[Article under the "Prognosis" rubric by Pavel Voshchanov, "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA observer and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress and the Russian Party Conference": "The Russian Party: First Move Already Taken—Republic Party Conference Begins Today. What Will Next Step Be?"]

[Text] Russia doesn't have its own communist party? Good thing, too... But do not fly into a rage when you read these lines. According to the findings of a recent sociological poll, that was roughly how seven out of every ten non-party Russian people responded. Two of the remaining three were totally indifferent to this problem. And only one believed that, since the other republics have their own communist party, we should have one in Russia too. You may object, of course, that you need to

know just who asked whom. But let us be honest here—whatever else, the creation of a new communist party is certainly not perceived in non-party circles as a task of paramount importance.

What about Russian communists? How do they react to this idea? On the whole, approvingly. But only to the idea. That is understandable—a sovereign Russia must have its own political parties. Just two to three months ago this question was a nonstarter. Neither the CPSU Central Committee nor its Russian Bureau was discussing the rapid formation of a Russian Communist Party complete with all the relevant leading organs. At any rate, rank-and-file communists knew precisely nothing about it. When selecting their delegates to the 28th congress and the first Russian party conference they gave absolutely no instructions on this issue. Now suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, there is a proposal to constitutionalize the party conference into a constituent congress and elect the leading organs of the Communist Party of Russia there. What has happened in the party and the country to make the leadership force the pace of events so openly?

Now we are being instructed to be guided by the following simple guideline: The rebirth of Russia should begin with the rebirth of its communist party. All very easy, then! But we naively thought that first it was necessary to restore Russian statehood and the Russians' lost rights to their national wealth. You only have to create a new communist party and it will solve all the problems and bring the republic to universal prosperity. A familiar and, indeed, strange logic...

It is not hard to see that the question of creating a Russian Communist Party at this very conference was officially raised immediately after certain events at the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, which proclaimed the republic's state sovereignty and elected its new leader. The party apparatus was literally caught unawares. Previously no one had even wondered why the CPSU Central Committee ran the activity of the Russian Supreme Soviet. Especially since its leader had always been a Politburo member. But now? Can all-Union political organs "direct" the activity of a sovereign republic's communist deputies? Obviously not. There is a paradox here: The Russian deputy is free in his decisions because his party allegiance does not have a republican status. Perhaps this, then, is one of the answers to the question that we have raised? The simple logic of the apparatus suggests that, the sooner the Russian Communist Party is created, the faster the solution of many political questions in the Russian parliament can be taken under control.

Another reason, I think, lies in the presidency, which was hastily produced in conditions of the one-party system. Today the head of state is simultaneously leader of the only political party (all the other parties are still in the formative stage and thus cannot realistically serve as a political balance). But what about in the future? If, at the 28th CPSU Congress, M.S. Gorbachev quits the post of general secretary—either voluntarily or under pressure from the conservative wing of the party apparatus—there could be a kind of dyarchy in the country for a time. I think that the logic of the supporters of the "one-party" presidency suggests a simple solution to this problem: The new CPSU leader's attention should be "switched" from the president to another potential opponent. Which one? The leader of the Russian Communist Party. The dyarchy in the CPSU will to some extent offset the dyarchy in the state.

Recently representatives of the CPSU's conservative wing seem to have taken the initiative of creating the Russian Communist Party into their own hands: Two "constituent congresses" were held in succession in the city on the Neva, and they elaborated a program, statutes, and even the membership of the new party's Central Committee. Undoubtedly, these events forced the present CPSU leadership to become considerably more active. The Russian party conference is a real chance for it to gain the upper hand, because at the conference it can announce the creation of the Russian Communist Party literally "on the spur of the moment" and elect its leading organs.

There is one snag, however: Supposing the conference delegates do not support this idea? After all, is this really how political parties are created—in haste, without program documents, and without their discussion in primary organizations? Many people were perplexed by the unusual ease of the decision: It seems that someone can fall asleep a communist and wake up a member of the Russian Communist Party. Wishes, convictions, the individual's position—in this situation all these things count for naught... But who can oppose this haste? Most probably, the supporters of the "Democratic Platform," who have no real force at the conference but who do have substantial support within the party. And this fact forces the party apparatus to look for allies. Where? Events in recent days provide the answer: among the Leningrad "fundamentalists." An alarming fact, because the result may be that the leadership of the new Communist Party will have ideological guidelines considerably more right-wing than the present CPSU leadership. I cannot vouch that this information is completely authentic, but the names most often mentioned by party conference delegates for the post of general secretary of the Russian Communist Party are as follows: Polozkov, Manayenkov, Baklanov, and Ligachev.

There is another factor explaining the apparatus' haste to create a republic communist party. After the well-known culling of a considerable number of nomenklatura workers, appointments are expected to new posts, naturally "commensurate with training and experience of work in the central apparatus." Where are they to be found? A new party means a new party apparatus. That is why many rank and file communists regard this entire situation as an attempt by the nomenklatura to transform itself into the new structure.

How will the discussion go? What decisions will be adopted? It will become clear in the next two to three days. But I do not think that this is the main thing. It is how ordinary communists react to them. Much, if not everything, hangs on that, indeed. It cannot be overlooked that the CPSU, in its present form, is losing the people's support day by day. It needs a radical reform affecting not only the organizational bases but also the ideological platform. And, of course, there must be an uncompromising assessment by the ruling party of what has happened to the country and the people under its leadership.

Yakovlev on Establishment of Russian Party

PM2006140090 London ITV Television Network in English 1800 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Editorial Report] London ITV Television Network in English at 1800 GMT on 19 June carries interviews with CPSU Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev and Mayor of Leningrad Anatoliy Sobchak during a video report from Moscow. Sobchak speaks in Russian with superimposed English translation. Following Smith's reference to Yeltsin's insistence that a coalition is feasible as long as the communist party "behaves itself," as he put it, Yakovlev says: "It is very right decision to gather Russian Communist Party and to constitute this organization." Smith reports that others on the radical wing are positively scathing about this new Russian party and claim that Gorbachev is now being trapped by his enemies.

In answer to Smith's question: "What sort of Communist Party do you think is going to emerge in Russia from all this?" Sobchak replies: "I think it will be a very reactionary Communist Party, if it's based on the idea of a return to the dictatorship of the proletariat. I wouldn't call such a party a Russian Communist Party, but would call it a party of political morons. I say that because these are people calling us to return to the past. They're people who want our country to go through what it's already been through, and with these people I will fight without any compromise."

Moscow Party Chief on Russian Party Congress

LD2506122690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0300 GMT on 25 June carries a three-minute report on the first stage of the inaugural congress of the Russian Communist Party. The new party, the announcer says "is simply obliged to be progressive and perhaps by its own radicalism to boost changes in the direction of democratization within the CPSU itself."

Correspondent (Boris Vaydetskiy) talks to Yuriy Anatoliyevich Prokofyev, chairman of the drafting commission of the congress and first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. Prokofyev assesses the congress overall as merely "good" because he feels that too many irrelevant issues encumbered the agenda and that important documents could not be discussed nor could the issue of the kind of party it should be. Nor was there any need to include the mechanism for electing the leading bodies. "To start with, just what the party was going to be should have been determined, which aims would be enshrined in its charter and program documents, and then leading bodies could be elected after the 28th congress," he says. The congress should have discussed its own documents, not those of the CPSU, especially as these would differ over Russian issues.

(Vaydetskiy) points out that there are objections also to electing a party central committee. Prokofyev says: "Actual practice has demonstrated that things are happening too quickly. We are in too great a hurry to form a party central committee." The Moscow delegation is preparing to make recommendations for the central committee at the second stage of the congress, however.

(Vaydetskiy's) final question is: "How did the members of the Moscow delegation react to the election of Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov as first secretary of the "Russian Communist Party?"

Prokofyev replies: "There were various reactions, and points of view differ. I can say one thing, that I know Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov to be a very honest, conscientious and principled worker, but he said himself when he [word indistinct] his candidacy that a certain public opinion has developed with regard to him, which will add to the complications of an already complex situation within the party."

Poll Shows Public Disaffection With New Party

LD2506165790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1245 GMT 25 Jun 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [Announcer] Now, about an event which has already taken place. The congress of the Russian Communist Party has taken place, but the passions around it and the decisions taken during the last days are not dying down. A camera crew of the Television News Service set off for the center of Moscow to find out the opinion of those who have not been left indifferent to the congress:

[Reporter O. Mezhennaya identified by caption] What is your real attitude to the fact that a Russian Communist Party has been formed?

[First unidentified speaker] Negative I think, as regards how it was set up. It is still a conservative structure, and a very powerful one.

[Mezhennaya] And are you a party member?

[First speaker] Yes, I have been since 1970.

[Mezhennaya] You're a member of the CPSU and, in the given situation, you are already also a member of the Communist Party of the RSFSR.

[First speaker] Now I don't know what to do after this congress—whether to stay in the CPSU or to search for a different, democratic party. Conservative forces have been consolidated in the Russian Communist Party.

[Second unidentified speaker] The facade has changed, nothing more. That is how it was with the Uzbekistan Communist Party, the Tajikistan Communist Party, and the Kirghizian Communist Party. So it is with the Russian Communist Party. And the CPSU has remained as it was. That is, its regional affiliation essentially doesn't change anything.

[Third speaker] Well, I had that impression. I think that it is the death throes, the death throes of the CPSU.

[Fourth unidentified speaker] Also, let me say it in my words, I am an old man. I consider, like an old man, that with the creation of this new Russian party they have turned the trousers, like I am wearing, inside out with the flies at the back.

[Fifth unidentified speaker] I consider that Polozkov is the successor to the same principles and methods of party work which existed 20 and 30 years ago. His style and working methods are analoguous to the style and working methods of the central bodies of the party.

[Mezhennaya] How do you relate to the creation of the Russian Communist Party?

[Sixth unidentified speaker, wearing a Lenin badge] A normal process, a normal fight is going on there. What else can you say?

[Mezhennaya] Are you a CPSU member?

[Sixth speaker] Yes. Moreover, I am secretary of a party organization. [video shows people reading Moscow News, interviews, brief shot of a front page of SOLIDARNOST, with the headline: "The Sharp Zigzags of Perestroyka"]

[Announcer] Like any street poll, this one does not make any pretence of research profundity. I suppose that there exists a multitude of other views and assessments of the congress of Russian communists. Well, only time will tell, which will put everything in its place.

Abalkin Remarks on Market Economy, Conference

LD0206224290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] A scientific and practical conference on the problems of transition to the market economy finished its work in Moscow today. Our correspondent (Valeriy Kiosa) provides more details about this.

[Kiosa] Over 600 scientists and people engaged in production, representatives of ministries, and of educational establishments have taken part in the work of this conference, which has been held for two days in the Academy of National Economy attached to the USSR Council of Ministers. The interest in it is quite understandable. The market means completely new economic conditions for us, you see, and it is possible to assess their advantages and disadvantages only on the basis of full and honest information on them. What was the main aim of the conference? Here is the answer of Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR council of ministers.

[Begin Abalkin recording] We are standing on the threshold of radical changes in our economic system, in the entire mechanism of management of the national economy, and first and foremost in connection with the transition to the regulated market economy. The decisive condition of success, or one of the decisive conditions of success is in restructuring public consciousness of management cadres, and perhaps, above all, which is of more importance, of those who are the carriers of the knowledge, those who form knowledge in others. To educate others, a teacher must educate himself. This conference is a step in this direction. [end recording]

[Kiosa] The highlight of the conference was the appearance of academician Abalkin, who had delivered a two-hour detailed report explaining the principles of the government's program of transition to the market. Answering, for example, remarks on insufficient radicalism of the program, Abalkin said that according to government's estimations there would indeed be a rise in effectiveness of the economy in 1993-95 if the market is to be introduced immediately at full scale, and consequently, the regulation by the government is eliminated. In exchange for this, however, in the first two years we must undergo a sharp recession, mass unemployment, and big rise in inflation. The government considered it far too high a price to pay and that is why it has chosen an option of a gradual transition, when the inevitable negative consequences will present less difficulty. Talking about the price reform Abalkin stressed that the measures, being proposed by the government, are not an attempt to introduce higher prices than those on the market. This is, as he put it, the prior-to-the-market clean up of prices, an attempt to give them appropriate appearance, from the point of view of the economy. The market will itself define its own prices. Far from all participants of the conference shared the government's point of view. Academician Tikhonov, for example, thinks that an all-around and speediest possible development of free enterprise and elimination of monopoly of state in all its aspects should be a basis of the transition to the market. Other participants talked about the necessity to differentiate prices depending on the quality of a product instead of an overall price rise. Keen discussion, in which the government participated also continued at the sittings of five sections. [as heard] Many critical remarks on the government's program were made there as well. It was said, for example, that demonopolization of the economy should be more specific, that the tax on profit, amounting to 55 percent, being proposed by the government, is far too high. So what is the result of this conference? I have talked to

many participants, and among the variety of opinions and assessments, they came to the common conclusion that these meetings are necessary, since they provide a chance to assess different approaches to the problem of the market and therefore, to make one's own decision. I think there will be many more such meetings. You see the discussion of the government's program has only just started, in essence.

Ryzhkov Views 'Confrontation' at Congress

LD2306174290 Moscow International Service in Czech 1700 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Excerpts] The activity of the congress of Russian deputies is becoming increasingly intensive. [passage omitted]

Some representatives of the Leningrad party organization proposed that a delegation be sent to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Congress of People's Deputies to ask them to prevent actions aimed against the party. In the end this proposal was not adopted. Nevertheless, it shows the effort by a certain party of the party congress to seek confrontation instead of looking for optimal variants of cooperation with all the social forces.

Radio Moscow Special Correspondent Vyacheslav Terekhov asked Nikolay Ryzhkov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, what he thinks about it.

[Begin Ryzhkov recording in Russian fading to Slovak translation] Yes, a certain confrontation took place, as well as tough dealing in the relations with other state bodies—including the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation. In my view, a delegation or mission of the Congress of People's Deputies in the form in which it was proposed was not necessary, which was all the more reason for excluding a delegation led by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

There is a need to look for other ways of cooperation. In every case, the party will have to cooperate with the soviets. There is a need to learn how to do this. I think that we still do not know how to do it.

The party had a monopoly in deciding social issues, and now it will have to cooperate with the soviets. That is why many people are inclined to tackle the situation by using pressure. I do not consider this to be a good method. [end recording]

Nikolay Ryzhkov went on to stress that in his view there is a need to approach various proposals flexibly, including the attitude of such groups as the Marxist Platform or Democratic Platform. He proposed to adopt everything what contributes toward consolidation of the party and society, coming from these two and other platforms, and not to take account of extreme stances which do not contribute toward consolidation.

Nikolay Ryzhkov went on to stress that he was taken aback by appeals to put restructuring on trial. The restructuring which we have embarked upon is moving forward with difficulties, Nikolay Ryzhkov said. Nevertheless, this process has included all aspects of our social life. There is a need to remember that moving forward presumes mistakes, without mistakes our progress is not realistic. I think that our society will after all take into account all those things brought to it by restructuring and our society, our people will not support those people who ask for restructuring to be put on trial.

Congress Views Creation of Russian Mass Media

LD2106170290 Moscow TASS in English 1631 GMT 21 Jun 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Lev Aksenov and Dmitriy Polunin:]

[Text] Moscow June 21 TASS—Leonid Gurevich, head of the commission for contacts with the mass media at the First Congress of Deputies of the Russian Federation, described the creation of republican mass media as "a crucial and priority task."

He reported to the congress today about the work of the commission, which analysed the postponement of the broadcast of an interview with Russia's Chairman Boris Yeltsin from June 8 to June 9. The management of the USSR State Committee for Radio and Television was responsible for the delay. Some deputies tactlessly said that the president was involved. Mikhail Gorbachev assured the congress that these allegations were unfounded. He asked them to analyse the incident and described it as a "provocation."

During the discussion many deputies, primarily professional journalists, said that Russia badly needed its own material basis for mass media. The congress adopted with an unusual promptness almost without a discussion a resolution authorising the republican Supreme Soviet and the government to create a network of republican mass media organs: television and radio broadcasting facilities, a Russian news agency, a newspaper of the Russian Supreme Soviet and so on.

Since many items of the agenda, including very important ones, remain to be discussed, the congress decided by a majority of votes to continue its work on Friday.

People's Deputies Abolish State Acceptance

LD2506172390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1400 GMT on 25 June, in its "Vremya" newscast and as part of its roundup of the news headlines, reports: "We have just received a decision of the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia on the abolition of state acceptance on the territory of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR]. The Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR resolves to abolish state acceptance at associations and enterprises situated on

the territory of the RSFSR, regardless of their subordination, and also to give enterprises the right independently to set the methods of quality control of output. The decision was signed by Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Boris Yeltsin."

Lebedev Remarks on Congress Delegates' Poll

LD2206184190 Moscow TASS in English 1820 GMT 22 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev, Igor Peskov, Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow June 22 TASS—It is not surprising that none of the candidates has gained the required number of votes, Spokesman Alksander Lebedev told a briefing in Moscow today. The final results of the election will be made public tomorrow morning.

Lebedev also told journalists about the results of a poll conducted among congress delegates by the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee sociological service. He described the poll as a sort of indication of "alignment of forces," "political and ideological creeds" of the congress delegates.

In particular, 73 per cent of those polled favoured a federation while 13 per cent were against it. Forty six per cent fully supported the declaration of sovereignty of the Russian Federation, and 47 per cent back it with some reservations.

Most delegates were critical of the government plan of transition to a market economy. Fifty six per cent believe that the plan is "half-baked," calling it either insufficiently or too radical.

Fifty two per cent of those polled believe that "changes in world affairs of recent years" meet "only partially" the interests of the USSR. According to 31 per cent of respondents, they meet them "completely," and 12 per cent think that these changes are not in the interests of the Soviet country at all.

Russian Premier Silayev Gives Interview

LD2506110590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1845 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Studio interview with Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, Prime Minister Ivan Stepanovich Silayev; questions from callers read by unidentified moderators; from the "Vzglyad", "View", program—live]

[Excerpts] [First moderator] We don't have a simple task in our program today. We shall try to examine a situation in which tension in the country and society has reached a very considerable pitch, and we shall attempt to do all we can to reduce it, albeit slightly and within the modest resources of our program: And we shall be helped in this by the new prime minister of the Russian Federation. Ivan Stepanovich Silayev is our studio guest. [passage omitted]

Well, I shall move on from here to the questions. There are a very large number of specific questions. Comrade Stankov from Moscow: Ivan Stepanovich, do you intend to retain the same number of ministries and the enormous apparatus of the ministries that currently exists?

[Silayev] Well, first of all, something must be made clear: The government must fulfill certain functions. There should be the appropriate structures for these functions. But I can say that little will remain of what exists at present. [passage omitted]

[First moderator] Do you intend to involve Bocharev, Travkin, and Artem Tarasov in work at the Council of Ministers?

[Silayev] I know that there were 11 candidates for the position that I have succeeded in filling up. At least two or three of these candidates will be invited. As far as I know, Bocharev has refused to work in this government.

[Second moderator] Excuse me; the point is that when the issue of cooperatives was mentioned, Ivan Polozkov said something like this from the rostrum: Come, we haven't broken up a single cooperative in Krasnodar! On the contrary, we are in favor of the cooperative movement. We are simply against any millionaires, any rogues and swindlers being engendered on the basis of the cooperative movement. We have fought against this and we shall continue to do so. He is a party leader. He wasn't speaking about the judicial organs or anything. He has fought. Tell me please. What is your attitude toward the cooperative movement?

[Silayev] My attitude is positive and, I would even say, an active one. In my old office, my previous one, there was a special section for cooperation with cooperative organizations.

[First moderator] The next question. What is your attitude toward the speech by General Makashov at the Russian Communist Party Congress? The question is from (Zarman) from Moscow.

[Silayev] It is undoubtedly negative. First, one cannot play upon the individual's or people's patriotic sentiments. Second, he also insulted the deputies. My attitude is extremely negative.

[Second moderator] But the insult to the president is something that hasn't upset anyone at the moment. It is obvious that a person has insulted the country's president. Having done that, he should either resign or something should be done not just to demote him, but to deny him the right to exist in that same room. And nothing has happened. Why, Ivan Stepanovich?

[Silayev] I agree with you entirely. It is because those legal rules that have been established, are not yet operating, they are not functioning. I think that is why. This speech was disgusting.

[First moderator] (Bukov) from Moscow asks: By what means can you demonstrate that you are not a conservative?

[Silayev, laughing] This is what I think. First, the very fact that I am here. Second, my meeting some days ago with the patriarch, and many other things.

[Second moderator] Well, most likely, when one speaks of conservatism, it is the economy one is talking about primarily. Ivan Stepanovich?

[Silayev] Well, people speak about it so much that I don't consider it necessary to repeat it at the moment. I am in favor of radical economics. This was outlined in my program. And now, in a few months time, we shall present a complete program to the republic's Supreme Soviet, and it goes right as far as private ownership.

[First moderator] You have worked in the military industry and you were known as an outstanding representative of the command-administrative system. How do you feel now?

[Silayev] I feel fine now. At least five headlong years have passed during which many of us have changed, if not all of us. And I have changed, too. But I have grounds to say that I gained a certain positive start in the aviation industry.

[Second moderator] But nevertheless, what is your attitude toward the military industiral complex?

[Silayev] It is complicated and, I would say, tense. I quarelled with it when the conversion program was being discussed.

[Second moderator] But now that you have power?

[Silayev] We shall act in accordance with the laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet...of the republic, the republic's Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

[First moderator] (Machalov) from Moscow: In what conditions is it possible for the program that has been adopted on solving the economic crisis to operate?

[Silayev] With the support of the Supreme Soviet and public trust.

[First moderator] (Monina) from Moscow: Give us your assessment of Gorbachev's conduct at the party conference.

[Silayev] In any event, I would demand an apology to the deputies from the general about whom we were speaking.

[Second moderator] But that should be demanded by the congress, which was previously called a conference. I don't think this has happened.

[First moderator] (Khadzhakuzina), Moscow: How does Comrade Silayev envisage the transition to the market economy without a reduction in the standard of living?

[Silayev] I don't think that the question can be put in that way. It can be done by a certain redistribution, with the accent on the highly paid and with protection for certain poorly paid categories. It is simply impossible without losses.

[First moderator] And so, the latest questions. (Zoya Vladimirovna Semukova) Why did Silayev not give up his post in favor of Bocharev. Was this political ambition?

[Silayev] First I do not intend to play political games. I won 33 votes more than Bocharev. Second, I believe that I shall work harder in tackling tasks concerning a Russian revival than Bocharev would have.

[First moderator] Galina Nikolayevna Belgorodskaya, a deputy of the Dushanbe City Soviet. What solution do you see to problems of immigration into Russia from the Union republics, for such immigration will increase.

[Silayev] Undoubtedly, this problem ought to be resolved on a legislative basis.

[First moderator] The decision on agriculture. What is your attitude toward land being given to people for private ownership? [question from] (Yuliy Vassilyevich Kilar).

[Silayev] In my program speech, I proposed, in particular, that land that has been neglected or deserted in a colossal quantity in the Nonchernozem Zone should be handed over to private ownership without the right of sale.

[First moderator] This will be implemented during your time, will it?

[Silayev] I think so. The Supreme Soviet has to support it, but we shall submit an appropriate bill.

[First moderator] And the second question from the same call. What is your attitude toward the elimination of party committees in servicemen's units?

[Silayev] Well, I believe that until a multiparty system comes into operation, I shall continue to permit this work.

[First moderator] Oleg Basov from the city of Murmansk. Do you consider the Moscow Soviet's decision on a strict regime for the sale of foodstuffs to be lawful?

[Silayev] I like the way the Moscow Soviet is working at the moment.

[First moderator] That's brief.

[Second moderator] Yes. Nevertheless, I shall permit myself, if Gavriil Kharitonovich Popov is watching us, despite our kindest relations to you, to recall the subject

of the VTO [All-Union Trading Associations]. Gavriil Kharitonovich, we have begun to monitor the VTO problem and we shall not lag behind you.

[First moderator] (Morzoyan) from the city of Kubyshev. What did your people at home say after your election as prime minister?

[Silayev] They didn't say anything to me that was a reproach. They support me and sympathize with me. [passage omitted]

[First moderator] (Slunyayev) from Moscow: The economic interrerlations of some oblasts have become reminiscent of barter trade. What does the government think about this?

[Silayev] Transfer to the market. [passage omitted]

[First moderator] Comrade Nesterov from Moscow: Which of the professional economists would you like to see as consultants to your government?

[Silayev] There will be several of them and they will have a variety of views, but I have not yet decided who there will be specifically. I am conducting talks.

[First moderator] My question, without a telephone call. How did Nikolay Ivanovih Ryzhkov react to your election?

[Silayev] Normally in my opinion, as it appears to me.

[First moderator] I am asking this question because there is a rumor at large among deputies that his reaction wasn't normal.

[Silayev] I cannot see this.

[First moderator] Okay. [passage omitted]

[First moderator] The new program on the function of the cabinet and the new approach to shaping its structure requires a new approach to selecting cabinet members. What's the essence of this new approach?

[Silayev] First and foremost, it's a multi-candidate approach, with an obligatory choice of several people when recruiting for each post. Second, as I've already mentioned, some academics and sociologists will be brought in, and third, the principle of renewal of the members of the cabinet is important, very important.

[First moderator] But nonetheless you will have the final say?

[Silayev] According to the Consitution. [passage omitted]

[First moderator] Vasilyev from Movopolotsk: can the government of Russia protect its citizens outside the republic, and if so, how?

[Silayev] It both can and must. A law on this should be passed to protect RSFSR citizens wherever they might be.

[First moderator] Semgunova: Your competence in so many areas is annoying.

[Silayev] I don't think many people would like to see an incompetent person in the leadership of the Russian government.

[First moderator] Sorokin, a driver from Moscow: How do you plan to solve the gasoline crisis in Russia, which is so rich in oil resources? Surely we're not going to ruin the harvest over and over again due to a shortage of gasoline?

[Silayev] Through sovereignty of the republic and market relations.

[First moderator] Ivan Sergeyevich Pakhomov: Do you feel yourself capable of pursuing an independent policy without relying on the CPSU? What do you think of Russia having an independent foreign policy?

[Silayev] In my actions I shall be guided only by the laws of the Russian Federation, and I take a positive view of independent foreign economic policy and am incorporating this in the government's plan of action.

[First moderator] ...and party influence—you're not going to, well...there is pressure...

[Silayev] the law, the law will take precedence.

[First moderator] ...and finally, more of a wish than a question: do not be afraid of a revolutionary sweep. Let Russia once again set an example of revival not in words but in deeds. This is from Lidiya Vasilyevna Butsova in Moscow.

[Silayev] Thank you for that wish, you can rest assured.

[First moderator] And I thank you, because you are the first member of the perestroyka government...we've invited them all to the studio, but you were the first to agree to come and answer these questions. Please believe, I concealed nothing from you. I think the viewers themselves realized that their questions got through, and if I failed to read some of them it was only because they were repeats. Many thanks.

[Silayev] I would like to think the viewers too for an active dialogue.

IZVESTIYA Views Silayev News Conference

PM2106113190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Morning Edition p4

[Report by correspondent I. Zhagel: "Questions for I. Silayev Before and After the Press Conference"]

[Text] I. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, very recently confirmed in this position at the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, gave his first press conference on 19 June for Soviet and foreign journalists.

The reason this press conference has been given special attention is that the new premier's nomination came as a complete surprise to many. Incidentally, as I. Silayev said in his opening address, the proposal to take up office—which came from the Conciliation Commission two weeks ago—was a surprise to him too. On the one hand, this frank admission is appealing but, on the other, it immediately raises several questions.

First of all, what was paramount in the choice of candidate for the future head of government if he submitted his program to be judged by the public essentially only during his speech at the congress? Can we believe that the new premier's ideas—which had not been broadcast before, or, in any event, not widely—came as a revelation to this body of RSFSR people's deputies and finally showed them a clear way to extricate the republic's economy from its crisis? And was there any choice between programs at all in this case or did deputies give preference to candidates' practical action and previous status over speculative schemes?

Incidentally, the question of the biography of the new RSFSR Council of Ministers chairman was also raised at the press conference. In just under 60 years I. Silayev progressed from shop foreman to minister of the aviation industry. And in recent years he worked as chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for Machine-Building. As is well known, the development of this area of industry was paramount in our previous economic programs. On the other hand, however, despite the special attention paid to machine building and the vast capital investments—sometimes even made to the detriment of other sectors—no outstanding successes were achieved.

I. Silayev himself was not uncritical in his assessment of the work he did in his previous post. Although he did point out that not all his ideas could be put into practice while he was a member of the union government. Which is why he had agreed to stand for the post of RSFSR Council of Ministers chairman, seeing this as an opportunity to carry his plans through within the framework of the RSFSR. In this respect he particularly stressed the importance of the recently adopted Declaration of RSFSR Sovereignty, without which, according to him, his job would have been made far more difficult.

Does this statement mean that he is critical of the union government program and is ready to go much further in the implementation of reforms in the near future? I. Silayev asked journalists not to insist on an unequivocal answer to this question. He sees the way out of the difficult situation as lying not in confrontation but in fruitful cooperation with the USSR Council of Ministers and in the search for reasonable compromise. He does not rule out, however, that decisions and laws substantially different to their union counterparts will be adopted within the framework of the republic and that they will be given priority in Russian territory.

I. Silayev also talked about his program, without going into any particular detail. Further elaborations have still to be made. He intends to involve important economic personnel and well known economists in this work. In particular, he announced at the press conference that P. Bunich has agreed in principle to take part in preparing the program.

However, he did outline the main directions of economic reform in the republic. It provides for developing enterprise, giving complete economic freedom to the basic unit of the national economy—enterprises—dismantling monopoly structures, and creating the conditions for competition. Particular emphasis is being placed on the privatization of state ownership. The Kama Motor Vehicle Plant is soon going to operate on a joint-stock basis, for example. But these processes are going to go ahead most vigorously in the consumer and trade sphere and at small enterprise level.

Journalists were no less interested in the question of who is going to be in the Russian government. As far as the premier is concerned, they should begin by developing a fundamentally new structure for the government apparatus rather than by nominating specific candidates. In particular, he spoke out against the idea of having sector ministries within the RSFSR Council of Ministers, with the one exception of the Agriculture Ministry. Nominations for members of government will only be made after the preparatory work is complete (which will take no longer than a month).

But questions no longer arise as far as one nomination is concerned. Many had been interested to know whether the experience of I. Silayev's rival in the elections to the post of RSFSR Council of Ministers chairman—namely, M. Bocharov, one of the initiators of our country's leasehold system—was going to be used. Whereupon they were informed that M. Bocharov has officially declined to work as a member of the new government.

It could hardly be said that the press conference answered all the questions that now concern us. It goes without saying that journalists were prompted to ask these questions because of their concern for the future of the country's largest republic rather than because of any prejudice toward the new head of government. Although, being objective, I. Silayev's restraint possibly had the same motive.

Ligachev Interviewed on Developments in Russia

LD2206223390 Moscow International Service in Czech 1700 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Interview with Yegor Ligachev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, by correspondent Sergey Vorobyev; place and date not given—recorded; Ligachev speaks in Russian with superimposed Czech translation]

[Text] [Vorobyev] Yegor Kuzmich, how do you think the Russian Communist Party congress is proceeding?

[Ligachev] In my opinion it is reflecting the moods in the party and in society very well. It is proceeding with the same zeal as the processes in our society. In my opinion, what is most important today is the absence of peace and the presence of worry. It is the absence of peace and worry about the party, homeland, our common cause. In my opinion, people came here just because of that. There are speeches which we may agree with. There are some which evoke objections. However, there are also views from people I repeat, who are worried about where the country is going, what will happen to the party and what will happen to the Soviet Federation.

[Vorobyev] How do you get on with Boris Yeltsin?

[Ligachev] I should like to say that I have tried to keep relations on the level of the party collective. There are many people who tried to make us thoroughly angry. We have also expended a lot of effort in this direction. I told Boris Nikolayevich this when I congratulated him on being elected chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet.

[Vorobyev] I saw a cartoon recently in one of the Soviet newspapers. Two ambulance drivers are carrying a man to the lunatic asylum who is crying: I believe that the present generation of Soviet people will live in communism after all.

[Ligachev] I believe that in the end we will set out on the path of progress, the path of transformations—I believe this absolutely.

[Vorobyev] Do you believe in communism?

[Ligachev] I believe in the final aim of communism. I think that it is premature to bury communism. It has been in the process of being buried for many years, and despite all this, lives for whole centuries. If we bury communism, we will have to bury the entire working class too.

[Vorobyev] There are strong anticommunst moods in the country now. Do you think it was necessary to call yet another congress, yet another confeference at such a time?

[Ligachev] The congress was not convened because of some special group. It was convened at the request of the communists of Russia because in society and in the party the view has prevalied that it is necessary to establish the Communist Party of Russia. It would be strange if politicians remained deaf and blind to this demand.

[Vorobyev] Do you want to become a member of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Communist Party?

[Ligachev] Absolutely. I am already in it. I am a member of the CPSU.

[Vorobyev] You are also a member of the CPSU. The RSFSR Communist Party and leadership is emerging in our country. Let us say that I do not sympathize with you, and you do not sympathize with me. I am in the leadership of the RSFSR Communist Party and I am automatically becoming your leader. How would you see it?

[Ligachev] I know that I have never in my life been guided by sympathies and antipathies. I am directed by principles, because if I were to be directed by sympathies and antipathies I would have to leave party work immediately and, at most, I could do accounting.

[Vorobyev] Are you not afraid that the founding of the Russian Communist Party at a time when strong centrifugal forces exist in the counry has led to party fragmentation?

[Ligachev] No, because I believe in the internationalism of Russian communists. I believe in the traditions of the Russian people. It is in me, so to speak, since birth. Why do I canvass for the Russian side? I am convinced that the communists of Russia will be even more responsible for and worried about the wholeness of our state.

[Vorobyev] How do you understnad the slogan: "Proletarians of all countries unite?"

[Ligachev] I understand that the communist and workers movement must be united, not divided. By the way, the more so, since one can see the end of socialism in a whole number of regions in the world. I am very concerned about this. I even signed a resolution with the others, a resolution of solidarity with communists of the countries of Eastern Europe. The countries of Eastern Europe are different. However, if we are to see the truth we must tell each other that socialism in this very important part of the world has collapsed. I am convinced that it is an honest defeat. In the end the socialist idea will win after all. The socialist community, unfortunately, has disintegrated. Imperialists forces in this part of the world have strengthened on this continent, that is my view.

[Vorobyev] Yegor Kuzmich, thank you for the interview.

'Democratic Russia' Deputy Gives Interview

PM2506114690 Rome AVANTI! in Italian 21 Jun 90 p 2

[Report by Libero Lizzadri on interview with deputy to the Russian parliament Yevgeniy Ambartsumov by AVANTI! editorial staff in Rome; date not given]

[Excerpt] Professor Yevgeniy Ambartsumov—a deputy to the parliament of the Russian Republic elected on the "Democratic Russia" list, opposed to the "Orthodox communists"—was a guest of AVANTI!. The editor, deputy editors, and desk chiefs asked him a number of questions.

[AVANTI!] Speaking at the Russian Communist Party's constituent congress, Gorbachev mentioned the possibility of leaving his post as general secretary at the CPSU Congress that begins 2 July. Is there such a possibility, and what could be the reason for and the consequences of such a decision?

[Ambartsumov] As I have said on other occasions, Gorbachev would perhaps have done better to relinquish this post some time ago in order to rid himself of the curbing influence of the apparatus. He evidently hoped—with some reason—that by remaining CPSU general secretary, first, he could control the levers of power; and, second, that he could use these levers to prevent the disintegration of the state. But in recent months actual conditions have shown that the apparatus is concerned not with strengthening the country but, selfishly, only with retaining its own power and privileges. Furthermore, the apparatus has lost more and more of its influence on the processes under way in the country, while there has been a strengthening of the democratic processes led by forces opposed to the apparatus and by mass movements that consider the apparatus responsible for the worsening economic situation and for the disintegration of society and the state. So by leaving the supreme party post, the position of the country's top party leader, Gorbachev would acquire greater freedom of action and be less involved in the increasingly frequent criticisms of the party. By opening up to the possibility of moving toward the radical left wing movement, he could regain some of the popularity that he lost through his indecision and virtual identification with the apparatus.

[AVANTI!] What are the chances of a split within the CPSU?

[Ambartsumov] Clearly the large majority of congress delegates hold traditional stances—that is, those of the apparatus. This, because the "Democratic Platform" only has two percent of delegates—as a result of the system for the election of congress delegates and partly also as a result of electoral trickery—even though, according to the opinion polls, it represents at least a relative majority of CPSU members. This being so, there is absolutely no hope that the CPSU congress can align in favor of renewal or even represent the opinion of the mass of party members. What can the party's democrats do? All they can do is leave, in order to free themselves from the hold of the apparatus and in order to be more acceptable to the man in the street, despite the knowledge that there will not be many of them to start with. But leaving the CPSU opens up more optimistic prospects.

[AVANTI!] What will Yeltsin do?

[Ambartsumov] I believe he will leave—and he has not ruled it out—especially since when he was elected president of the Russian parliament he said that in his opinion a president of the USSR or of a republic must not be bound to a single party, since he must be the president of all citizens and not bound by party discipline.

[AVANTI!] What scenarios present themselves in the country?

[Ambartsumov] The most worrying scenario would be that of a general disintegration, chaos, a military dictatorship, or—even better—a Stalinist-type party leader. I regard this scenario as the least likely, however, partly because of the split within the Army, which is growing deeper.

A second scenario would be a process of further democratization, a more or less normal evolution toward a market economy, with a multiparty system—with or without Gorbachev, through better with than without, because his presence would eliminate superfluous conflicts—and a coalition government comprising several democratic forces and a substantial number of responsible and competent experts who enjoy the people's confidence. This is not an easy solution, partly because it will not be enough to resolve the internal conflicts.

There is also an intermediate scenario involving slower development, with further hesitation on Gorbachev's part between left and right, with fewer real changes in the economy and growing disillusionment among the people.

[AVANTI!] So would an understanding between Gorbachev and Yeltsin be a good thing?

[Ambartsumov] I recommended it a long time ago, and I believe that it is the only solution—the least conflict-ridden, the least dangerous. Of course the question would arise of the respective spheres of responsibnility of the president of the Union and the president of Russia; but I believe that if Gorbachev were to be satisfied with the role of a U.S. president it would be better for him, for the Soviet people, and for the world as a whole. The economy must be decentralized: Responsibility must be transferred to the republics and to the natural market processes.

[AVANTI!] But does this possibility of understanding exist?

[Ambartsumov] An understanding already seems to exist: Personal conflicts must be set aside, if they are genuine politicians. Of course this does not preclude future conflicts between them, but at the moment I would stress their points in common: They both grew up within the apparatus, but thanks to their common sense and capacity for "deideologizing," they managed to perceive citizens' real needs.

[AVANTI!] Is there a "Bulgaro-Romanian" element in the evolution of the situation in the USSR?

[Ambartsumov] There is a danger that the apparatus could exploit the security services' structures in order to manipulate the people's dissatisfaction, especially among the working class. But my impression is that the vast mass of our workers realize who is really to blame for their situation—whether the protesting intellectuals or the leaders of the apparatus of the old system. As for Bulgaria, the characteristic that they share is that the forces for change took shape within the single party

because there was no other opportunity to express themselves publicly. Excerpt for Sakharov, almost all the democratic opposition leaders are, or were, CPSU members.

[AVANTI!] But not even a Gorbachev-Yeltsin understanding will resolve the nationalities problem.

[Ambartsumov] The USSR's reconstruction on the basis of a new treaty of Union is inevitable. Despite all the formulations, until yesterday the USSR remained a centralized, not a federal, state. It would be possible to envisage a genuine federation with confederal elements, but also with special relations with future independent states, such as the Baltics, modeled on the British Commonwealth. [passage omitted]

Economist Interviewed on Ryzhkov Report

LD2605185290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1100 GMT on 26 May carries a five-minute interview with Leonid Pavlovich Sychev, economic expert and head of the Central Directorate of the RSFSR Non-Chernozem Zone State Agro-Industrial Committee, by an unnamed correspondent.

Asked about Ryzhkov's report on the economic situation in the country and the concept of the transition to regulated market economy, Sychev observes that, when debating it, deputies in the USSR Supreme Soviet should have have approached it as a concept and not as a program for transition to the market economy or for immediate use. He says that the government and Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, in particular, were very bold in announcing even specific forms of compensation for losses suffered by the population. Since the sixties purchasing prices of grain in the USSR have changed little and retail prices have virtually remained unchanged altogether. That is to say, these prices do not meet the real conditions of producing it.

In many areas, especially in central Russia and others, he continues, the profitability of grain production is not high. At any rate it does not allow farms to engage in expanded reproduction and, as regards efficiency, it is greatly inferior to some kinds of produce. So that in the conditions of fairly large-scale democracy in enterprises this spring, farms are not expanding grain sowing but are reducing it and if this becomes a trend this is very dangerous.

Sychev concludes by saying that any measures must be taken for grain to be produced in the USSR and for the purchase of grain abroad to eventually cease.

Moscow City Party Congress 'Position' Viewed

PM1106143290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jun 90 Second Edition p 4

["Draft Position of Moscow City Party Organization for the 28th CPSU Congress," with foreword by Yu. Prokofyev, first secretary of Moscow City CPSU Committee, as part of "Discussion Sheet No. 44": "Contribution From the Capital's Communists"]

[Text] [Prokofyev foreword] PRAVDA readers are being given the opportunity to study the draft "Position of Moscow City Party Organization for the 28th CPSU Congress."

I foresee that along with the interest the document could arouse, doubts will also be expressed as to whether it is necessary. Several dozen different political platforms and positions are being discussed in the party today—from those that lay claim to partywide recognition, to those that are adopted by individual rayon organizations and even primary organizations.

It was not without doubts of this kind that the Moscow Communists' draft position was born. All the same, we decided that the document is needed. Why?

The CPSU's political destiny is basically being decided today. And it is being decided in the context of extremely acute intraparty conflicts. Until these are resolved, there can be no question of a democratic and radical renewal of the party. They cannot be eliminated solely through the efforts of a small circle of party leaders and apparatus officials. It needs the efforts of the party's collective intelligence and the involvement of all communists in the quest for ways out of the crisis.

And another thing. Progress cannot be achieved unless the horizons are cleared, unless the party is given freedom to choose among the many possible paths of development. We must not be blinkered, it is important to compare existing views and opinions. Only mutual enrichment will enable us, we are convinced, to make the right choice. This was our premise in opening a Moscow-wide party debate. Free polemics has enabled us largely to overcome ideological dogmatism and to take a critical and unbiased look at our society's life.

The Moscow party organization's draft position takes into account the opinions of supporters of different platforms within the CPSU, without counterposing the document drawn up to any of these platforms. Our chosen form has apparently proved sufficiently flexible to allow the integration of ideas. And this work took place in the course of active discussion of the draft in the primary party organizations, at conferences in the rayons, and at Moscow CPSU Gorkom [city committee] plenums and bureau sessions. The text of the position underwent substantial changes in the course of its discussion at sessions of the club of delegates to the city party conference and the 28th CPSU Congress.

We realize that this document cannot claim to be the truth in the last resort. First and foremost it lacks depth of insight into the future, it is oriented more toward interpreting the present. But like other such documents, the proposed draft position is open for criticism and

creative amendment, through, among other things, discussion in the pages of the party press. [Prokofyev ends]

Draft Position of Moscow City Party Organization for the 28th CPSU Congress

If the 28th CPSU Congress is to justify the hopes placed in it, fundamental significance is attached to the objective and honest evaluation of the present moment in the country and the quest for ways to overcome the crisis situation in society and implement radical reform of the party.

We, communists and delegates to the 28th Moscow City CPSU Organization Conference, at this critical time for the country and party, advocate civil consensus and the consolidation of all political forces united by the socialist choice, and deem it necessary to set forth our position to the inhabitants and communists of Moscow and the delegates to the forthcoming party congress.

I. Evaluation of the Present Moment in the Country

Perestroyka started major democratic developments in the country and in the world.

Thanks to glasnost, our society has seen the start of a truthful, albeit dramatic, reinterpretation of the path traveled and the real problems of the present time. New organs of power have been democratically elected and have begun to operate, and the creation of a modern rule-of-law state has begun.

But it must be acknowledged that all this is taking shape against the background of a general economic, political, and spiritual crisis in the country.

An economic system unreceptive toward scientific and technical progress has proved incapable of providing a worthy, civilized life for one-twentieth of the earth's population on one-sixth of its land, rich in natural resources.

As a result of imprudent economic activity, the natural environment is deteriorating.

In comparison with the developed countries, life expectancy is low.

Interethnic relations have deteriorated sharply, and the unhealthy condition of society is manifested in the growth of crime and disregard for the moral principles of human life.

Crisis processes have emerged particularly over the last year or two. National income is falling, inflation is accelerating, and the shortage of many food products and consumer goods has assumed an unprecedented scale.

Statehood is growing weaker, laws and legal norms are often not fulfilled, and confidence in the authorities is declining.

The CPSU's political prestige is falling. Furthermore anticommunist sentiments have sprung up and are being whipped up. In the party itself the ideological and organizational crisis is growing, and many communists are characterized by a position of passivity and a wait-and-see attitude.

II. Causes of the Crisis in Society

At the fundamental level, the crisis was engendered by dogmatic and simplistic ideas on socialism as a society based on the monopoly of state ownership and class ideology, on dictatorship of the party and state bureaucracy in the name of the proletariat, on the feasibility of people's power without political pluralism, and on the unconditional paramountcy of the state's interests over the interests of the individual.

In these conditions the alienation of the working person from ownership, of the citizen from power, and of the individual from culture was not overcome.

Conscientious, skilled labor was devalued, and public interest in the efficient utilization of scientific and technical achievements and national resources declined.

In the years of totalitarianism and stagnation, the party's highest echelon degenerated into an undemocratic power structure cut off from the masses, and this was accompanied by a decline in the activeness of grass-roots organizations, which apparently tacitly supported the decisions of the upper echelons.

Without forgetting the historic leap forward achieved by the party after the 1917 socialist revolution, we must today acknowledge that this leap forward was bought at a high price.

The CPSU, as the ruling party for more than 70 years, bears political and moral responsibility for what happened.

But of course, it is necessary to differentiate between the responsibility of the party leaders and that of the millions of communists who toiled honestly and selflessly and fought courageously for the motherland's freedom and independence. The Moscow City Party Organization resolutely rejects attempts to cast aspersions on them or counterpose their interests to the people's aspirations.

Errors and miscalculations in carrying out reforms in the context of perestroyka itself have played a negative part in reinforcing the crisis processes that rack the whole of society today.

After showing political boldness in April 1985, the country's new leadership began energetically to implement transformations. But it has now become clear that it did not succeed in formulating a consistent concept of perestroyka foreseeing all the major consequences in a vast country like the USSR.

Since the 27th CPSU Congress, and particularly since the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the Central Committee and its Politburo have lagged behind the developing events, among other things as regards questions of

wide democratization in the CPSU itself, and have not infrequently operated on a "trial and error" basis.

III. Ways of Overcoming the Crisis

Assessing the dominant trend in world development, one cannot fail to see that it includes many socialist values. The social orientation of production is developing and mechanisms are being set up to involve working people in the management process. Production and distribution, the education sphere, and social security are increasingly coming under society's control. This represents confirmation in practice of the key ideas of the founders of scientific socialism, especially Marx and Lenin, although the historical timing and forms of progress toward such a society have proved in many respects different.

The party's main aim today is to lead the country out of the crisis on the basis of a conscious socialist choice. To this end it is necessary, while preserving social stability, to embark on a path of radical transformations of the state and party and to consolidate social currents and groups that stand up for the working people's vital interests.

In the Political Sphere

Proceeding on the basis that our goal in the foreseeable future is a society of humane, democratic socialism, we advocate the implementation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of man, peoples, and nations, harmony of interests of the individual and society, and social justice, in which free development for each is a condition of the free development of all.

We therefore consider monopoly and diktat unacceptable in politics, ideology, and information, wherever they originate.

No one should hamper the emergence and activity of parties and sociopolitical movements that observe the Constitution and laws of the USSR.

The time is ripe for the conclusion on a voluntary basis of a union treaty permitting a diversity of forms of national state structure in the country, given unconditional observance of civil rights throughout its territory. The treaty must take full account of the legitimate right of peoples and nations to self-determination and balance the interests of all the republics, including a sovereign RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

In the Economic Sphere

It is time to draw practical conclusions from what the best world experience has demonstrated. A modern highly efficient and socially oriented economic system incorporates:

—equal rights for different forms of ownership, with a trend toward growing significance for collective forms of labor, distribution, and management;

—the market as the main economic regulator;

—a ramified system of state levers for economic management, under social control;

—a consistent antimonopoly policy;

—powerful social and ecological protection mechanisms.

In the concrete conditions of an intensifying crisis in the country, the country's economic policy must necessarily be aimed at freeing economic initiative and enterprise and providing the greatest possible incentive for honest, highly efficient labor.

The Moscow City CPSU Organization supports a course of consistent economic reform and phased transition to a regulated market in goods, finances, and resources.

This requires legislation to allow the transfer of a certain proportion of state enterprises and property to collective and private leasing and share ownership, the speediest possible implementation of antimonopoly measures, and credit and financial reform.

At the same time the destatization of the economy must not become just another campaign "sent down from above," and the emergence of new forms of ownership should not be artificially imposed or accelerated through the granting of any exclusive privileges.

It is necessary to make provision for a social protection system capable of preventing a sharp decline in living standards for the working people and all poorly off strata of society and to ensure the establishment of guaranteed social security for citizens at the level of a minimum livelihood.

Effective state price regulation should be retained for the basic food products. It is necessary to ensure the growth of all pensions and grants to take account of inflation and provide job finding services, retraining, and compensation for redundant workers and unemployment benefit. Without this, the transition to the market system will inevitably provoke a social explosion.

The government should take account of the trade unions' position on questions of employment and social guarantees.

In order to formulate a collective CPSU position on the main avenues of real economic reform, this question must be included on the agenda for the 28th congress.

The switch to a regulated market should take place only with the consent of the people in a unionwide referendum.

In the Spiritual Sphere

Today more than ever before it is necessary to create the conditions for the manifestation of a free, creative, and moral individual personality. Its development is possible only given the preservation and revival of the fatherland's spiritual and historic values and the priority

development of culture, science, and education as necessary sources of progress for a society with a guaranteed future.

The CPSU acknowledges the individual's right to freedom of the creative quest and association in creative unions and supports the formation of charitable and cultural foundations.

Art should be able to draw on state and public support; it is impermissible to put it on a purely commercial footing.

Education should remain accessible to all, regardless of differences in families' incomes.

IV. Reform of the Party

We have reached the point where a slowing down or further delay with the radical reform of the party will inevitably lead to the loss of the people's confidence in it. We must not lose the opportunity that still remains to transform the CPSU into a modern, active political force with real social prestige.

What form should the renewed CPSU take?

It is a party of social progress and reforms that sets itself the goal of progress toward democratic socialism.

It is a party that has resolutely discarded old, invalid ideas about society and draws on humanist principles and the best achievements of world civilization.

The ideological legacy of Marx and Lenin is the main, but not the only theoretical source of the present-day ideology of a communist party faced with a highly complex task: to formulate a new concept of socialism and the communist future.

It is a party operating in accordance with the USSR Constitution and laws and defending its own right to political leadership in honest, democratic elections to the organs of state power.

The party's parliamentary activity and its participation in the work of soviets of people's deputies is an important task, but not the only task of the CPSU. At this stage activity by party organizations in the labor collectives to defend the working people's political and social interests and wide political work among the masses are not only justified, but necessary. It is up to the primary organizations themselves to decide how to do this.

At the same time political life today demands a strengthening of the CPSU's influence in the neighborhoods, through the development of territorial party organizations and clubs, with the communists having a free choice as to where to be on the party register and do their party work.

The CPSU should struggle to extend its social base and enlist supporters and political allies.

The real course of events shows that the party cannot speak in the name of all the people. Society is becoming increasingly complex; social and political forces of different orientations, some of them diametrically opposed, have emerged within it. In these conditions the potential base of the renewed party is the broad strata of society, first and foremost workers, rural workers, the intelligentsia, and employees, who link their fate in one way or another with socialism.

A profound democratization of intraparty life is long overdue. The CPSU should be a living, developing political organization; it should not subjugate or suppress its members, but rally them around a common goal and the democratic means by which this goal can be achieved. Its policy should be formed from the grassroots structures upward.

We advocate reducing the number of tiers in the party and the numbers of full-time party workers.

Total clarity should be achieved on questions of party ownership and the use of monetary resources and all privileges and benefits associated with CPSU membership should be abolished.

The party must ensure the paramountcy of the political, organizational, and financial rights of primary organizations and make activity by various horizontal structures the norm.

The CPSU should become a truly democratic party based on the power of the party masses, conscious discipline, and party comradeship. It should operate on the basis of democratic principles that combine the universal electoral principle, glasnost, and regular accountability of higher organs to communists with obligatory subordination of the minority to the majority and fulfillment of the decisions of party congresses and conferences.

In this context intraparty democracy should incorporate reliable guarantees of minority rights and the right of every communist to his own opinion in the course of discussion of questions of principle in party policy and access to the party media.

Recognizing the possibility of the existence of several political platforms within the CPSU, we should guarantee communists the right to uphold and propagandize these platforms, among other things through the party press. At the same time the formation of autonomous factions with their own internal organizational structure and disregard for the CPSU Statutes and the decisions of party congresses are to be deemed unacceptable. In the conditions of a multiparty system such factionalism only destroys the party and provokes splits.

The greatest danger for the party is an artificial split among communists who adhere to the positions of perestroyka and advocate the renewal of the CPSU.

Their consolidation is both necessary and possible. Ultimately it is the guarantee of the party's emergence from the crisis.

While acknowledging the CPSU Central Committee's right to the assessment of the situation in the party that was expressed in the well-known "CPSU Central Committee Open Letter to the Country's Communists," we believe that this important political document should have been discussed at a CPSU Central Committee plenum. We are convinced that in the conditions of a detailed intraparty debate it was inappropriate deliberately or otherwise to urge organizational measures against participants in that debate.

The party's ideological and organizational basis and its present-day political line can be finally determined by the congress, and only the congress.

Moscow's communists are in favor of the maximum expansion of the rights of republic party organizations. They should be fully autonomous in their organizational structure and tactics for action. But it would be a serious mistake to curtail interparty ties between republics and renounce the formulation of a joint policy and solidarity among the country's communists.

The question of the formation of an RSFSR Communist Party must be resolved. The Russian party conference, consisting of 28th congress delegates, should be the constituent congress of the RSFSR Communist Party. It is expedient to hold the elections of its leadership organs after the partywide CPSU congress.

The 28th congress should offer personal assessments of the work of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat and the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee and substantially renew the central party organs.

We call on all communists who advocate the renewal of the CPSU not to take, at this crucial time, any hasty, ill-consdered action leading to the weakening of the party, still less its disintegration, but to seek mutually acceptable decisions and strive to ensure that the coming congress adopts them as the fo. ndatic.s of its program documents.

Rostov Oblast Party Conference Reported

90UN2009A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 5 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA staff correspondent G. Belotserkovskiy: "Without Smoothing Things Over"]

[Text] The results of discussing the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the congress, the new CPSU Statute, and the Open Letter of the CPSU Central Committee to the communists of the country "For Consolidation on a Principled Basis" were summed up at the Rostov Oblast party conference. It will gather again after the congress to hear a report of the obkom [oblast party committee] and elect its new membership.

A day or two in advance, the conference delegates received a brochure prepared by the public opinion research center of the obkom. Its employees surveyed more than 2,000 communists from the most varied groups of the populace.

The picture of the condition of party affairs turned out to be far from glowing. Cases of leaving the party have become more frequent. Fifty-seven percent of "refuseniks" are workers with formidable party tenure and of the most capable age at that. Almost nobody from among those who have been expelled from the party have filed appeals with superior organs.

Let us look at the following fact. Barely half of all the communists polled consider their primary organizations to be authoritative. This regularity is almost mathematical: The higher the rank of the committee, the less it is respected. It is not the press with its "cooked" articles and not the "journalistic pranks," as one of the orthodox speakers at the conference put it (incidentally, only five percent of those polled are on his side), that are to blame for this, but rather much more real things. This includes the pollution of the CPSU with random people, the non-constructive activities of the party committees, and even the "flight" of party committee leaders to soviet and economic work...

Obkom First Secretary V. Suslin, who delivered the report, said that last year the strength of the oblast party organization dropped by 5,467 people. This year, another 3,000 people were added to them in the first four months alone. Party discipline has noticeably declined. Primary organizations are indifferent to the future of the communists who leave.

These alarming phenomena are explained to a great degree by tension in our society, the shortages of everything, and the growing aggravation of political life. The formations, movements, and groups which quite recently were underestimated became vigorously involved in our political life. Under the storm of criticism, which is both constructive, justified, and indiscriminate, some of the communists panicked and began to abandon the party "ship." V. Suslin stressed that under the circumstances a reasonable and sober approach is needed; any abrupt turn "to the left" or "to the right" may bring about irremediable consequences.

It was noted in the report that the communists of the oblast consider the documents of the Central Committee an adequate basis for consideration at the congress, and view them as a considerable step along the road of renewal. This is not at all a ritualistic phrase: It corresponds precisely to the data of sociologists.

Here are the main ideas of the report in brief. The CPSU is a party of not only the working class, but also all workers. It should strive for "communist prospects"

(incidentally, 90 percent of the delegates are against renaming the party). The CPSU remains the ruling party (80 percent of the citizens of Rostov said "yes" to the communists in elections to the local soviets), and for this reason it should not relinquish its influence on the economy which, of course, should not be officially imperious. A radical economic reform is needed, but "the burden of the proposed price increases cannot be placed on the shoulders of the populace."

During a break in the proceedings, I came up to a turner-borer of the Atommash Association, Yuriy Zhuravlev, and inquired about his impression of the report.

The worker said: "It is balanced, and it provides food for thought. However, personally I would have heard out the proponents of other CPSU platforms—the Democratic Platform and the Marxist Platform. Incidentally, there are such people in our Volgodonsk delegation as well. Say, Markin signed up with the 'democrats,' but I am afraid he will not be given the floor (this is what happened—note by G. Belotserkovskiy). It is a pity, because our discussion could proceed in a livelier manner. So far, the debate has proceeded along the same lines, especially when nomenklatura comrades come to the speaker's stand. Everything goes as it used to—'we approve,' and that's the end of it... Incidentally, I am a member of the editorial board of the conference. Here is the draft, and it does not satisfy me. I am going to fight for changing a number of wordings. Look at, for example, this one: 'The delegates believe that the idea of building a communist society in our country was and continues to be the goal of the CPSU.' This is too general, just as in school textbooks."

I also heard other thoughts on this topic, and also from a worker:

"I have striven for communism all my life, although I did not know what it was. However, there was a goal. What about now?"

An emotional presentation by a secretary of the Atommash Association, N. Sakirko, was memorable as well. Defending the principle of democratic centralism as interpreted by Lenin, the speaker observed that it will not work unless a mechanism protecting the rights of a minority is developed. As of now, it is not even clear what can be considered a minority—one party member, two, three, or over 10? Not a single platform as much as breathes a word about this.

N. Sakirko stated: "The absence of an analysis of what we have arrived at after 72 years in power is a big drawback of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform. We also need an honest analysis of the last five years: Why are we going downhill? The ones to blame for failures and stupid bungling should be pointed out. As a congress delegate, I will insist that members of the Politburo give personal reports, each on his own, rather than substitute the report of the general secretary for this."

At the conference, there also were clearly wholesale attacks "from the right" against the main ideas of the documents on which the discussion focused. Expressions were heard which, thank God, we are already beginning to forget—"grist for the mill" and "frantic faction members." Let us note that workers were not the ones who said this. By all signs, the worker-communists are mainly in favor of a definite renewal, but also in favor of the equally definite preservation of social guarantees. Their voice was exactly a quite significant factor which made it possible to adopt a generally balanced resolution at the conference.

Rally Protests Tatar AES Construction

LD2606013790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2100 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Video report from Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic by correspondent I. Latypov, identified by caption; from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [Latypov] The Tatar Nuclear Electric Power Station [AES] is being constructed in spite of arguments by Kazan scientists to the effect that the wrong site has been chosen, something that could result in a catastrophe. This was done contrary to the will of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet which had adopted the decision to halt the construction. The USSR Ministry of Atomic Power is heading for an open confrontation with the peoples of two large autonomous republics which do not want to be pawns of dubious projects. [video shows protest rally, close-ups of several slogans]

Work on Nuclear Submarine Reactors Opposed

OW0706050090 Khabarovsk Television Service in Russian 0910 GMT 04 Jun 90

[Vyacheslav Zdorikov video report; from the "Far East" program]

[Text] I have a letter in my hand. This letter came to the "Far East" program and, as you know, viewers express their likes and dislikes regarding the program in their letters; that is, what they write in these letters is usually their reaction to our program. Well, the "Far East" already has several regular viewers who always write us letters. This is a letter from the Sovetsko-Gavanskiy Rayon of Khabarovsk Kray. It says here that the nuclear reactors in nuclear submarines will soon be dismantled in one of the bays along the Pacific coast of Khabarovsk Kray. Our correspondent Vyacheslav Zdorikov offers his version of this event. [video shows crowd in front of unidentified building, man holding Geiger counter, sign reading "We are for a clean ecology."]

[Zdorikov] Journalists were not invited to this rally, which was held in the town of Vanino in Khabarovsk Kray, because the rally was not planned. People were drawn here by the feeling of the current danger which they experienced after reading an article in the rayon

newspaper VOSKHOD. The article said that, not far from the rayon center, work has begun on dismantling decommissioned nuclear submarines. Is it not possible, writes the article's author, that, as you read this issue, an invisible trail of radioactive dirt is creeping along above you, seeping into your apartment? Perhaps your children's hair has already begun falling out, as happened in the Ukraine after the Chernobyl tragedy? [video shows Zdorikov interviewing unidentified woman previously seen on speaker's platform]

[Begin recording] [Zdorikov] [Name indistinct], passions have been brewing in this square. The rally developed quite spontaneously, without preparation. What has drawn people here?

[Woman] People have been drawn here to prevent what happened at Chernobyl. It so happens that last year I was in Moscow, at the USSR Institute of Pediatrics, and I saw children doomed to die, without hair. A lot of the children were of different ages. All of them were from the Ukraine. Therefore, I did not know about today's rally either, but I happened through by chance. So, I joined the rally, I will sign a petition, and I will defend the position that we won't stand for this. [end recording] [video cuts to additional crowd scenes, people signing petitions, speakers with bullhorns]

[Zdorikov] On Peace Square, signatures began to be collected for a resolution protesting the Pacific Fleet Command's plans for dismantling old ships along the shore of the Tartar Strait. So, one must share the people's anguish, while also telling them how the journalists of the rayon newspaper VOSKHOD have played on their feelings. In pursuit of cheap popularity, they published material in which conjecture about work supposedly already begun replaces accurate facts. People's deputies who visited the naval garrison announced that there is nothing like that there now, and that nothing is foreseen in the near future.

But staff members of the Pacific Fleet have such plans. Seaside residents, led by deputies from the city and rayon soviets, expressed opposition to the military's intentions. They are even prepared to take drastic measures, right up to blockading the gulf to keep out nuclear submarines.

Article Predicts Return of Strikes in Kuzbass

PM2506124790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Dispatch by V. Kostyukovskiy: "Hot Summer in the Kuzbass"]

[Text] Kemerovo—Strike or no strike? This is what has been worrying everyone, if not since the fall, then in any case since the beginning of the year. And not just in the Kuzbass. The potential of this relatively small but densely populated and over-industrialized oblast is simply too great. Its role in the economy is too great for this issue not to become highly topical for the whole of the country. Furthermore, last year's events have shown that a spark struck somewhere at a small mine in Mezhdurechensk is capable of setting alight virtually all the coal basins. Such are the times we live in.

Will there be a repetition of the strike? There is no one who would dare to answer this question unequivocally. For the time being the pits and open-cut mines are operating, but the situation is very tense. And it is not just because the situation as regards the supply of food products and other material goods in the Kuzbass is worse now than it has ever been. Even the panic which arose after N.I. Ryzhkov's report to the USSR Supreme Soviet session did not cause an explosion, although it is virtually impossible to replace what has been bought up in a flash. At present social tensions are largely based on realities of a political nature. The workers movement which sprang from a concern about the contents of the miners' "lunchbox," and subsequently moved on to demands for economic independence and regional economic accountability, is now steadily shifting the focus of its interests to questions of ownership and power.

Many of the movement's activists have been elected deputies to various levels of soviets ranging from republic level to local level. In a number of cities, Kemerovo, Kiselevsk, and Myski, for instance, they head the soviets. And a group of deputies "on the platform of workers committees" has formed in the Oblast Soviet. The soviet's first session was marked by flareups of confrontation. Many people believe that it all started with a demonstrative walkout from the hall by the said group. Cursory acquaintance with the stenographic record reveals that it started even earlier. As soon as the session opened certain deputies deemed it their duty to criticize and denounce "cliquishness and factionalism" and to call on people to give up their "ambitions." This gradually hotted up the atmosphere.

What has caused the differences? Is it the candidacy for the post of chairman? The council of workers committees put foward M. Kislyuk, economist at the "Chernigovskiy" open-cut mine, while the obkom [oblast party committee] backed A. Tuleyev, chief of the Kemerovo Railroad. The root causes lie deeper however, in the platforms presented by the candidates (for candidates read respective blocs).

To put it in a nutshell, it is a clash between the positions of the radicals and the advocates of a phased transition, between the supporters of a radical switch to the market and the adherents of the principles of planning, between the proponents of the idea of the creation of a free enterprise zone in the Kuzbass and the opponents of "selling out Russia." Although it must be noted that neither platform rejects the idea of the socialist choice.

There is another point which is of fundamental importance. The group ["on the platform of workers committees"] proposed that the soviet chairman be elected on the basis of an all-Kuzbass referendum, while the majority insisted that the procedure established by law

be followed. As a result M. Kislyuk and his comrade Yu. Rudolf withdrew their candidacies for this post as a matter of principle. Aware of their responsibility for the fate of the radical economic program which they had put forward, the leaders of the workers movement deemed it necessary to obtain the backing of the population. As you can see, the dividing line here again passed between the supporters of a radical breakthrough toward democratization, and those who prefer to approach this goal step by step.

But are the conflicts really impossible to settle? After all, as regards the elections even the majority, while defending their stance, concurred that it will be better to switch to direct elections when the law has been changed. The dispute between the two platforms can, of course, be resolved only through their cooperation and mutual enrichment. Judging by the first steps of A. Tuleyev, chairman of the oblast soviet, and M. Naydov, chairman of the soviet executive committee, they are on the whole in the mainstream of the carefully thought-out workers committees' program which was elaborated in cooperation with economic experts (again I cannot but draw an analogy: You will recall the rejection by the USSR Government of the criticism of the "phased" program for improving the economy and its rapid transition to a more radical option). Furthermore, it is possible to claim that a "coalition government" is taking shape in the Kuzbass: M. Kislyuk is deputy chairman of the soviet executive committee responsible for the economic reform, while Yu. Rudolf heads a commission on the work of soviets.

Is it really only time that can reconcile us and help us to overcome our conflicts? Yes, time is a powerful, but not the only, factor. Of utmost importance is the sides' willingness to engage in patient persuasion and compromise and the ability to hear out the other side without intolerance, to listen to others' viewpoints, no matter how unorthodox they may be.

Many party officials last year sorely lacked this kind of willingness and ability. Especially after the strike had ended and the strike committees not only did not disband but turned into permanent workers committees and even formed a new sociopolitical organization—the Union of the Working People of Kuzbass.

"Anyone who joins this union, must surrender his party card!"—was the insensed reaction of certain Kuzbass party committee secretaries. What kind of a threat is that?! People are surrendering their party cards without prompting anyhow. And what is more, as has been observed, it is by no means the most expendable members that are leaving the party. It is time to stop consoling ourselves with the thought that with the shrinking of the party's ranks a kind of natural "purge" is taking place. The Kemerovo Oblast organization, for instance, the largest beyond the Urals, lost more than 9,000 members last year. During the first quarter of the current year almost 4,000 people left, and in April alone a further 2,500.

The obkom did not include many workers, and after the oblast party conference and free nomination directly from primary organizations, they became even fewer. And that despite the sharp politicization of the situation caused by the mass strike—is that not a paradox? No, it is perfectly obvious that in the past the presence of "workers representatives" was regarded as necessary and, openly or otherwise, places were set aside for them on committees, bureaus, and presidiums, and in delegations. Now when democratic elections have been held the true picture has emerged. It has proved worse than was expected.

New leaders and activists have emerged, they have taken up their places in the workers movement, in the soviets, and the trade unions, but there are not many of them in party organs. What is more, a new facet, which I noticed at the recent congress of independent workers movements in Novokuznetsk, has appeared in their attitude toward the party. When the congress was in the process of adopting a resolution on relations with the CPSU, the following opinions rang out from the hall: "Do we really have to do this? Let the communists themselves sort out their party, we have plenty of problems of our own..." Indifference and alienation—this is what spells an even greater danger for the party than the former squabbles about Article 6.

Naturally, the crisis in the Kuzbass party organization is partly a reflection of the state of affairs in the party and society as a whole. However, I cannot but recall one opportunity for reinforcing confidence in itself which the obkom has missed. It occurred in August of last year, immmediately after the strike, when First Secretary A.G. Melnikov proposed to the plenum that it adopt a decision on holding early report-and-election meetings in committees up to and including the obkom. At that time, the committees would have, unquestionably, been reinforced by communists from among the leaders of the workers movement, people with a truly active life stance. The plenum rejected this proposal.

During last year's strike the strikers' main demands were addressed to the actual, "unofficial" [neformalnyy] ruler of the mining cities—the Ministry of the Coal Industry without which no house is built, nor kindergarten is opened. This still applies today. The agreement with the miners was signed by the CPSU Central Committee Commission, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions]. The country's government guaranteed its implementation by a resolution which it adopted. Judge for yourselves against whom the miners' dissatisfaction will be directed if the strike repeats itself.

These are no gloomy predictions, it is a realistic forecast borne out by recent events and documents. The congress of workers movements adopted a resolution on the situation in the country's coal and ore mining regions: "...the relevant state departments, and the USSR Council of Ministers as a whole, are failing to implement the commitments which they have adopted as a result of

the agreements between the government and the miners. Social tensions in mining cities are mouting." Here is a quote from the resolution on attitudes toward the government: "In order to overcome the political and economic crisis, the country needs a government whom the working people trust." On 10 May a two-hour warning stoppage was held at the "Usinskaya" mine (Mezhdurechensk again), demanding that Minister M.I. Shchadov and his apparatus be dismissed forthwith. "By their inertia, the Ministry of the Coal Industry and local authorities are pushing the people toward a no-confidence vote in the government."

And finally, another document—the appeal of the Kuzbass council of workers committees to labor collectives: "The time which has elapsed since July 1989 has shown convincingly that in putting forward economic demands, we have achieved virtually nothing. In view of the working people's mood as regards the necessity of holding a political strike, the council... is proposing to workers collectives that they revive the workers (strike) committees at enterprises and in cities and establish new ones wherever they did not exist before.... It is necessary to elaborate measures in preparation for holding an all-Kuzbass strike so as to prevent it from breaking out spontaneously...

It appears that the summer promises to turn out hot again. If what none of us wants happens nonetheless, no one will be able to complain that the "weathermen did not forecast it."

Kursk First Secretary Views Local Soviets

90UN2015A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 22 28 May-03 Jun pp 1, 2

[Report on interview with USSR People's Deputy Aleksandr Seleznev, first secretary of the Kursk CPSU Obkom and chairman of the oblast soviet, by IZVESTIYA correspondent Vladimir Kulagin; date and occasion not specified: "'What Should Be Scrapped?'"]

[Text][Kulagin] Aleksandr Ivanovich, what do you, chairman of the oblast soviet, think about such a "symbiosis" as "kolkhoz [collective farm]-sovkhoz [state farm]-party-soviet rule?" Do you believe such a status in the soviets to be temporary

[Seleznev] First, about authority. And it is true that its present structure is rather heavy. Although the fact that the first secretary of the obkom [oblast party committee] heads the oblast soviet, that in cities and rayons it is principally first secretaries of city and rayon party committees, and that in villages it is secretaries of party committees of kolkhozes and sovkhozes who head their soviets, this does not yet speak of usurpation of authority in the soviets by party apparatchiks, as it is now fashionable to put it. And, indeed, party secretaries do not head soviets everywhere.

It is not worth wasting energy on arguments about who should head a soviet. There is a more important task—to transfer the levers of real authority to the soviets.

We have become so carried away with rejecting the experience of many years, and even that acquired during perestroyka, that at times we simply behave without foresight. For the soviet, and the party as well (I have in mind not only the CPSU), cannot be some kind of an end in itself—it is only an instrument for achieving a fully defined objective of one or another social force.

Thus, is it sensible to arrange an outright breakdown of the entire party apparatus and all authority? Already the apparatus is not the same: half of it, and even more, is made up of new replacements who went through the school of perestroyka. And we do not feel that comfortable within the framework of new management structures. As for the inveterate conservatives, then, we have become convinced that there are enough of them in all social and governmental organizations—from primary party organizations to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

And the fact that there are many party functionaries (I am not bothered by this term) in many soviets is even logical to a certain extent in the present stage of perestroyka: Because, for the time being, we have only one leading party. It does not have many strong competitors in elections. And, perhaps, for the first time since 1917, the CPSU came to authority in a democratic way. Although I can agree that in some districts there were election violations, but here one must seriously think about perfecting the Law on Elections itself. On the whole, the people expressed their attitude toward the new soviets.

It is possible that in the near future the CPSU will have to fight for the right to form soviets under multiparty conditions. And that there will be a different distribution of forces in the soviets. However, it is now already different here and there—take the Moscow Soviet of People's Deputies and the Leningrad Soviet of People's Deputies. And this means that the structure of local authority can also change substantially.

For the time being, I believe that for the benefit of the work it is necessary to rely on the best party cadres in the renewal of the soviets. If we are people of action, and not words, then we must not neglect even the tiniest grain of positive experience (and, believe me, it exists) that was "earned" in the bowels of the command-administrative system which is currently censured, but, of course, which does not contradict the ideas and objectives of perestroyka.

[Kulagin] Still, you will agree, Aleksandr Ivanovich, that there is very little that is new in the Kursk Oblast Soviet itself. I have in mind most of all its executive committee and managers of directorates and branches. And, alas, all of the faces on the permanent commissions and in the presidium are familiar. It already became apparent at the first session that it will be difficult for new ideas to break

through the solid ranks of deputies who are party apparatchiks, and the nomenklatura elite. Does this not disturb you?

[Seleznev] It puts me on guard. However, I would not categorize all deputies as conservatives, as you put it, from the nomenklatura elite.

Secondly, it is convenient for some, of course, to lay everything on the apparatchiks. This also has become a kind of dogma. In the work of the soviets, it seems to me, it is necessary to proceed not from ideological and other dogmas, but from the daily needs of the people. I visited many rayons of the oblast after the elections. What struck the eyes? Those who like simple answers, as the saying goes, almost grabbed me by the throat, inquiring: What will happen tomorrow? Honestly, I do not know. Although I will try to change life for the better.

The problem here is that the weariness, distrust, and apathy in society are not decreasing, and the social realities are such that quick prosperity should not be counted on. And it is too early to amuse oneself with illusions, inasmuch as the socio-economic base of changes has not been firmed up yet. In fact, each step has to be taken against a wind of disorders and poor economic management.

We are getting more and more bogged down in nonproductive ideological and political arguments and interethnic conflicts. It is time to cool off with sober practice and everyday work, otherwise we will not be able to extricate ourselves from the abyss of blind dogmatism and we will not be able to shout down the supporters of barracks socialism. Radicalism of creation and not radicalism of destruction—this is what people need now more than anything.

And at times it seems to me that we are not even humiliated by poverty, the lack of good roads, and the badly organized living conditions around one's dwelling. However, we are unexcelled experts in the amount of complaints about the poor life. Indeed, we blame everything on foreign countries... One cannot help but mention here the Chekhov hero who put it simply but wisely in a peasant way: If you want to sow wheat, then first dig up the stumps, remove all of the rocks, then plow, and walk and walk, and walk and walk, until you are able to succeed in what you are doing... We have very few real plowmen and little patience. We shun manual labor.

[Kulagin] You also have the deputy corps in mind?

[Seleznev] To a certain extent, yes. Because in previous soviets a deputy was simply not allowed to engage in manual labor. The apparatus did everything for him.

Unfortunately, even now many have not switched over to the wave of new demands. Let us take the very basis of any soviet—its budget. It was always a well-kept secret even for the deputies. The other day I inquired in the Main Planning-Economic Administration of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] about the allocation of resources. I was given a breakdown, but only for the main directions. I say: But no, give me an analysis for each position, and not in hundreds of thousands and millions for capital expenditures, but down to the ruble... And, I sense, that the economist-planners kept in the background. Because for whole decades, none of the deputies ever demanded a scrupulous report from them for each ruble put into the local economy. Now the soviet will really take part in the allocation of its budget. Openly and publicly.

[Kulagin] Aleksandr Ivanovich, since we have touched on the holy of holies—the local budget, it would be nice to know what kind of priority directions in the socio-economic development of the oblast will get financial support?

[Seleznev] Among the numerous problems, housing construction, health service improvements, the full supply of the commodity market, social reconstruction of the village, and the assurance of ecological safety were placed in the foreground by the voters. I will cite only a few figures, so that our problems and capabilities will become clearer. In the next five years, it will be necessary to build more than 60,000 apartments. For housing construction, we are now allocating a third more resources than in the previous five-year plan. We are also attracting the savings of the population and granting privileges to individual builders.

The social renewal of Kursk villages now occupies a special place in our plans. The villages are getting old. As before, the young people are leaving for the city. So, we have to hurry.

Incidentally, we have already begun to receive a return from recent additional investments in industry. This year we will be able to market commodities worth almost R2 billion, which will exceed the annual earnings of the residents of the oblast. We are beginning to implement a program to saturate the market with washing machines, electric mixers, food processors, and other locally produced intricate domestic appliances. To expand the output of such commodities, we will also use accumulated hard currency.

[Kulagin] So, can one conclude that local authorities have finally gotten completely involved in social policy?

[Seleznev] Yes, I think so. Because in our country, before perestroyka, the values of life were distorted to a significant extent: The interests of the country did not always coincide with the interests of the people, not to mention the individual person. The person was dropped out of the socio-economic process and was transformed into a faceless formula: everything for the people, for the glory of the Motherland. And despite the fact that all of us—both the party workers and the deputies—imagined ourselves to be the servants of the people and swore loyalty to communist ideals, we forgot that a country is strong primarily because of the riches of each person.

It is for this reason that we should not now be frightened by the variety of forms of property and the multistructural character of the economy. Political pluralism cannot develop successfully without economic pluralism. All of this is in one bunch. Let each person and each collective determine independently where they are to live, what they are to engage in, whom to join, and whom to trade with—whether these are leased industrial enterprises and kolkhozes, family farms or cooperatives, farmsteads or single farms... Otherwise, we will again force the economy into a dead end of stagnation, or, as one of our deputies put it, into a swamp of eternal rest. And the main thing is to be logical in the selection of a social policy, not to dash from side to side, and not to retreat.

I suppose that we must in the first place form a principally new view of the economy, the market, free enterprise, and another approach to new forms of property.

In our country many people for some reason drift: To the right, then to the left, then to NEP [New Economic Policy], then to a firm hand, then to democratic socialism, then to flourishing capitalism...

And, indeed, we do not always respect laws. But they should work this way: On the one hand, to guard against dictatorship and philosophizing, and on the other hand to arouse into action. In other words, the law places on any soviet responsibility not only for increasing authority, but also for inertia. I am personally impressed by the centrist style of leadership. It responds more to the nature of our still wavering social conscience, our intolerance, and our lack of restraint both in the assessment of events and of personalities.

Comparison on Congress Appeal to Republic Parties

PM2206104790

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian on 22 June carries on the front-page of its Single Edition the "Appeal from the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Constituent Congress to the Union Republic Communist Parties." Comparison of the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA item with the translation of the Moscow TASS International Russian version published in the 22 June Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, beginning on page 83, reveals the following variations:

Page 83, column two, second paragraph of the item, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...of the RSFSR, wish to address... (deleting "[as received]" notation);

Page 83, column two, fourth paragraph of the item, second sentence, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...basis of the unified program and statute documents.

The congress... (rewording);

Page 83, column two, fifth paragraph of the item, second sentence, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...spiritually liberated democratic system.

The RSFSR... (deleting "political", picking up sixth paragraph);

Page 84, column one, first paragraph, sole sentence, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...activity upon the principle of internationalism and favors equal cooperation among peoples and respect for the... (rewording);

Page 84, column one, second paragraph, second sentence, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...the basis of the common striving toward humane... (rewording);

Page 84, column one, third paragraph, sole sentence, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reads: ...our great country.

[Signed] Delegates to the RSFSR Communist Party Constituent Congress. (adding signature).

Comparison on Gorbachev Remarks to RSFSR Party

PM2206105990

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 22 June 1990 carries in its Second Edition on pages 1 and 2 a TASS report on the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Constituent Congress. Comparison of the PRAVDA report of Gorbachev's remarks, entitled "RSFSR Communist Party: Starting Out," with the translation of the Moscow Domestic Russian version published in the 22 June Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, beginning on page 86 reveals the following variations:

Page 86, column one, PRAVDA version begins: This question is very important. It was raised during the debates. And I had been planning to speak out on certain problems and answer questions in my speech at the end of the congress—this may not be possible because there are so many questions that if I started answering them all it would take us another two or three days.

As for the... (deleting first six paragraphs; adding passage; deleting Well,");

Page 86, column two, fifth full paragraph, sole sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...and to making use of the... (deleting "broad");

Page 86, column two, sixth full paragraph, sole sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...even tolerate, for many years, the use of this phrase commodity-money relations. That's the first point. Yes, I too have the right to say it. Because you talk about this everywhere. However, I won't go far, I'll return to the subject.

Radical economic reform... (rewording, adding passage, picking up seventh paragraph, first sentence);

Page 87, column one, second full paragraph, first sentence, PRAVDA reads: ..and so forth were all preceded by conferences at the Supreme Soviet... (rewording);

Page 87, column one, third full paragraph, second sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...VAZ works and the Sumy works... (deleting phrase, editorial note);

Page 87, column one, sixth full paragraph, sentence four, PRAVDA reads: ...Presidential Council and the discussion at the Supreme Soviet... (rewording);

Page 87, column one, eighth full paragraph, first sentence, PRAVDA reads: Second, we simply failed to think through the following thing: that discussions and consultations should have... (rewording);

Page 87, column two, first full paragraph, first sentence, PRAVDA reads: Now there will still be work on the concept, and very major work at that. There has been criticism and very serious comments. There will be a great deal of further work, and along constructive lines. All... (rewording);

Page 87, column two, second full paragraph, penultimate sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...we care about. Our aims are to find new... (rewording);

Same paragraph, last sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...what it's about. [Applause]. (adding "[Applaus]" notation).

Western Republics

Belorussian Democratic Party Favors Secession

LD2506140190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1245 GMT 25 Jun 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] In Grodno the constituent conference of the Democratic Party of Belorussia [Demokraticheskaya Partiya Belorussii] has taken place. The new party stands for the proclamation of the independence of the Belorussian state and its secession from the USSR.

Belorussian Deputy Premier on Chernobyl Cleanup

LD2406094290 Moscow TASS in English 0932 GMT 24 Jun 90

[By TASS Correspondent Aleksandr Kryzhanovskiy]

[Text] Minsk, Belorussia, June 24 TASS—The Belorussian parliament has decided to set up a special commission to assess the activity of governmental and other officials, connected with the cleaning up of the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident.

Deputies sent invitations to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and former Belorussian leaders—Politburo member Nikolay Slyunkov and Georgiy Tarazevich, chairman of the Commission for Nationalities Policy and Ethnic Relations of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Council of Nationalities—to take part in the discussion of the issue.

Belorussian Deputy Prime Minister Alekander Kichkaylo delivered a governmental report about the clean-up work. He said more than 3.5 billion roubles had been spent for this work in the republic and that 12,000 houses and flats and hundreds of community cultural centres had been built for the evacuated population.

However, he noted, the Soviet Union has no scientifically substantiated concept of safe living conditions for people in areas contaminated by radionuclides. These areas make up 30 per cent of Belorussian territory and have a population of two million.

The state programme for the cleaning up of the consequences of the accident in the republic provides for the additional evacuation of 118,000 people from 527 populated localities, which will require huge funds.

Kichkaylo said many governmental and charity organisations from Holland, Spain, West Germany, Italy and other countries, as well as international organisations, including the UN European Economic Commission, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Health Organisation, were rendering aid to Belorussia.

The European Parliament unanimously voted for the provision of the Belorussian population with emergency medical and food aid.

One hundred experts from international organisations have arrived in Belorussia to help work out recommendations to make the living conditions safer.

Moldavian Supreme Soviet Declares Holiday

LD2606055190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Text] A session of the Supreme Soviet of Moldavia today passed a declaration on the republic's sovereignty....This event occurred yesterday. It says that the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova is a sovereign state. This document should provide a basis for drafting the republic's future constitution, and for the preparations leading to the signing of a Union treaty by a commonwealth of sovereign states. There were many disagreements among the deputies during the debates at the session. The parliamentarians managed to adopt a number of decisions. Here are some of them: The session decided that from now on, June 28 will not be celebrated in Moldova as Liberation Day. August 31 will be a non-working day—the holiday of (Limba Noastre), or Our Language—in honor of the laws which have declared the Moldavian language the state language. It is also reported that in Kishinev the 28 June, Pavlik Morozov, and Katovskiy streets have been renamed.

Tiraspol City Suspends Moldavian Constitution

LD2506222290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2100 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] The Tiraspol City Soviet has decided to suspend the laws of the republic of Moldavia and the republican Constitution in the territory of the town. A decision has been adopted to the effect that the USSR Constitution is valid in the town.

Soviet Bulgarians in Ukraine Call for Autonomy

LD2406165290 Moscow TASS in English 1640 GMT 24 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Liliya Novitskaya]

[Text] Odessa June 24 TASS—Soviet Bulgarians and Gagauz living in compact communities in neighbouring southern districts of the Ukraine and Moldavia voiced their desire to set up territorial autonomies. They held today a meeting of many thousands in the central square of Bolgrad, Odessa region.

Bulgarians are responsible for 60 per cent of the population in the district. There are also many Gagauz who settled here in the first half of the 19th century.

There seemed to be no interethnic, including language, problems before. As a rule, people spoke their native language in their families and Russian was the language of interethnic communication.

The voluntary society to promote the development of Soviet Bulgarian culture, named after Saints Cyril and Methodius, was formed in Bolgrad soon after perestroyka began. The society seriously raised the language problem as its members assess the state of the language as critical.

The sphere of Bulgarian language use has catastrophically shrunk and it is not taught at school, society activist Viktor Stoyanov told TASS. After Ukrainian was declared the state language in the Ukraine, Bulgarians are afraid of further language discrimination, he said.

Similar fears were also caused by the declaration of Moldavian the state language in neighbouring Moldavia. Stoyanov said local Bulgarians see the way out in the foundation of a territorial autonomy within the Russian Federation.

Local authorities tried to improve the situation. Optional Bulgarian language lessons were introduced in 13 schools in Bolgrad district and Gagauz—in three schools. Training of Bulgarian language teachers has been started.

Optional native language studies cannot solve the problem, Stoyanov said. There should be compulsory Bulgarian language, history and culture studies at schools.

Local Bulgarians and Gagauz are also troubled with growing territorial claims of the Moldavian National Front.

Reportage on 28th Ukraine Party Congress

Commissions Formed

LD2206142790 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] The 28th Ukraine Communist Party Congress continued today in Kiev for the third day. The congress continued discussing the renewal of the party and democratization of its life. At today's session several working commissions were formed: Among other issues, they will examine the question on privileges of the party apparatus, the use of money from the party treasury, and examine documents relating to Chernobyl.

Leninism Discussed

LD2206094890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1816 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] Kiev, 21 June (UKRINFORM TASS)—Lenin and the present—this is the outstanding theme running through many speeches at the 28th Ukraine Communist Party Congress [CPUK]. The delegates today continued discussing the report from the CPUK Central Committee and other points on the agenda.

Recently, it was noted at the congress, it has become almost shameful to look to the Leninist theoretical legacy. The reason is probably not that we have ceased to respect our outstanding compatriot, but that we are afraid of being accused of dogmatism. This is a profoundly mistaken fear in the conditions of the political struggle, it was stressed at the forum. Leninist thought is a reliable and proven ideological weapon which should not be forgotten.

The delegates looked to Ilich's theoretical legacy as they spoke about reviving a party along Leninist lines which is not afraid to refashion itself in order to lead the masses. It was noted that the CPSU will be strong and capable of action if it guarantees the principle of the integrity of the party as an internationalist detachment of communists on the basis of the single set of CPSU rules, taking account of the new status of the communist parties of the union republics, and if the principles of the territorial and production construction of the party and of democratic centralism operate, filled with new content which guarantees the rights of the minority.

The delgates expressed proposals on improving the structure of party committees. In particular, it was proposed to make standing commissions and problem-analysis and consultative groups the main units within them.

Much space in the speeches was devoted to the activitzies of the UKCP in the conditions of a multiparty system. It was stressed that the "informal" organizations which currently emerge one after another put forward various goals, from moderate, universally democratic aims to the openly antisocialist and anti-Soviet ones. While giving a decisive rebuff to political opponents, the

speakers pointed out, it is necessary persistently to seek allies, adhering to the Leninist "left-wing bloc" tactics. They also turned to Lenin's ideas when the party's publications were being discussed and when a number of other problems was discussed.

Program Principles Adopted

LD2506191790 Kiev International Service in English 2300 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] There was a heated debate at the congress during adoption of the program principles of activities of the CPUk [Communist Party of the Ukraine]. Presenting the project, head of the corresponding commission, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPUk Leonid Kravchuk in part said:

[Kravchuk speaks in Ukrainian with superimposed English translation] The draft had been considered for over two months. For that period over 7,000 amendments and proposals were suggested. We had taken into account the most important of them. The document has become more constructive, precise, enriched with new ideas, both in the process of discussions at the commission and in the process of the congress' work. I'd like to note that we also included in the draft document those proper constructive amendments which were expressed by the representatives of the democratic platform.

[Announcer] In one of the documents, the congress unanimously expressed an idea of proclaiming state sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Soviet Republic]. The forum of communists views a sovereign Ukraine's statehood as transition of all power to the people, as the supremacy of the republic's laws, as the Ukraine's independence in solving issues of political, economic and cultural life of the republic, as stopping the action of the all-Union laws, which do not correspond to the treaty between the Ukraine and the center, as making the Ukraine a real subject of international relations, having the right to establish direct economic and trade relationships with foreign states.

Another document adopted at the party congress, was a statement on protection of population from the after effects of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which is very vital for every resident of the Ukraine. That is why the statement was adopted practically unanimously. One more document which was adopted by the congress, is entitled: For revival of the Ukrainian village. The forum called on the party, on all constructive forces of society, all the population to provide a priority development of the countryside of the Ukraine, using our huge economic potential of the republic.

Today, at the party congress, the new composition of the Central Committee and the Auditing Commisison of the CPUk was elected. [passage omitted]

Today in Kiev, there was also an organizational plenum of the Central Committee of the CPUk, which elected the secretaries and Politburo members.

'Democratic Platform' Threats

PM2506132590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by own correspondent S. Tsikora: "Uncertain Balance of Opinions. At 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress"]

[Text] Kiev—But for the fact that some delegates to the 28th republic Communist Party Congress spoke in Ukrainian, you might have thought that you were not in Kiev but at the Russian Communists' Constituent Congress in Moscow.

There has been the same sharp criticism of the top echelons of party power, the same ideas on the crisis in society and...the same lack of concrete suggestions on ways out of the prevailing situation. Several dozen speakers have addressed the plenary sittings inside the Ukraina Palace, more than 100 have addressed the commissions, but so far the consolidating idea—how the Ukrainian Communist Party should live henceforth in conditions of the multiparty system and how it should conduct itself in fundamentally new conditions of the republic's adoption of sovereignty—is missing.

This creates a certain nervousness, there are increasingly harsh words and assessments from the platform, and people have begun to walk out during speeches. Three times I. Grintsov, secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, was interrupted by the noise in the hall and eventually he was unable to say all that he had planned. No wonder then that outside in the corridors people found the choice of speaker highly selective. In any event, young communists representing a local party club in Lvov and sitting alongside the seats reserved for the press were unable to read out their statement, which is just one short page, even after waiting their turn at the microphone for three days.

The trend in one direction quickly produced an opposite counter trend. Representatives of the "Democratic Platform in the Ukrainian Communist Party" spoke out against the restoration of the old "tough" procedures. After giving his interpretation of the present moment and the causes and consequences of the crisis in society and the party, delegate V. Khmelko read out eight proposals whose non-adoption by the present congress, in his words, could result in the supporters of the Democratic Platform, which constitutes "approximately 40 percent of of the party," leaving the party, V. Khmelko claimed.

What are these eight proposals about? Here are a few of them: "to condemn all the crimes committed under the party's leadership," "to legalize communists' right to organizational unification on the basis of platforms," "to recognize the right of republic Communist Parties to

adopt final decisions on all questions connected with the rights which will be granted by the new Union treaty to the competence of the republics" and also to prohibit all parties from creating their own organizations in administrative state organs, the KGB, the Internal Affairs Ministry, and the Army and to consider it impermissible to combine leading posts in the party with a leading post in social or state organizations.

The delegates' reaction to the possibility of staging a "separate congress of that section of the Ukrainian Communist Party which wants to stand on the basis of a unifying Democratic Platform" is as yet unknown. The Democratic Platform representative was the last speaker to address the plenary sitting. Thus we shall probably learn the delegates' opinion on this statement during Friday. This is going to be a difficult day for the congress.

On that day in the congress' work it is planned to nominate and discuss the candidates for the top posts in the Ukrainian Communist Party. So far two candidates have been named from the platform—S. Gurenko, presently second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, and A. Ruzhitskiy, head of the Cherkassy party oblast committee.

First Secretary Warned

PM2406194990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Sergey Tsikora: "Ukrainian Communist Party Has New Leader"]

[Excerpts] Kiev—The Ukrainian delegation will be coming to the 28th CPSU Congress with a new leader—Stanislav Ivanovich Gurenko, who has been elected first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. [passage omitted]

S.I. Gurenko is 54 and grew up in the Donbass, in a teacher's family. He has two children and three grandchildren. He has the degree of candidate of economic sciences. His engineering career culminated in the post of director of a major enterprise and his economic career in the post of deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

"I am in favor of perestroyka," S. Gurenko said in his program speech at the congress, "but the pace of it should be matched to the extent of society's readiness to accept that pace: with regard to both program goals and their implementation."

It is interesting to note that, according to a sociological poll among the congress delegates (654 people), S. Gurenko gained the highest rating among nominees for election to the post of Central Committee first secretary. However, this did not prevent people from speaking of his shortcomings during the discussion of the candidacies.

"To ensure that the style of your future work does not cause trouble for the republic party organization," M. Voloshchuk, a delegate from Transcarpathia, declared from the congress platform, "we would ask you to polish certain aspects of your character. I am referring to the arrogance that sometimes creeps in and the occasional inability to patiently hear out the opinion of others who have a different view of matters. If you bear in mind these 'features' of your character, I think you will be a good leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party."

The congress delegates made a highly original assessment of the Central Committee report "On the Political Situation and the Main Directions of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Activity at the Present Stage," formulating their thought as follows: the political line is deemed correct, but practical work to implement it is deemed inadequate.

The second stage of the Ukrainian Communist Party Congress will be held after the end of the 28th CPSU Congress.

Ivashko Nominee Fails in Ukraine Election

LD2506190190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] The session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet resumed work after an interval in Kiev today. Vitaliy Andreyevich Masol, a candidate for the post of chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, a post he held before, was discussed. He was nominated by Ivashko, chairman of the republican Supreme Soviet. The candidate, however, failed to get the required majority of votes.

Dnepropetrovsk Detention Center Riot Ends

PM2506093190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Stepan Troyan: "In Dnepropetrovsk Remand Center"]

[Text] Dnepropetrovsk—On 19 June special militia detachments from Donetsk, Zaporozhye, and Dnepropetrovsk oblasts numbering over 250 men entered the house of detention No. 1 zone at 0600 hours.

That was the beginning of the concluding operation to restore order in the institution where mass riots had begun on the night of 13-14 June. IZVESTIYA has already reported the extraordinary incident.

"In the slightly more than four days the 'rebellion' lasted 2,100 people left the house of detention," your correspondent was told by I. Gladush, the republic's minister of internal affairs. "They were immediately sent to other houses of detention in the Ukraine. By the morning of 19 June there were about 400 people in the zone—in basements, attics, and elsewhere. As a rule they include those who have nothing to loose—drug addicts with previous convictions and recidivists."

Early in the morning special detachments moved in to take those who had smashed and burned everything which could be destroyed and burned. Several prisoners

armed with files, knives, rods, and chains, tried unsuccessfully to offer resistance. Firearms and special means were not used in the concluding operation. There are no wounded or seriously injured among the militiamen.

The operational investigation group of the republic's prosecutor's office and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Internal Affairs Ministry have begun to clear the site of the incidents, the territory of the house of detention is being studied, and the damage caused is being ascertained. The names of those who organized the "rebellion" are being established.

As I am sending this report the house of detention has been surrounded by the relations of those who were serving prison terms or under investigation there. The last of the "rebels" are sitting peacefully on the grass in the institution's inner courtyard.... As of now it is known that five prisoners have died.

First Crimean Tatar Village Since 1940 Built

LD2506064190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] The first crimean tatar village celebrated its inhabitation on 23 June, according to INTERFAX. The village has been built on land allocated by the local authorities to those Crimean Tatars who are returning home after their forcible removal from there in 1940. There are 54 houses in the new village. These have been built and funded by the new settlers themselves.

Caucasus

Azerbaijan President Suspends NKAO Soviet

LD2606121490 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 26 Jun 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] By a decree of Mutalibov, Azerbaijan's president, the powers of the Soviet of People's Deputies of Gadrutskiy Rayon, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], and of its executive committee have been suspended until new elections are held. The duties of the executive committee have been laid on a provisional organizational bureau of Gadrutskiy Rayon. After this decree Grigoriy Bogiyan, first secretary of the Gadrutskiy Rayon Party Committee, was expelled from the Azerbaijan Communist Party.

Grant Mukulmyan, secretary of the Stepanakert City Party Committee, in an interview to a correspondent from the Armenian newspaper KOMMUNIST, stated that in his opinion the same thing faces all leaders of party and soviet bodies in the NKAO.

Recently Vachagan Grigoryan, first secretary of Martunskiy Rayon Committee and USSR People's Deputy, was expelled from the party. The bureau of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers have examined the question of the situation in the NKAO in connection with the suspending of the activities of the city soviet of Gadritskiy Rayon. This action is seen by the Armenian leadership as provocative and immoral and contradictory to the CPSU rules and the USSR Constitution.

Two Azerbaijanis Killed by Armenian 'Bandits'

NC2506112590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Excerpt] Kemal Salimov, 53, and his son, El'chin Salimov, 14, were treacherously murdered by Armenian bandits in Lachinskiy Rayon's Kohnekend (?on 21 June). Asad Kerimov, 24, the only witness of the incident, who has remained alive by chance, has disclosed this regrettable incident.

The employees of the procuracy in Lachinskiy Rayon and the military servicemen who arrived at the place where the crime was committed discovered the bodies and a number of cartridges that were fired from automatic weapons. The search for the criminals continued the next day. The operations and inquiry group of the USSR Interior Ministry has also been (?alerted). A search is being carried out for the bandits in three of the Armenian residential areas in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast that are close to Kohnekend. As indicated by the previous incidents in Lachinskiy Rayon, the culprits of crimes committed in that rayon come from these residential areas.

Major General Malushkin, deputy head of the USSR Interior Ministry troops in the northern Caucasus and the Transcaucasus regions, said the following during the funeral ceremony: We shall make every effort to see to it that this tragic incident will be the last. Forgive us for being unable to protect the people who are close to you. [passage omitted]

Azerbaijan Constitution Amended, President Elected

PM2305102590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by Asim Dzhalilov under "Direct Line" rubric: "Amendments Introduced Into Republic Constitution"]

[Text] Baku—A session of the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet has adopted a Law "On Amendments and Additions to the Republic's Constitution (Basic Law)," and has established the post of president of the republic.

The deputies examined proposals made by a plenum of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee on amendments to the wording of articles of the Azerbaijan SSR Constitution which define the role of the republic's Communist Party and other political parties and the various social organizations and mass movements in the administration of state and social affairs.

A number of Constitution articles which examine the question of ownership, recognize the multiplicity of its forms, and ensure that they all have equal protection were ratified at the session in their new wording.

Important amendments were also made to the section "The National-State and Territorial-Administrative Structure of the Azerbaijan SSR." Thus, Article 68 envisages that the Azerbaijan SSR will autonomously resolve all questions connected with political, economic, social, and cultural building in the republic and its territorial-administative structure.

A draft law "On Establishing the Post of President of the Azerbaijan SSR" was ratified unanimously. As a result of a secret ballot, A. Mutalibov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, was elected president.

The session elected Deputy E. Kafarov chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

Azerbaijan Council of Ministers Meeting Reported

NC2506133690 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 23 Jun 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The republic's newspapers reported today that the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers Presidium held a meeting on 22 June. Gasan Gasanov, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers Presidium, addressed the meeting. He briefed the members of the Council of Ministers on the results of the earthquake which occurred in Iran and in the southern parts of the Azerbaijan SSR. A government committee was established under Mustafayev, deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers Presidium. The committee has begun its work.

Meanwhile, Gasan Gasanov has sent a telegram to President Hashemi-Rafsanjani of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Oktyabrskiy Rayon First Secretary Replaced

NC2506132990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Text] The Oktyabrskiy Rayon Party Committee [Raykom] has held a plenum to examine the question of organization. In view of his election as secretary of the Baku City Party Committee [Gorkom], Rustamov was relieved of his post as first secretary of the Oktyabrskiy Raykom.

(?Farashi), formerly deputy chief of the Organizational Party Work and Cadre Affairs Department of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, was elected by secret ballot as first secretary of the Oktyabrskiy Raykom and bureau member.

Agayev, first secretary of the Baku Gorkom, participated in the work of the plenum.

'Relative' Peace in Kedabekskiy Rayon Disrupted

NC2506135590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Text] The relative peace in the towns of Kedabekskiy Rayon near the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic has again been disrupted by the bandits of the inauspicious Armenian National Army, who opened automatic fire on Karavelli town in the mountains. However, the self-sacrificing military servicemen confronted the terrorists. The extremists escaped after meeting with strong resistance. Fortunately, no one was killed.

Regardless of the grave situation, the shepherds of the local establishments in the border towns continue to put themselves at risk by taking their herds to the grazing grounds without escorts or arms. The situation in the rayon is still tense as a result of the disruptive activities of the Armenian bandits.

Armenian Communist Party on Elections, Situation

NC2705120590 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0500 GMT 27 May 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] A consultative meeting took place at the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee on 26 May. It examined the election of delegates from the Armenian Communist Party to the 28th CPSU Congress, the holding of repeat elections for the republic's people's deputies, and a number of issues related to improving the situation in the republic.

The meeting, which was attended by Armenian government and party leaders, was addressed by Vladimir Movsisyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee.

Continuing Tension on Armenian Border Viewed

LD2506220990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 25 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] It must be admitted that interethnic relations remain, as before, an acute problem in our country. A report from our correspondent from a buffer post between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]:

[Correspondent M. Mamedov, identified by caption] This outpost is probably the first in the country set on the border between the two Union republics. It is located in Kelbadzharskiy Rayon of Azerbaijan at a height of almost 3,000 meters where the mountains seem to touch the sky. Several such outposts have already been established on this section of the border. Almost daily clashes with fairly well-armed so-called Armenian guerrillas have become a real test for the soldiers of the internal troops. [video shows misty grassy landscape, armed

troops entering a hut and crossing a hillside, then correspondent interviewing A.N. Chervertkin, military commander of Kelbadzharskiy Rayon]

[Chetverkin] Literally this night, at 0120, a group of guerrillas from the Armenian side fired on our outpost. The servicemen were forced to open return fire, as a result of which the guerillas disappeared.

[Mamedov] Tell me please, will any kind of engineering installations be set up here?

[Chetverkin] Definitely. Discreet obstacles will be set up in front of every outpost—barriers with barbed wire, signal mines, and searchlights have also been set up. Everything will be done to ensure that a decisive rebuff will be given and not to permit the penetration of Armenian guerrillas on the territory of Azerbaijan.

[Mamedov] And yourself, how do you assess the fact that there are borders in the republic?

[Chetverkin] All in all, it sounds strange. We Soviet people are not accustomed to this.

[Announcer] Yes indeed, it sounds strange if not to say almost absurd. But evidently one has to resort to any measures which may defend people from death.

Probe Into Yerevan Shootings Continues

PM2506103390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with Colonel of Justice A. Korotkov, deputy chief of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office Investigation Administration, by own correspondent N. Burbyga under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA: place, date not specified: "Yerevan, 27 May—Investigation Continues"]

[Text] As reported earlier, criminal proceedings have been instituted in connection with the events in the building of the Yerevan railroad station and in the vicinity of Nubarashen settlement. Investigation groups have been set up and an investigation is under way which is checking the details of what has happened. Colonel of Justice A. Korotkov, deputy chief of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office Investigation Administration, who has just returned from Yerevan, gave an account of the findings to an IZVESTIYA correspondent.

[Burbyga] Anatoliy Pavlovich, two opinions are still being expressed in the republic press: Some people are claiming that civilians began to shoot at the servicemen, while others are accusing the troops of having provoked the incident. Where is the truth? I realize that the investigation has not been completed yet, but could you, as far as possible, tell us what is already known?

[Korotkov] We have questioned all the servicemen involved in the incident, with the exception of two—A. Tukhtabayev and O. Zhovtyanskiy—who sustained multiple firearm wounds, and have reconstructed in detail the situation prevailing in the railroad station building on the morning of 27 May. As reported earlier, internal troops servicemen were escorting a train from Kafan to Yerevan, ensuring the safety of passengers at the risk of their own lives. When the train arrived, they entered the railroad station building and went to the hall for the military. Shortly afterward Lieutenant Tereshchenko went out into the street to see whether a vehicle had arrived for them from the unit. He handed his assault rifle to a serviceman. When he returned to the hall, he saw some armed people and was immediately shot in the back. This is how a "neutral" eyewitness, draftee Sergey Karkin, recalls the events:

"On 27 May at around 0730 hours I arrived at Yerevan station together with other draftees and we went to the hall for the military. Apart from us there was also a man and a woman with large traveling bags. I remember these people well because I borrowed a knife from them to open a can.

"A group of internal troops servicemen, 11 of them, entered the hall and settled at the other end of the hall. There was a lieutenant with them. Handing his assault rifle to a servicemen, he walked toward the exit. I noticed that the magazine on that weapon was clipped in position. The servicemen's assault rifles were on their backs.

"At approximately 0850 hours a number of people came into the hall. Some sat down on the benches, and some went to the other end of the hall. A bearded man stopped in the middle of the hall next to a column. He had a pistol in his hand. He shouted something and fired into the air. Those who had come in with him started shooting. I saw several servicemen fall down straight away, and rushed toward the servicemen over by the bench then back again. I do not know how long I would have rushed about, but for a soldier who threw me to the floor. I managed to notice that the serviceman who was holding the lieutenant's assault rifle also opened fire. The firefight lasted between five and seven minutes. All the servicemen were wounded and were bleeding heavily. I was asked whether I could handle an assault rifle should the shooting resume.... I also recall that when it all started a serviceman started bundling the man and the woman out of the door to save them. And the moment that they were out of the door, he was shot in the back."

Others who were also present and witnessed this drama have given similar descriptions. So the servicemen acted correctly in the circumstances, and what is more, they tried to protect not only their own lives and the weapons entrusted to them but also took all measures to save the lives of the people who happened to be in the hall.

[Burbyga] As I understand it, you have only questioned people in military uniform. It would be a good thing if, in the course of the investigation, you could give a hearing to eyewitnesses and victims.... As far as I know, none of the attackers has been detained....

[Korotkov] As for the sphere of responsibility of the Military Prosecutor's Office, I can tell you right now

what the military did and where and how weapons and armored vehicles—which, incidentally, were needed—were used. The attackers were firing from at least six positions using machine guns and even a grenade thrower. All this has been captured by the troops.

The investigators of the republic prosecutor's office have a more difficult task. They are being accused by certain leaders of informal associations of virtually betraying national interests and their people's cause.

[Burbyga] How do the attackers get hold of weapons?

[Korotkov] We have established that revolvers captured from internal troops and an assault rifle from an internal affairs department were used during the attack on the escort at the railroad station.

During the firefight at the gasoline pump weapons stolen from military units were used. Thus those who were fighting were criminals, they had illegally acquired weapons.

Unfortunately, not everyone understands this. Instead of helping the law enforcement organs to expose the criminals and confiscate their weapons, certain people are sheltering them and treating them virtually as national heroes. This explains why the investigation is not progressing as fast as we would like.

[Burbyga] I have heard it said that this was a "stage-managed" operation aimed at discrediting the movement of democratic forces....

[Korotkov] In our view, it is much simpler than that. There are a great many informal groups of all hues in the republic which want weapons. Where are these weapons to come from? From the military. This is why they engage in crime to acquire them.

The attack at the station had a sequel a few hours later at a gasoline pump where Warrant Officer Arutyunyan and two servicemen were robbed of their assault rifles. Unidentified persons fired at two military vehicles carrying servicemen which had arrived at the scene. I must add that the servicemen were even shot at from the attic of a house, which put the residents of the house in danger. An armoured group was dispatched to the gasoline pump to establish order.

As a result of the ensuing firefight and clearing of the road 46 people were injured and 21 killed. They included Afghan veteran Lieutenant Colonel V. Chekmarev.

[Burbyga] What, in your opinion, can rectify the current siutuation in Yerevan?

[Korotkov] The nervousness and tension—all this makes life in the republic explosive. Above all it is necessary to confiscate the weapons, explosives, and munitions which criminal groups have captured and are illegally keeping and also transport facilities, and to flush out criminals from the city, especially armed criminals who are discrediting the national movement by their actions.

Armenian 'Fidain' Groups Profiled

PM2106115090 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 23, 17-24 Jun 90 pp 4-5

[Dmitriy Radyshevskiy article: "Fidains"]

[Text] Thousands of silently-raised fists cast the only shadow on the sun-scorched square in Yerevan. Stiffened corpses with shot skulls were lying there. On May 27 people gathered for the burial of those killed in clashes with internal troops.

On that day all soldiers stayed in their garrisons and only those who opposed them stood beside their coffins, young fellows in semi-military uniforms with submachine-guns pressed to their chests. In Armenian they are called fidains, but in the language of the central press—"extremists"...

"Defender of the Motherland" is how the word fidain is translated. In Armenia this name is given to popular heroes. This is what the soldiers of independent Armenia in 1917-1918 were called; the same name is now given to soldiers of the self-defence detachments which appeared in Armenia in 1988.

Razmik Vasilyan, financier, commander-in-chief of the Armenian National Army (ANA)—the largest armed formation, numbering 10,000-15,000 people: "We are still very far from being called an army, although we take the oath and have servicemen's identity cards and a military hierarchy. We are members of the emergency volunteer corps armed with old guns who defend our frontiers. We need our army: the Soviet Army (SA) was always late—Sumgait, Baku, the Iranian border—and it cannot guarantee the security of Armenia. But an army needs weapons, that's why sometimes our boys snatch them up like hungry people grabbing at a morsel of bread... But the ANA has made a statement that if anyone leads the fidains into conflict with the Soviet Army he will be regarded as enemy of the nation."

Today fidains, apart from the ANA, also include a dozen independent formations subordinate to the Coordinating Council. The total number is about 40,000 people, consisting of men from all kinds of professions and with no age restrictions; among them are grey-bearded fathers of families, students, officers discharged from the SA, young soldiers who left their units (the spring conscription has been suspended by a decision of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia). Most fidains retain their jobs, at the same time guarding the Armenian-Azerbaijan border—"we are given time off to do this". Paid fidains—commanders and others—live on donations. The arms mainly consist of sporting guns. But according to Armenia's KGB from 3,000 to 4,000 are armed with submachine-guns. According to the same source the flow of home-made arms and explosives was sharply reduced after dozens of cases when these "home-made" explosives blew up in their hands.

We met various groups of fidains: the headquarters in Yerevan, armed groups of political parties, detachments

stationed in frontier districts, rank-and-file fidains—ordinary rural dwellers who work in their fields along the border, but are ready, at a signal, to join the self-defence units. We had not chosen the best time to get acquainted. Almost every unit had lost some of its members in Yereva on May 27. Although there was no trace of the anti-Russian sentiments used by the central press to scare us, we did not receive any reply to the following questions:

What is the explanation for the strange chain of coincidences? On May 26 All-Union Radio broadcast that one of the members of the Karabakh Committee appealed to listeners to rise up against the Soviet Army. The Supreme Soviet of Armenia made an immediate inquiry and the reply was that it had been a mistake.., but on the same day, May 26, Central Television spoke about the "provocation of Armenian nationalists". On the eve of the shooting, May 27, Lieutenant-General Ivan Shilov, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Colonel-General Yuriy Shatalin, GOC of the USSR internal troops and high-ranking officials from the USSR Procurator's Office and the KGB arrived in Armenia. The incident occurred on the eve of Armenia's Independence Day—on that day the fidains, by agreement with the Yerevan City Soviet, were going to hold a review of troops in the square—where they later mourned their comrades-in-arms (why would they have ruined their own parade?). The shots that enabled the military to immediately suggest the imposition of a state of emergency in Yerevan, only to be turned down by the Supreme Soviet, were fired on the eve of the last, decisive round of elections of deputies to the Supreme Soviet of Armenia, at which representatives of unofficial organizations should have won a major victory...

Why do the eyewitness statements from civilians and military people differ to such an extent? Why did the fidains act to thoughtlessly, countering eleven submachine-guns? Why was the attack not prevented, if plans were known in advance? And if they did not know, then why were 35 people among the party that launched the surprise attack killed, whilst there was only one casualty among those taken unawared? It is also not clear why the bullets fired by the internal troops entered the arms of victims, passed through the intestines and made their exit through the stomach.

The Armenian United Movement (AUM) is a sociopolitical organization which enjoys the greatest popularity in Armenia, as shown by public opinion poll. The AUM has declared its principal aim to be the struggle against provocative attempts to incite hostility towards the Russian population and the Soviet Army in Armenia (to the credit of the local authorities let it be said that they held the same stand and will accuse no one, till the investigation is completed, of provoking the tragic events of May 27. They are trying to establish calm by actively pursuing contact with the AUM.).

Vazgen Manukyan, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of Armenia, member of the AUM Council and the Karabakh Committee: "The Supreme Soviet has already passed a decision on forming detachments to protect law and order and ensure self-defence. We understand that large numbers of armed young people pose a threat—their detachments must be merged with the state structure. Anyone who refuses to submit to this decision will be considered illegally armed—a criminal. The issue of fidains has to be settled in a different way. We hope that our new Supreme Soviet will pass a resolution on the legalization of the Armenian army, therefore there is now no sense in breaking the already established structure..."

We got to know each other at the funeral—a tall, limping bearded fellow in a sailor's stripped vest who clutched at his left side all the time. Samvel Torosyan is a scout from the detachment Tigran the Great, a former Soviet Army paratrooper and punch operator, now a student at the Philology Department of Yerevan University. "After Sumgain," he said, "we formed a student detachment in Yerevan to protect meetings from the militia. Then we got hold of some sporting guns and went to the mountains of Karabakh to defend the villages. I have spent two years in battle and was wounded in the leg. We live for a month in the mountains, then spend a week at home. I'm not the only student among us: the commander lets us go down to the city to take our exams... Six people from our detachment were killed on May 27. I was wounded and the bullet is still lodged in my ribs. In two years of war against Azerbaijan 120 fidains have been killed. Here 35 people were murdered in two days... Now the detachment is stationed near Yerevan. When the number of robberies and rapes increases we stand on duty in the city alongside the militia."

Ashot Manucharyan, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of Armenia, member of the AUM Council and Karabakh Committee: "For two months we have been engaged in negotiations with internal troops, the KGB and the Procurator's Office on disarming the fidains. But, firstly, this would cause bloodshed and secondly, there is still a need to defend the border. The idea of uniting the fidains and militia is not popular with the fidains or the people—the very word 'militia' causes resentment. To my mind the major difficulty for the fidains is that agents of forces which would like to convince people of the danger of democratization in Armenia by the use of provocation can easily join their liberal ranks. I am sure that precisely these forces provoked the attack on the buildings of the City Party Committee and the KGB in Yerevan, as well as the incident at the railway station. Had the Soviet Army wished it could have disarmed the fidains as well as Azerbaijani gunmen in a week. But all this time they did not put up any resistance and the Soviet Army even lent its weapons including tanks. This is a political game. As soon as there is the threat of one of the two republics gaining sovereignty this is followed by an aggravation of the sitaution on the border and state of emergency."

Vazgen Sarkisyan, a writer, commander-in-chief of the AUM dedtachments: "Moscow has assumed the role of judge in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict without taking a firm stand. We have been punched below the belt one, two, three times. And they just let it happen. We are compelled to retaliate. Hopes for a fair settlement of the Karabakh problem by the central authorities were not justified. Karabakh is being used by them as an apple of discord by which it keeps both Republics from secession from the USSR. Only our two peoples can solve this problem by the democratic election of their parliaments. We are not at logger heads with the Azerbaijani people—there are no villians here, it is just that many Azerbaijanis are becoming toys in the hands of the enemies of our mutual freedom."

Look—Mount Ararat, just stretch out your hand. But in reality it is four kilometres away. The River Araks is the frontier post. But for Armenians it is much nearer—300 meters—to another state—the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. When people here say "abroad" they have this in mind... We jolted across a field in a Soviet jeep with fidains from the frontier village Avshar. They make the round of the fields, canvassing for AUM candidates at the forthcoming elections. We got out the car some 100 meters from women working in the field. Seeing armed men they rushed to the village...The border is not far.

Vardan Vardanyan, art critic, chairman of the Military Council of the Armenian National Army: "Now it is comparatively quiet on the border the Soviet Army is posted along it on both sides. We withdrew our detachments from the area to avoid accidental clashes with the Army and our possible disarmament. Some of the detachments stayed on the border, building livestock sheds there and growing crops, although they are permanently ready for battle. The unit is deployed in camps 50-80 km from the border, training young fidains in the military skills and helping local residents to run their farms. Others returned to the cities—we help the militia to combat the increasing crime rate. Under the guise of fidains many people are involved in rackets. We set up our own tribunal and ruthlessly punish criminal behaviour. Of course, young fidains suffer from idleness and having once savoured the taste of weapons they do not want to put them aside. But our discipline is strictly and we can't allow ourselves to weaken. There are many rumours that the Soviet Army is again ready to withdraw from the border. In that case there will be a new threat of clashes with the Azerbaijanis. Neither side wants this. But there are a number of provocateurs on both sides..."

We are at the ANA camp of the Tumayanyan District. Scorching heat in the mountains. But as we turn into a mountain pass we are able to sit down in the snow. "The whole winter we were in conflict up in the snow," says Mais Mirzoyan, commander of the detachment, a driver from Yerevan. "I have a wife, children. They ask me: 'Oh, Lord, why have you taken up the gun? Don't you have other things to do?' Seventy per cent of fidains are family people, like me. They, too, would be happy to stay at home. As soon as this army is put under state control I'll leave on the very first day and let the professionals fight. But for the time being it's impossible, there's no one to defend Armenia..."

At the election meeting a candidate from the AUM said: "There must be a multiparty system, but the parties must not have armed detachments like those which now exist. There must be a single army subordiante to parliament..."

The detachment of the Republican Party consists of bearded fellows in black shirts with white gun holsters. The aim is Armenia's immediate secession from the USSR; they are waging a struggle against everyone who opposes this. "They are honest fellows," one of the AUM leaders said about them, "only it's just as well there aren't many of them: the latest book they've read is Rob Roy:" "I don't want to kill," a lad from that detachment shouted after the burial on May 30, "but I must kill! They cut the throat of our wounded men like sheep." I don't want to kill, but I must kill. Deadlock.

We went to the Eraskhavan village, the Armenian border with Nakhichevan. In January a battle was fought there for three days, with artillery and bazookas. Now an APC is there on the road, near the railway barrier. One hundred metres away, in Nakhichevan, a wine-bottling plant was destroyed during the exchange of fire. Together with a soldier and two fidains we packed our water-bottles and went there to investigate. "Aren't you afraid?" I asked one of the fidains. "After all, it's 'enemy' territory. What if they take you prisoner?" "I shan't surrender," he answered seriously. Unbuttoning his shirt he showed a pistol shoved into his belt. "Then you need potassium cyanide sewn into your collar," I said. "I do," he replied seriously and let me feel his collar...

A war is going on. With reconnaissance, headquarters, victims and POWs. With armies. We saw one of them from inside. We can reflect on all this an make our own conclusions, we can moralize and appeal to them to stop, to change their mind... But this won't help matters. Words are powerless here. And until a political solution is found, the conflict should at least not be aggravated. For Armenians to hear words like "extremist" addressed to fidains is an insult. The fidains are at once the pride of Armenia and her woe.

Officer on Troop Casualties in Trancaucasus

PM2106114190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 90 First Edition p 4

[Lieutenant General I. Matveyev, chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff directorate, answer to letter under the rubric "We Answer Readers' Questions": "In the Heat of the Conflict"]

[Text] Dear editor! KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has given the names of some servicemen who died upholding law and order in the Transcaucasus. But how many of our Army and Navy servicemen in total were killed or wounded in

connection with the interethnic feuds and actions of extremists in the transcaucasian republics?
[Signed] Ye. Syrtsov, Moscow

At the editor's request Lieutenant General I. Matveyev, chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff directorate, answers this question.

In connection with the interethnic conflict in the Transcaucasus from 19 January to 18 June this year 37 Soviet Army and Navy servicemen died, including eight officers, three warrant officers, 26 soldiers and sergeants, and also a warrant officer's wife. Among the dead were 28 Russians, five Ukrainians, one Belorussian, one Kazakh, two Azerbaijanis, and one Estonian. Twenty-six people died at the hands of extremists and 11 people died as a result of accidents, some involving a breach of security measures.

In addition, 153 Army and Navy servicemen were wounded or injured. Ten died from their wounds.